USs Billfish...worst depth charging ?

[Bubblehead1980]

I am sure any depth charge attack was a harrowing experience but some were worst than others, more intense, accurate etc.

Most of us have read many accounts...Gato, Drum(when conning tower was cracked during intense depth charge attack, lead to a Balao class conning tower being placed when a Gato one was not available during refit period) , Halibut, Plunger(early war), Salmon (October 44). From what I have read, the BIllfish endured the worst one I have read about in the Makassar Strait on November 11, 1943.

Billfish was forced to 650 feet to get under the charges.The CO was paralyzed with fear, the XO could not command due to illness from lack of air.A Lieutenant took charge, realized the boat was leaking oil and that was how the DD was keeping track, so ordered reverse of course and escaped in the confusion.After 12 hours of attack, they survived.

I plan to order the book by Don Keith(who also authored the book about Batfish) to learn more.Just wondering what the most harrowing depth charge attack you have read about is.

[Armistead]

That's a great book, hard to imagine what the crew went through.

The Sculpin is another terrible attack with Cromwell on board. I think the USS Puffer or Pufferfish was held down over 30 hours, when it was over many of the crew were put in s8 jackets.

[TorpX]

Oddly enough, I can't remember reading about outstanding depth charge attacks like you describe.

I guess I need to read more. :)

[Dread Knot]

I always thought this artist's rendering of the Pufferfish's crew near the limit of their endurance should have been posted tapestry-sized large in blabbermouth Congressman Andrew May's jail cell after we was incarcerated for war profiteering and sent to federal prison. The temperature in the cell should have been turned up to 120 degrees as well.

Well played counselor....well played.


http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0826810.jpg

[Bubblehead1980]

Oddly enough, I can't remember reading about outstanding depth charge attacks like you describe.

I guess I need to read more. :)



I would say that you do. The Gato took a accurate sustained depth charging in late 43, surfaced to find one live but unexploded charge stuck in her deck, unexploded.The crew removed it and put it on a life :arrgh!: Tense moments I am sure.

The Salmon attacked a large tanker with four escorts(Type C and D) on 30 October 1944 off Ryuku Islands.Sure you know Salmon was an older pre war boat, 250 foot test depth.Fired Mark 18's from 3,000 yards I believe it was, scored some hits on already damaged tanked, then underwent a brutal, accurate, relentless depth charging, caused heavy damage, boat went several hundred feet beflow its test depth.Damaged severely enough they surfaced and tried to run away, then an escort came in to ram but was so close and sub of course set lower in water, crew used their 20 MM guns to strafe the deck, killed or injured everyone topside and on the bridge, Salmon, with a strong port list, then escaped into a squall and made it home.Inspection showed severe damage from depth charges but only a few small caliber hits from the gun.Made it back to port but her war was over.Salmon was later given partial credit for the tanker, other subs finished her off.

[Bubblehead1980]

That's a great book, hard to imagine what the crew went through.

The Sculpin is another terrible attack with Cromwell on board. I think the USS Puffer or Pufferfish was held down over 30 hours, when it was over many of the crew were put in s8 jackets.


So the Billfish book was worth a read? Saved a link about the Puffer's depth charge attack in October 43 in Makassar Straits.Hmmm wonder if it was perhaps same escorts delivering these damaging, prolonged, accurate attacks? Billfish was November 43 in Makassar Strait, Puffer was October 43Given same area and same time period, possible.

[Dread Knot]

I am sure any depth charge attack was a harrowing experience but some were worst than others, more intense, accurate etc.

Most of us have read many accounts...Gato, Drum(when conning tower was cracked during intense depth charge attack, lead to a Balao class conning tower being placed when a Gato one was not available during refit period) , Halibut, Plunger(early war), Salmon (October 44). From what I have read, the BIllfish endured the worst one I have read about in the Makassar Strait on November 11, 1943.



I'm curious. In his book, does Keith give the names or classes of the Japanese ASW vessels involved in this November 11th 1943 attack on Billfish?

