Quote:
Originally Posted by General Tso
I also read something else interesting about U.S. search radar. It's common knowledge that most submarines rarely used their SD radar during the war because they thought that the Japanese could detect it and immediately locate the sub. The reason they believed this was because whenever the set was turned on Japanese aircraft usually showed up in a relatively short time. It appeared that the radar was attracting enemy planes when actually the planes where there all of the time but where to far away to be spotted visually.
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I'm still up in the air about the Japanese capability to detect U.S. radar sets. I finished a comprehensive book, one of a very few of it's kind, about WWII radar. Way too much info to remember. The problem with understanding Japanese capabilities during the war was that they began destroying volumes of records, prototypes and other forms of info/intel immediately upon surrendering. Extensive postwar interrogations were conducted by intelligence personnel, one such example that I saw via a film excerpt of an actual interrogation of a Japanese POW. I myself have received extensive training on questioning and interrogations, including the use of body language during such. One thing I can assure you is that since WWII, interrogation techniques have evolved considerably. What I observed in that film excerpt was a U.S. Army Captain questioning a Jap POW and leading his subject in the questioning. By "leading" I mean, he questioned in such a way as to inadvertantly suggest the answers for his captive.
I'll try to give an example of what I mean. During the questioning, the Army Captain used a
translator.
Here's how it went, as best I can remember:
Army Captain: "
What is the state of Japanese resupply?"
POW: "
Scarce."
Army Captain: "
Is that what brought you to our side, you surrendered because you had no food?"
POW: (shrugs shoulders and nods in approval).
Here, the captain provided the answer by suggesting why the POW surrendered. The POW simply nodded in agreement, rather than elaborate on any other possible reasons that may have divulged military secrets. I actually found myself laughing in disbelief of the interrogation technique used by this Intelligence Officer. I have received some of my interrogation training from courses provided by the FBI.
There are volumes of information that can be found online regarding these postwar interrogations. I certainly haven't read through them all considering their numbers and length. I have glanced over them and have seen instances of similar questioning methods, where the subject is lead to a number of possible answers. This, of course, raises serious questions in my mind regarding the validity of the answers provided by these POWs. There are a lot of instances, in books, war memoirs and other sources where conclusions are drawn (by very credible pilots, boat captains, sub commanders, etc.) about Japanese radar detection capabilities. However, these conclusions (as far as I have seen) are based on presumptions that could just as well be coincidences based on enemy contacts so numerous among the various military branches that coincidences were inevitable.
There are a lot of such coincidences mentioned in my book in which other valid possiblities are given as to why an incident (or enemy reaction) might have occurred.
Still, on the other hand, I am faced with the reality that location through radio signal triangulation was very common, easy to do given the right circumstances and practiced by all the warring powers. The Germans had the ability to detect radar signals of some frequencies and the allies had refined that ability even further. The Japanese, contrary to beliefs during WWII, were very resourceful and proficient in technical matters. It was only their perspective of "necessity" that influenced any lapse in technology. That alone, is indicative enough that the possiblility of radar detection capabilities existed. Still, yet again, there seems to be (from what I've dug up), more hard evidence to the contrary.
I'm undecided at the moment but with emphasis that they probably did not delve into that area of expertise or lagged too far behind in radar technology to catch-up by war's end.
