The whole issue around should the USN deploy SSK type vessels has been discussed quite a bit, I am in the firm belief that there is no current requirement for SSK type vessels AIP or not to be deployed under the current doctrine of the USN.
Lets take a look at what the doctrine is roughly about:
First off the USN is about operations away from home waters, therefore power projection is vital and this is based around 11 aircraft carrier battle groups, the USN also deploys heavy assets such as CG and DDG type vessels which have long legs for extended deployments, the USN also maintains a large oiler fleet for under way replenishment and thus is termed a blue water navy.
The current SSNs / SSGNs the Ohio conversion, 688 and Virginia allow the rapid deployment of subsurface forces to be on station within a short period of time, they also allow huge weapon loads to be carried, this in turn with the capability of maintaining pace with a carrier strike group.
Now with that the conventional submarines / AIP Submarines could never keep pace with a carrier strike group and generally do not carry as much fire power as the SSN or SSGN, the reality is these submarines while yes they are capable of deploying into open ocean arenas they cannot do so on a fast basis.
If we look how long it took Onyx to get back from the Falklands you can understand that these boats are limited for distant operations, also her sister submarine HMS Ocelot left the UK in 1991 en route to operations in the Persian gulf Desert storm, now she left before the war broke out, she didn’t make it to theatre before war was over and was brought home.
Now while I have highlighted 1960’s era submarines the big reality is the technology for straight conventional boats has not changed much, speed and endurance curves remain relatively the same.
AIP boats have the capability to remain submerged for extended periods around 3 to 4 weeks however they could not do so at high speed.
This is a key limiting factor in their inclusion into the USN or indeed re inclusion in the RN, next would be weapons load out and sensor capability.
While we can state that the AIP and conventional are quieter this is often true they still have some serious issues, the USN found this out twice in the early days of the cold war, they still must surface and if caught its unlikely they could out run an opposing ASW force. (re USS Gudgeon)
Right now in North America there are no hostile threat countries around (not even Cuba) so the only real theatre of operations would be right now around the Persian Gulf, with the transit times of conventional submarines measured in weeks not days the transit alone would require re supply in the Gulf states or by Under way replenishment which the current Military Sealift Command is not geared up to do at sea. (they can and have done it the capability is there but they usually do it in port stationary).
The other option would be to transit the submarine using heavy lift ship, which is exactly what they did back in 2006 with HMSwS Uppland from Sweden because the transit would have been too long for her.
This would mean you would have to do something like what the RN does with its MHCM vessels which is station overseas, currently the RN operates 4 or 5 MHCMs from Bahrain on a permanently stationed basis, this isn’t such a bad idea however you draw back is where do you maintain the vessels ? and also would the proposed country allow submarines to be permanently stationed there?
The USN and RN moved away from SSK operations due to the nature of their operations so I am in agreement with their thinking because I cannot see any real need for an SSK in the USN or RN doctrines, yes they are good for training and coastal defence, but with the USA part of NATO if the need arises and the suitable platform for said mission is a SSK it is likely to ask one of the NATO countries that currently operate this type of vessel to under take the mission on its behalf. (Does and has happened)
So in conclusion I can only say that yes maybe build a few conventional submarines for training and OPFOR training but in reality they provide the USN and RN with little to no useful extension in their operational capabilities.
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