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With this being said your statement being that things are different when they went on those ops because they were allowed to 'use a wartime stance' is just garbage. The ONLY way they could be construed to have made a difference is if the Soviet navy was intentionally operating stupidly at other times. Hence my use of sarcasm.
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Yet in case of the Soviet force this was the reality as:
- transfer routes (bases->Atlantic)
- tactics (evasion tactics)
- equipment (self propelled imitators)
were wartime restricted (with exceptions - ie Atrina).
This follows the "surge" logic Soviets in general and Soviet Navy in particular used.
While one could disagree with that logic (ie citing the possibility of a surprise attack) it nonetheless existed. If one does not understand this logic one makes the common mistakes in understanding the Soviet forces and the scenarios, under which those would be deployed and thus the the likelly outcomes of such scenarios.
The prime example (other than the nuclear forces we have discussed here already) would be the large, conventional land war in Europe post Ogarkov reforms, where many analysts assumed that, for example, NATO would be capable of conducting the lengthy (30-90 days) re-deployment of forces under REFORGER and that Soviet Navy would be attempting to deny such re-deployment and as such was built for this mission, and through that perception lense the Soviet Navy (including the Naval Aviation assets it had) was analysed.
(I applogise for not citing fully, as I am pressed for time and capability to respond adequately)