[Skybird]

I may be wrong in some details, for example I lived by the idea that upgraded T-80 before the U-version had thermals, but not every vehicle, but only a small number of them, much like the German Marder AFVs had a Milan only for the platoon leader'S vehicle, not for his wingmen. But maybe I mixed up "thermals" with "night vision equipment" - like infrared. However, I stick to my statements about the Leopard-1's superior fire control system and cross-country mobility and reliability. Also, even during the 80s NATO was given the advantage in night-fighting capabilities. On paper, the T-64 indeed looks very much like the Leo-1, but practice showed it to be different. It is described to be extremely maintenance-heavy, the autoloader is a notorious danger for the gunner, and the engine is said to be extremely prone to mechanical problems and breakdowns. The gun suffered dearly from wear and tear and the barrel had to be replaced more often than in Western tanks - every 80-100 AP-shots, I read on the web, with cases of replacement known that even were much lower than 80 (after high rate of firing). The tank for the most was used in first-line GT-units of the Soviet army in East-Germany, and was produced in significantly lower quantities than the T-62 or T-55, both of wich still would have been met on the battlefield in case a war would have broken out in the 80s. While the Russians studied the use of DU very early indeed, to my knowledge they did not produce them in quantities that would have made them a regular piece of equipment, but more exotic - like you also have artillery-delivered minefields available - but not as something the ordinary fighting force would just see any day (that ammunitions was damn expensive and thus only made available in limited quantities on NATO's side).

The T-72 may or may not have been designed with the intention of stopping the Leopard-1, we will not solve here to what degree intel of both sides knew in advance what potential the new tank of the other side would have. Those close release dates of the T-64 and the Leo-1 speak against the T-64 having been a direct answer to the Leo-1. On paper, the T-64 may appear as the better tank (and more expensive to build, compared to other Russian tanks), but it'S notorious mechanical unreliability made the T-72 the tank being more popular, since it is more reliable, and slightly easier to maintain. It had a nice maximum speed on the road, but in cross-country mobility was generally inferior. Several of its features nevertheless were considered as innovations.

I am no insider on these things, just an interested layman picking up information when it jumps into his face. I had more information on it than the following text excerpt, and from so many different sources (as well as forum discussions I listened to and which were held by insiders for sure), but I give the following snippet from the SBP manual'S appendix just because it is easily available for me - I just had it at hand - and I do not want to re-search all the other stuff manually. There are dedicated tanksites on the web, though. The full text from which I take the section on Russian AP-design neither is historically complete nor is it up to date, it does not include the third generation of US DU-rounds, for example. But it is the only thing I easily and comfortably have available now without letting this become a piece of real time-consuming work.

Russian APFSDS

for the 125 mm 2A46 gun uses a

distinctly different design than APFSDS rounds manufactured in the

West. When the Russians first started making 100 mm and 115 mm

APFSDS in the 1960s, they used steel penetrators rather than dense
materials like tungsten or uranium. Since the Russians needed vast
quantities of APFSDS ammunition (they produced some 20,000 T-62
tanks alone), manufacturing considerations played a very strong role
in their ammunition designs. Steel was strong, easy to machine,
readily available, and quite economical, so it made sense to use it for
the penetrator. Although steel penetrators were not as effective as
denser metals

, they performed well enough if they could be fired at

high velocities.

To ensure high muzzle velocities the Russians chose a very

lightweight sabot design, called a "ring sabot". This resembled a
narrow disc around the center of the penetrator, and it weighed
much less than the "spool" designs now in use in the West. The light
rounds could be accelerated to very high speeds, and muzzle
velocity was an unmatched 1800 m/s for early 125 mm rounds.
However, using the ring sabot design meant that the penetrator's tailfins
had to touch the barrel walls, to keep the projectile properly
aligned while it was in the gun. These wide fins cause large amounts

of drag, and Russian APFSDS rounds all slow down quite quickly,

lowering their penetration at long range.

