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I never heard of a substantiated account of a Soviet SSN holding sustained trail on a US SSBN during the 60's, 70's, or 80's. Ever.
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This is probably because you are not familiar with the Soviet experience like your comrade here.
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SSBN surge capability? That defeats the nature of forward deterrence using SSBNs. SSBNs are safest when submerged, not tied to a pier, vulnerable to an offshore TLAM strike.
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Yet this is exactly what the doctrine was and still is, but it does imply, as I have mentioned before, that leadership would conduct the surge before the initiation of the hostilities. This doctine also applies to other assets, for example land mobile ICBM TELs.
The surge stance allows the capability to push more assets into the patrol areas during threatened period that the constant at sea patrol stance would allow, but it does have the disadvantage that you have mentioned.
As to the specific threat that you have mentioned, the SSBN bases (and other nuclear deterent related fascilities) were covered by an air defense zone, with multiple layers, including SAM layer. Here you could see the change in capability vs bombers and CMs between two time periods in multiples (starting period is used as the base):
source:
http://www.vko.ru/koncepcii/prikryti...ozdushnyh-sil2
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As the 80's progressed, the Soviets went broke trying to keep pace with US/NATO ASW tactics and retreated to the bastions closer to their home waters, (this is called self-preservation) with other forces to help protect them.
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As I said, as the Soviet SSBNs were deep second strike assets, with the advances in weapons range there was no need for them to deploy forward.
In part, in the later years of the cold war, they were supplimented in the nuclar deterence role with Granat capable SSNs.