Thanks Hitman! Yup, you've hit on the single most important factor in why Americans had MUCH worse hits per torpedo and sinkings per torpedo ratios: excessive dependence on fussy accuracy, while shooting too far from the target. They didn't know that precision is wasted when your measurements are not accurate enough to justify the precision.
Germans, with full realization that it was war and they were risking their sorry necks anyway, knowing that they could be killed even if they took every precaution, and not wanting to waste their lives, properly analyzed the relative interaction between unavoidable errors and precision. They pressed the attack darned close because they KNEW their solutions contained errors and that the solution to the errors was closing the distance. Result: more booms with lower technology and more "questionable" precision. Questionable!!!? You heard the boom didn't you?
Until Admiral Lockwood started replacing sub commanders wholesale because they were just plain unwilling to put their boat at any risk whatever (forget about the fact that leaving the dock did that!), our performance was frankly terrible. The fact that Mush Morton and Dick O'Kane garnered popular reputations as crazy madmen who would just get their crews killed (well, actually they did, but not for that reason, the evidence seems to show), is very revealing of the general attitude of the non-commanders in the fleet.
In fact, one book I have, which is self-published and I fear not available to anyone, is
Torpedoman, by Ron Smith. This book parades as fiction but it is clear that it is based on Ron Smith's personal experiences as a torpedoman. Its whole focus is the wide gulf and mistrust between the officers and men on a US submarine. From the liner notes:
Quote:
|
The story moves into the real area of combat unique to submarines with its physical and emotional demands that challenge human endurance—where the desire to perform one's duty is in constant conflict with the desire to live. A near mutiny occurs as the crew struggles with the decision of sacrificing themselves by blindly following orders or disobeying and surviving.
|
The book is rather crudely written, but this serves to give the book authenticity: its written by a torpedoman, not a college educated pretty boy from officer country. Hell, they couldn't tie their shoes without the chief of the boat holding the knot as they did so.
There was little trust and no respect between officers and men of many US submarines. It apparently was worse in the Royal Navy. The destructive dichotomy led to a restructuring of relationships after the war was over and the harmfulness of this lack of trust was revealed. The boats that succeeded in eroding that wall between officers and men, Barb and others, were much more successful than those that ran stictly "by the book." Today, this aberrant relationship is mostly written out of history. And there is a higher sheen of professionalism top to bottom in our modern sub navy. Yes, we've lost some character but we've gained a lot of effectiveness.
Heck, I've wandered into Davey territory and left Sub Skipper's Bag of Tricks territory. I'll shut up now.
But on tactics: do the best you can on working out a solution on a historically justified basis, but then use the hammer. Getting close makes the errors insignificant and ensures a very high hit percentage anyway. It worked for the Germans and it will work for you.