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paulhager · 03-23-13, 12:28 PM

U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL Month dd, 194_

From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #7.

Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering seventh war patrol.

Bernard H. Schwartz

(A) Prologue

The “Pike” was offered the opportunity to try out another experimental torpedo, the Mark 16. Unlike the diminutive “Cutie”, this one is standard size and has large warhead. In fact, at 943 pounds, it is the largest in the U.S. inventory. The Mark 16 doesn’t home like the “Cutie” but it runs at 46 knots for an amazing 13700 yards! In view of our sinking the Musashi (intelligence verified the identity of our target), we’ve been offered 12 of these super torpedoes. In return, all we have to do is provide a detailed report of each torpedo’s performance (see Attachment A). Naturally, we accepted the offer.

Torpedo loadout: 8 Mark 18 – stern; 4 Mark 18, 12 Mark 16 – bow.

(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)

(B) Narrative

23 NOV – 29 NOV
Left Guam at 1700, 23 November. Reached patrol zone 29 November. Everything routine in transit.

30 NOV
Received report of ship just outside the PZ, headed ENE at medium speed. We altered our search pattern to account for its possible movements. We were lucky to catch in our one of our sweeps because it had changed course: Speed 10 KTS, Course 01°T. Seas were moderate, light haze – we would make a submerged attack and try out one of the Mark 16’s.

Attack#1.
The ship was obvious bound for the Bungo so it was unlikely to make any major course change. We obtained a good radar solution. When the ship came into visual range we went to radar depth, now using the radar to supplement our periscope observations.

The ship was a Ryuun Maru – we set the Mark 16 for magnetic and depth for 1½ feet below the keel and opened the outer door.

We went to p-depth and let the PK run for awhile before raising the scope. We were on the money. We downed scope. When the PK indicated that the target was bearing 335, we popped the scope for the terminal reading. Everything looked good – we fired and downed scope. Five seconds before the torpedo was to hit, we raised the scope again. It detonated just behind the stack.

Not a perfect shot but it should have been good enough. However, the Maru wasn’t dead, it turned to port and began to withdraw. We allowed it to open the range to 2200 and then battle surfaced. We got off the first 3 shots from the 5” before the Maru could respond.

By the time the Maru was able to fire, it was uncoordinated and ineffective. A few more 5” hits and she was done.

The first test of the Mark 16 revealed nothing special. The large warhead should have been enough to deliver the quietus to the Maru but it didn’t. Perhaps the magnetic exploder didn’t detonate in the optimal position. Maybe a depth problem. With 11 remaining, there will be enough for several more tests.

01 DEC
Attack #2
Minutes after the clock reached 0000, our second target appeared. Initially its speed was 7 knots, course 249°T. However, about the time we got into position it changed course to 270°T and accelerated to 8 knots.

The ship turned out to be a Haruna Maru – a small tanker. It wasn’t work a Mark 16, so we readied the Mark 18 in tube one. The attack was nothing special and the one torpedo sufficed.

Sent a message notifying ComSubPac of our kill. About 45 minutes later, two aircraft were spotted at long range. Both appeared to converging directly on our position. The Japanese must have DF’ed our position somehow – perhaps patrolling subs. There was nothing for it but to dive. We remained submerged until nightfall, then we sent another message to ComSubPac requesting an update to our orders. We were given a new PZ in proximity to Iwo Jima.

02 DEC – 04 DEC
In transit to patrol zone.

05 DEC – 09 DEC
Patrolling, in the course of which, we moved farther West.

10 DEC
Attack #3
At 0021, began tracking ship: Speed 9 KTS, Course 69°T. At 0109, changed course to 76°T. Turned out to be another Haruna Maru. Once again, we chose not to waste a Mark 16 on it and went with a Mark 18. One hit, one kill.

11 DEC – 12 DEC
Patrolling.

13 DEC
Attack #4
Yet another small merchant came our way. Perhaps solid evidence that Japan is on the ropes: we’ve sunk the large ships in such numbers that only pitifully small ones remain. For this attack we used a Mark 18 from the stern.

We reported in to ComSubPac late in the day so that if we were DF’ed it would be dark by the time planes had been vectored to our location. We were given a new patrol zone in the NE end of the Tsushima Strait.

14 DEC
Attack #5
Convoy detected at 2225, 10 knots, 185°T. Seven ships, 2 escorts. It was only a few minutes before dawn. We decided to use the Mark 18’s in the stern and set up 2400 yards off the track.

As the convoy came into visual range, we selected the lead two ships in the near column: a Momoyama Maru and an Akita Maru. They would be attacked in reverse order the number 2 Akita first, followed by the Momoyama.

The attack couldn’t have gone better. Each target was hit twice.