[Aktungbby]

Nothing tops a recent history-channel show on Treasure Hunters examining several Uboats (4) around the British Isles and sending down robots to properly ID them and update German archives. One of the boats was completely cracked open all along the top of her pressure hull probably from direct hedgehog hits and resembles a sardine can. This amount of damage shocked even the crew of the vessel filming the episode. I found the footage unsettling myself-REALITY!

[Armistead]

So the Billfish book was worth a read? Saved a link about the Puffer's depth charge attack in October 43 in Makassar Straits.Hmmm wonder if it was perhaps same escorts delivering these damaging, prolonged, accurate attacks? Billfish was November 43 in Makassar Strait, Puffer was October 43Given same area and same time period, possible.

It' worth a read, but can be tedious and reviews of many technical errors.

Be interesting to know what TF attacked

Amazing the men of the Billfish kept silent about the CO's failure, not only in that, but the next one as well and Lucas agreed he would transfer out of subs to them, which he did. More amazing, it was kept silent for 60 years.

http://www.uss-la-ca135.org/50b/1950lucas.html

[Rockin Robbins]

Sometimes severity isn't related to duration. I submit this evidence from the sailors involved for your consideration. Welcome to the cruise from hell!
STILL REMEMBER THIS USS FLYING FISH?
On August 28, 1942, Flying Fish (Donaho) hit a battleship of the Kongo class. While setting up to fire at one of the escorts, a plane dropped a bomb close to Flying fish, forcing her deep, while the escorts delivered a devastating depth charge attack. Two hours later Flying Fish returned to periscope depth. While Donaho was scanning the horizon a nervous torpedoman in the after torpedo room accidentally fired a fish from No.7 tube with the outer door closed. For the following two days the crew worked to release the torpedo, finally being able to pull it back inside the ATR. Donaho then proceeded to the Truk area where he was attacked and seriously damaged by a patrol boat. On Sept. 4 he closed another patrol boat on the surface. It opened fire with a three-inch gun. Donaho cleared the bridge, then closed to 600 yards and fired a torpedo, which missed. As Flying Fish dove, she took a terrific down angle. Two Destroyers joined in the attack, dropping a total of 54 depth charges. Flying Fish, severely damaged, went to 350 feet. In order to maintain depth, Donaho had to hold the boat at an 18-degree up angle. The ordeal was over in four and a half-hours as the Flying Fish survived one of the worst depth charging of the war.
And I'm tragically informed that the numbers of US Submarine Vets of WWII are so low now that there will be no more conventions, no more Polaris newsletters, no more "Remember This?" columns. Likely there are no Flying Fish sailors to "Still Remember This." And those who never returned have been joined by those who lived to return on their eternal patrol.

[Rockin Robbins]

Forget being down for 48 hours! How about a 24 hour with 111 people on board? Yikes!
STILL REMEMBER THIS USS PERMIT?
Early in the war the Permit (Chapple) was ordered to Corregidor to evacuate General MacArthur. While enroute, Permit got the word that MacArthur had gotten nervous waiting and decided to leave Corregidor by PT-boat. The Permit was ordered to proceed to a small island where the PT boat was to take MacArthur. MacArthur had already left when Permit arrived at the island near Panay, and only a disabled PT boat was found. Chapple took the 11-man PT boat crew aboard and proceeded back to Corregidor with new orders to evacuate certain key personnel deemed too valuable to be left behind. A senior naval officer among the evacuee was overcome by a sense of duty as Permit was leaving Manila and ordered Chapple, again'st his will, to continue a war patrol despite the fact that Permit had on board a total of 111 men. An unsuccessful attack on three destroyers proved nearly disastrous as the DD's attacked with depth charges and kept Permit down nearly twenty-four hours. Nearly all of Permit's oxygen supply was used up in this interval, and after surfacing she headed directly for Fremamntle, Australia. Upon arrival, Commander Chapple was severely reprimanded by Captain Wilks for unduly risking the lives of valuable personnel. (It was not recorded what was said to the senior naval officer who forced the issue)

