I did a rough translation of the first video; there are some termns in the middle of it which I am really not sure about (the magnetic torpedo stuff).
Read it or leave it
Quote:
Question (0:11):
How was your military career going after your had studied abroad?
Kretschmer:
Returned from Spain in the year 1937 I soon became commander of the U-Boot U-23 on October 1st 1937 and till the begin of the war I had done almost 2 months of peacetime training with it which took place in the Baltic sea and which was very in-depth.
You started from Kiel where U-23 was stationed with the U-Flottille Wedding. You started into the middle Baltic sea on Sunday evening where the training took place against target ships around the dive quadrants of Rügen - at night and day. You returned on Saturday evening.
So you practically had only 24 hours a week to see something else as the sea in Kiel - not even time to go shopping because the stores were closed by then. It was a very strict training which later had proved it's value in the results.
I began war with U-23 and had to notice that we had faulty torpedos and during the whole war time - mine lastet until March 17th 1941 - you could have had almost twice as high successes with intact torpedos.
The torpedoes had been developed by the (Kriegs)Marine and we shot with a magnetic detonator. The targets had been undershot so that the torpedo would detonate mid-ships under the target and therefor develop a huge detonation. Actually a nice idea, however it did not work.
The electro magnetic status of the torpedo were not fully controllable what made the torpedo sometimes detonate in front or behind the target.
Furthermore the magnetic fuse had to be changed depending on the latitude the U-Boot was operating in.
So the torpedo detonated when the earth magnetism had been changed by the ship magnetism of the target. Unfortunately that did not work always.
Therefor it had been ordered to shoot the torpedos with impact because it had been discovered that the torpedos were running deeper than were adjusted. That was known to the testers of the (Kriegs)Marine but they tolerantly ignored this fact with the reason that the torpedo nevertheless
needs to "undershoot" the target and thus the actual depth of the torpedo does not matter. But this had consequences when we had to shoot with impact later: then the torpedos did not work because they were running too deep and did not hit the target. So you had to select the shallowest setting of 3 meters - at least that's what I did - since with a shallower setting the torpedo would turn into a surface runner.
Furthermore the torpedos sometimes tended to change course and were running in circles so that the shooting ship (the U-Boot) endangered itsself.
So when you shot at night or a electro torpedo - which did not have a bubble trail - you had to turn on the hydrophone to check whether the torpedo stayed on it's course or if you were in danger of sinking yourself.
Qestion: Did that happen? (5:57)
Kretschmer: Yes (laughs a bit), I think that's what sank Prien - that's my personal opinion.
Question (6:04):
The British could intercept the german U-Boot radio transmissions already during WWI. How was it in WWII?
Kretschmer:
These silly transmissions have been repeated in WWII. I myself used it - when at all - unwillingly. That's why once Admiral Dönitz asked me when I reported from a Feindfahrt:
Kretschmer, don't you want to obey orders any more?
And I said: Herr Admiral,... not all of them. I am responsible for the security of my boat and I don't want to be triangulated all of the time because of the radio transmissions and thus lure airplanes with depth charges to my position. And I want to do everything to help win the war.
And he accepted it, but I don't know if others could have said that to him.
In any case I have the opinion today that much of the U-Boot War's success had been lost because of this damn radio transmissions.
I myself always were very cautious and have thought that the code cannot be secure because I knew the Britains from my studying time and had recognized their attitude related to practice compared to the more scientific attitude of the Germans schools.
The high commanders always calmed us down: dont' worry the code cannot be broken; but myself I was worried.
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