Although we didn’t get visual confirmation, we could hear the ships breaking up as we dove for 400 feet.

Both escorts began to search for us – somehow, despite our wakeless torpedoes they began depth charging only 500 yards away. Then the hydrophone operator alerted us that one of the escorts was approaching fast. That bit of information we didn’t need because the whole crew could hear the pinging. Just when the escort passed overhead, we executed a hard port turn and released decoys. We dove the boat to 545 and resumed silent running. This seemed to confuse the escorts which blasted away at the decoy.

Unfortunately the decoy kept them occupied only a few minutes because one of the escorts made another pass. We repeated our previous maneuver except we turned hard astarboard. Again the the destroyers went after the decoy. This time, instead of trying to maneuver away, we settled on the bottom at 667 feet. It is unlikely that the Japanese sonar can pick us up.

. . .

Thirty minutes have elapsed since a near miss damaged our pumps, 2 electric motors, and caused flooding. If we don’t surface soon, we won’t be able to. One of the escorts is still up there – thankfully, the other returned to the convoy. I plan on trying to ambush him and hit him with a full spread of Mark 16’s. God be with us.

(C) Fuel Consumed
TBD%.

(D) Weather
Normal for the area(s).

(E) Torpedoes Expended
xx (xx Mark 18, xx Mark 16) – x ships, estimated tonnage xx,xxx.

(F) References
See Patrol 6
See Patrol 1

NOTE FROM USN HISTORICAL SOCIETY
We know from contemporaneous Japanese action reports that an American submarine was rammed on the surface and sunk and that all hands perished. Thanks to the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute Department of Marine Archeology and their dives in the Tsushima Strait we have been able to confirm that the sub was the Picuda, which was officially reported missing and presumed lost on 14 December 1945. The Picuda was found in 667 feet of water and this unfinished report was retrieved from the Captain’s safe.

Along with the reports filed by Commander Schwartz, this narrative reveals for the first time that Schwartz, whose exploits up to and including this attack had been nothing less than stellar, made a fatal error in judgment by ceasing evasive maneuvers and, instead, laying on the bottom. Forensic analysis validated Schwartz’s statement that a near miss caused damage and flooding that could not be controlled at that depth.

All 6 torpedoes were still in the bow tubes when the submarine was found. Schwartz never got off his last ditch attack.