[Rockin Robbins]

Puffer account by the US Submarine Veterans of WWII:

REMEMBER THIS USS PUFFER?
At 1100 on the morning of Oct. 9, 1943, Puffer (Jensen) hit a merchantman with two torpedoes while patrolling the northern end of Makassar Strait. The merchantman's escort was not detected, and Puffer fired a second time. Shortly thereafter distant depth charges were heard, and at 1145 six depth charges exploded close by. The concussion caused the conning tower hatch to unseat, admitting a shower of water. A sea valve plug in the ATR was loosened, admitting a thin, high-pressure stream of water. Gaskets were blown out of the main induction valve and the ventilation supply. Ten minutes later another depth charge exploded nearby, followed by four more, staggered in depth, fifteen minutes later. Depth control became difficult. The boat slowly settled to an alarming depth level, with a twelve degree down angle. The temperature reached 125 degrees in parts of the boat. Safety tank, negative, auxiliary, and after trim were all blown dry.
The ASW attack continued for a total of thirty-one hours. Many of the men were in a state of physical collapse. Stations had to be manned by volunteers.
Finally, Puffer surfaced directly from deep submergence at 1910 on October 10, 1943.

[Bubblehead1980]

It' worth a read, but can be tedious and reviews of many technical errors.

Be interesting to know what TF attacked

Amazing the men of the Billfish kept silent about the CO's failure, not only in that, but the next one as well and Lucas agreed he would transfer out of subs to them, which he did. More amazing, it was kept silent for 60 years.

http://www.uss-la-ca135.org/50b/1950lucas.html

I am sure they liked him, assuming he had been a competent captain until that point and having went through it together, understood how he could crack.Instead of humiliating him and probably costing an otherwise stable and competent officer his career, they did it off books, allowed him to move on to surface ships.

The one Captain I have read about that really irks me was Donald McGregor, first CO of the Seahorse.McGregor was relieved of command earlier in war due to lack of aggressiveness which resulted in dry patrols.Using his connections, he got command of Seahorse and when went to sea with Slade Cutter as exec, his results were just as poor.Also, he was vindictive as aside from lies in his patrol report, Cutter later found out he had badmouthed him in a fitness report, trying to Sabotage his career for no other reasons than personal .Years later, Cutter ran into McGregor and his wife at a football game, she was friendly and said hello, McGregor stayed away and didnt say a thing.Glad they weeded most of the jerks like this out early in the war.

[Armistead]

I don't know, Rush basically called Lucas a coward. I guess Lucas did OK out of subs. I think men had a honor for their sub and each other. Rush seemed more concerned for that that Lucas.

[Bubblehead1980]

I don't know, Rush basically called Lucas a coward. I guess Lucas did OK out of subs. I think men had a honor for their sub and each other. Rush seemed more concerned for that that Lucas.



Ill have to read the book.I just figured since they kept quiet about it, they understood what they all went through and some men cracked.

[virtualpender]

Just wondering what the most harrowing depth charge attack you have read about is.

USS SALMON was pummeled.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/WDR/WDR58/WDR58-7.html

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/WDR/WDR58/img/WDR58-VII.jpg

[Talltom]

Puffer and Billfish had long and harrowing depth chargings, but the Kingfish may have gotten closest to being destroyed. See report and photos at: Report and photographs of damage at: www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/WDR/WDR58/WDR58-5.html (http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/WDR/WDR58/WDR58-5.html)
Major indentiations in pressure hull, valve and door frames, and instruments. Very luckly to have survived. Section of the submarine had to be replaced. I recall there were other US WWII submarines that may have been so badly damaged that it made no sense to attempt to repair them. That was likely near the end of the war when the US had so many submarines around Japan and what was left of "Empire Watters" that the effort to get the boat back to sea did not appear to be worth it.

