To make matters even worse, it appears that there are two angle of attack sensors, one on either side of the fuselage and only one of them was hooked up to the MCAS system, with no warning that the sensor didn't agree with other autopilot systems. In addition MCAS was much too powerful, able to overpower pilot input and set stabilizer trim to FULL down.
However there is a stabilizer trim cutout switch in the same position it has been for more than 30 years of 737 production. The proper procedure for an MCAS malfunction is just to throw that switch, which every 737 pilot in the world, regardless of airframe series, knows where it is. That's easy to say sitting behind a computer.
Here's the perspective for why confusion in the pilot seat (actually hyper-focusing and blocking out "irrelevant" things that busily kill) you is sometimes a fatal affliction and why having a jump pilot (one saved the flight previous to the fatal crash!) is a great idea. This is the absolute best source of info on this lousy situation and also shows that Airbus isn't immune from pilot tunnel vision either. Subscribing to this guy's You Tube channel is a great connection to the developing situation.
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