The other factor affecting Russian APFSDS design is the
fact that the 125 mm gun uses two-part ammunition. The projectile
and main propellant charge are stored separately, and loaded into
the gun one after the other by a mechanical autoloader. This means
that Russian APFSDS rods can only be as long as the stowage cells
in the autoloader. On the T-72 the ammunition hoist doors are only
long enough to let a 70 cm object through, so long projectiles like the
M829A1 (78 cm long) simply cannot fit. This is the fault of the tank,
not the gun, and is the price the Russians have paid for a compact
autoloader system.
The Russians fielded a number of 125 mm APFSDS
projectiles in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the steel
3BM9, and the steel and tungsten carbide 3BM12, 3BM15, and
3BM17. These low performance rounds are no longer in front-line
service with top Russian units, but many remain in storage, and
large numbers were exported or licensed to client states. Many
nations used them throughout the 1980s, and, in some cases, up to
the present day. Iraq, for instance, was still manufacturing 3BM15s in
1991. A further series of rounds, including the 3BM22, 3BM26, and
3BM29, were produced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but very
little is known about them, and they were not widely exported.
The next round, the 3BM32, entered service in 1984,
although it was not shown to the outside world until it was offered for
export in 1993. The 3BM32 is made of depleted uranium, unlike
previous 125 mm rounds, and it has an enlarged redesigned ringsabot.
The round is quite short, only 49 cm from tip to tail, and the
penetrator weighs about 4.5 kg. The 3BM32's 1700 m/s muzzle
velocity is good, but the wide fins make it slow down fairly quickly, so
long range performance suffers.
The 3BM42 is part of the same generation as the 3BM32,
with a very similar rod shape and sabot. It entered service in 1986,
although it too was only revealed in 1993. The 3BM42 uses a
tungsten alloy core, but this particular alloy is too weak to form the

entire rod, so the tungsten is sheathed inside a strong steel casing to
keep it intact.

The projectile is longer than the 3BM32, at 57 cm, but
its mixed steel and tungsten construction means its performance is

worse. The 3BM42 has a 1700 m/s muzzle velocity, but its wide fins

slow it rapidly, just like the 3BM32.
The next generation of Russian APFSDS is the 3BM42M,
which is quite different from other Russian APFSDS because it uses
a spool shaped sabot with frontal support flanges, and has narrow
fins, like typical Western designs. The penetrator uses a longer onepiece
tungsten alloy body, but few other details have been released
so far. Deliveries of the round were supposed to begin sometime in
1998-99, but the state of the Russian economy may have delayed

this.

(by Andrew Jaremko)

On Soviet doctrine, I would summarise it like this: extremely heavy preparatory artillery bombardement, three-waves, the follow-on wave exploiting the breaches cut into the enemy front by the first wave, and doing so not in width, but in depth. Third wave had second-.class equipment for cleanup-operations and securing the "Hinterland", major offensive burdenm on the first two waves. With the appearance of the T-72, a slight change in doctrine, no longer was the best equipment to be forming the opening offensive (T80s were available, T-64), but the T-72. When NAQTO suffered losses and its frontline was in danger, or penetrated, then the real flagships would take over, that way causing even greater damage to the enemy. Lost equipement was to be cannibalised for maintaining the effort of the ongoing first and second wave offensive. Goal was not necessarily to flank and destroy NATO frontlines, but to strike deep and reach the logistical supply network and control-command infrastructure far behind the front, and crush it. All this, like the "general aggressiveness" or "offensiveness" of military politics of the USSR, was a lesson learned the hard way in WWII, when the Russians learned they could beat the Wehrmacht only by ammassing firepower in hotspots of interest and by claiming the offense no matter the cost, not limiting themselves to defending. The restrictive chain of command and somewhat "automatted" battle lineup in the Russian army results from a general distrust of higher ranks into subordinate ranks, and from limited communication networks that did not allow as individualised command-and-control decisions as in NATO armies where subordnnate ranks are left with greater freedoms and space for flexibility. That'S what I took from various sources, and that's how a former Eastgerman Major described the Russian doctrine to me some years ago. I think we can agree at least on this part.