03-23-13, 12:28 PM	#488
paulhager Seaman Join Date: Sep 2005 Location: Bloomington, IN Posts: 31 Downloads: 42 Uploads: 0	U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382) c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California CONFIDENTIAL Month dd, 194_ From: The Commanding Officer To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #7. Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering seventh war patrol. Bernard H. Schwartz (A) Prologue The “Pike” was offered the opportunity to try out another experimental torpedo, the Mark 16. Unlike the diminutive “Cutie”, this one is standard size and has large warhead. In fact, at 943 pounds, it is the largest in the U.S. inventory. The Mark 16 doesn’t home like the “Cutie” but it runs at 46 knots for an amazing 13700 yards! In view of our sinking the Musashi (intelligence verified the identity of our target), we’ve been offered 12 of these super torpedoes. In return, all we have to do is provide a detailed report of each torpedo’s performance (see Attachment A). Naturally, we accepted the offer. Torpedo loadout: 8 Mark 18 – stern; 4 Mark 18, 12 Mark 16 – bow. (Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.) (B) Narrative 23 NOV – 29 NOV Left Guam at 1700, 23 November. Reached patrol zone 29 November. Everything routine in transit. 30 NOV Received report of ship just outside the PZ, headed ENE at medium speed. We altered our search pattern to account for its possible movements. We were lucky to catch in our one of our sweeps because it had changed course: Speed 10 KTS, Course 01°T. Seas were moderate, light haze – we would make a submerged attack and try out one of the Mark 16’s. Attack#1. The ship was obvious bound for the Bungo so it was unlikely to make any major course change. We obtained a good radar solution. When the ship came into visual range we went to radar depth, now using the radar to supplement our periscope observations. The ship was a Ryuun Maru – we set the Mark 16 for magnetic and depth for 1½ feet below the keel and opened the outer door. We went to p-depth and let the PK run for awhile before raising the scope. We were on the money. We downed scope. When the PK indicated that the target was bearing 335, we popped the scope for the terminal reading. Everything looked good – we fired and downed scope. Five seconds before the torpedo was to hit, we raised the scope again. It detonated just behind the stack. Not a perfect shot but it should have been good enough. However, the Maru wasn’t dead, it turned to port and began to withdraw. We allowed it to open the range to 2200 and then battle surfaced. We got off the first 3 shots from the 5” before the Maru could respond. By the time the Maru was able to fire, it was uncoordinated and ineffective. A few more 5” hits and she was done. The first test of the Mark 16 revealed nothing special. The large warhead should have been enough to deliver the quietus to the Maru but it didn’t. Perhaps the magnetic exploder didn’t detonate in the optimal position. Maybe a depth problem. With 11 remaining, there will be enough for several more tests. 01 DEC Attack #2 Minutes after the clock reached 0000, our second target appeared. Initially its speed was 7 knots, course 249°T. However, about the time we got into position it changed course to 270°T and accelerated to 8 knots. The ship turned out to be a Haruna Maru – a small tanker. It wasn’t work a Mark 16, so we readied the Mark 18 in tube one. The attack was nothing special and the one torpedo sufficed. Sent a message notifying ComSubPac of our kill. About 45 minutes later, two aircraft were spotted at long range. Both appeared to converging directly on our position. The Japanese must have DF’ed our position somehow – perhaps patrolling subs. There was nothing for it but to dive. We remained submerged until nightfall, then we sent another message to ComSubPac requesting an update to our orders. We were given a new PZ in proximity to Iwo Jima. 02 DEC – 04 DEC In transit to patrol zone. 05 DEC – 09 DEC Patrolling, in the course of which, we moved farther West. 10 DEC Attack #3 At 0021, began tracking ship: Speed 9 KTS, Course 69°T. At 0109, changed course to 76°T. Turned out to be another Haruna Maru. Once again, we chose not to waste a Mark 16 on it and went with a Mark 18. One hit, one kill. 11 DEC – 12 DEC Patrolling. 13 DEC Attack #4 Yet another small merchant came our way. Perhaps solid evidence that Japan is on the ropes: we’ve sunk the large ships in such numbers that only pitifully small ones remain. For this attack we used a Mark 18 from the stern. We reported in to ComSubPac late in the day so that if we were DF’ed it would be dark by the time planes had been vectored to our location. We were given a new patrol zone in the NE end of the Tsushima Strait. 14 DEC Attack #5 Convoy detected at 2225, 10 knots, 185°T. Seven ships, 2 escorts. It was only a few minutes before dawn. We decided to use the Mark 18’s in the stern and set up 2400 yards off the track. As the convoy came into visual range, we selected the lead two ships in the near column: a Momoyama Maru and an Akita Maru. They would be attacked in reverse order the number 2 Akita first, followed by the Momoyama. The attack couldn’t have gone better. Each target was hit twice. Although we didn’t get visual confirmation, we could hear the ships breaking up as we dove for 400 feet. Both escorts began to search for us – somehow, despite our wakeless torpedoes they began depth charging only 500 yards away. Then the hydrophone operator alerted us that one of the escorts was approaching fast. That bit of information we didn’t need because the whole crew could hear the pinging. Just when the escort passed overhead, we executed a hard port turn and released decoys. We dove the boat to 545 and resumed silent running. This seemed to confuse the escorts which blasted away at the decoy. Unfortunately the decoy kept them occupied only a few minutes because one of the escorts made another pass. We repeated our previous maneuver except we turned hard astarboard. Again the the destroyers went after the decoy. This time, instead of trying to maneuver away, we settled on the bottom at 667 feet. It is unlikely that the Japanese sonar can pick us up. . . . Thirty minutes have elapsed since a near miss damaged our pumps, 2 electric motors, and caused flooding. If we don’t surface soon, we won’t be able to. One of the escorts is still up there – thankfully, the other returned to the convoy. I plan on trying to ambush him and hit him with a full spread of Mark 16’s. God be with us. (C) Fuel Consumed TBD%. (D) Weather Normal for the area(s). (E) Torpedoes Expended xx (xx Mark 18, xx Mark 16) – x ships, estimated tonnage xx,xxx. (F) References See Patrol 6 See Patrol 1 NOTE FROM USN HISTORICAL SOCIETY We know from contemporaneous Japanese action reports that an American submarine was rammed on the surface and sunk and that all hands perished. Thanks to the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute Department of Marine Archeology and their dives in the Tsushima Strait we have been able to confirm that the sub was the Picuda, which was officially reported missing and presumed lost on 14 December 1945. The Picuda was found in 667 feet of water and this unfinished report was retrieved from the Captain’s safe. Along with the reports filed by Commander Schwartz, this narrative reveals for the first time that Schwartz, whose exploits up to and including this attack had been nothing less than stellar, made a fatal error in judgment by ceasing evasive maneuvers and, instead, laying on the bottom. Forensic analysis validated Schwartz’s statement that a near miss caused damage and flooding that could not be controlled at that depth. All 6 torpedoes were still in the bow tubes when the submarine was found. Schwartz never got off his last ditch attack.