Don't forget the WWII experience, which suggests that casualty rate is a function of speed of advance.
The West computes fights tactically and lets them build up to operational. The Soviets COMPUTE from the operational and subordinates the tactical to the operational.
The straight assault lines versus Western "flexible" overwatch tactics is an example of what is desirable tactically from what is favorable operationally. If the command and control problems can be surmounted (when they practiced their style of attacks at the NTC, not a few American formations broke down), overwatch tactics tactically suffer fewer losses. However, they also take more time, so in an operational point of view, you are:
1) Killing your traffic control system
2) The enemy has more time to bomb your rear columns (a Soviet experience much more than a Western or even German one)
3) The enemy has more time to prepare Line 2, then Line 3 (this is a experience shared by the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans, but they came away from it with different conclusions)
So the Soviets hope to bleed heavily breaking Line 1 (let's say it is "Fully" prepared) at the fastest possible speed, then introducing a fresh formation to hit Line 2 when it is only Hastily Prepared, and a 2nd fresh formation to hit Line 3 in Meeting Engagement.
The West tries and finds the best way to break Line 1, and then bashes their head at Line 2 and Line 3.
Given the Soviet's visualized main scenario, their operational art and tactics make sense. The problem is what happens when their whole array cannot be deployed? Such as in guerilla warfare. That, along with a long lack of financing to train their troops in any tactics, is why the Soviets have greater trouble than the West adjusting in modern warfare.
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