[Aktungbby]

Talltom! :Kaleun_Salute: great first post; keep 'em coming!:up:

[Jimbuna]

Welcome to SubSim Talltom :sunny:

[SSI01]

I don't know if it pertains specifically to a depth charging, but it is related to other comments in this thread re: suitability of some COs for submarine command. If you've already covered this I apologize. Wasn't there a captain in one boat whose subordinate officers essentially staged a mutiny against him because he repeatedly refused to attack targets that might involve some risk to the boat? I remember reading about this in Clay Blair's two-volume work on US subs in WWII. If memory serves the boat was recalled from patrol and a quick COI was held. The capt admitted to basically being far too cautious for the work and was removed from command. Officers involved were not reprimanded or disciplined -at least, not officially. I can't remember if the XO was made CO or they just got a new CO. But if the actions of the XO and subordinate officers didn't constitute a mutiny in this case they came bloody close. Probably the only things that saved them were 1) the capt admitting he wasn't cut out for the job; 2) the XO and others wanted to take more aggressive actions, not avoid combat.

EDIT: Suspect boat involved was Batfish.

[Longknife]

If memory serves the boat was recalled from patrol and a quick COI was held. The capt admitted to basically being far too cautious for the work and was removed from command. .

Early in the war this was rather common with the "old school" officers. Doctrine for subs was more to be used as a patrol boat than an offensive weapon.

One of the 1st boats to have this happen was the USS Argonaut.

Thanks for refreshing this old thread. It was an interesting read! :up:

[Pigboatcook]

The U.S.S. Salmon was indeed pounded to scrap metal. How she made it home for her final patrol is a miracle. Because of her history she is one of my favorite SH4 boats. I ran an entire career with her.

I located on eBay a matchbook of her. Yes, the sub crews commissioned match books for the several subs (some for post war reunions). I have that matchbook framed and here in my office next to a large B&W framed photo of the U.S.S. Houston and H.M.A.S. Perth. Yeah, I'm an old sentimental fart but those two things always give me a feeling of pride in ours and the Australian Navy.

Cheers, mates.:yeah:

[SSI01]

Longknife - interesting you mention the differences between accepted norms for fleet boat activities before and then during WWII. As you said this new, much more aggressive attitude on the part of the newer, younger captains grew in favor following early lack of results by the older, pre-war captains operating IAW accepted pre-war doctrine (i.e., night sonar approaches/attacks (?)). It's got to be remembered in the pre-war Navy this was a service where a captain's continued command of a boat could depend on whether he came alongside a dock wall too heavily. Lockwood and the other force commanders eventually allowed much, much more aggressive tactics but it was with the realization, arrived at with eyes wide open, this would inevitably lead to increased losses. The wartime captains were younger men, the most successful with exceptional aggressiveness - Morton, Dealey, O'Kane. Of these three outstanding examples, two ended up dead and the third a POW. This is remarkable because Navy doctrine normally specifies preservation of the ship above all other considerations. I would think SSs and DDs were the two most quickly thought of exceptions to this outlook in WWII.

The most ironic thing about Morton's loss was that Wahoo's PCO was aboard with him for a fam patrol at the time of the ship's demise. One wonders what Lockwood, Nimitz or King would have done with him once relieved.

[TorpX]

I don't think the Navy's problems in this department were limited to subs. In peacetime, officers were judged by the performance of their engineering plants, efficiency reports, exercises, and such. Risk-taking behavior was most likely to be a negative factor. Nor were there many vessels to command. Officers lucky enough to get one, would want to keep it.


Pre-war, USN sub doctrine involved complicated tactics making torpedo attacks by sonar. Exercises with aircraft and task forces indicated periscope attacks were too dangerous, and skippers who did it that way were given bad grades, when they were spotted. What is the Navy's slogan? You fight how you train.



***

I haven't read about the Batfish 'mutiny', but certainly there was tension on the Wahoo under Kennedy. O'Kane and Morton didn't mutiny, but they sure tried to prod Kennedy to take more risks.

[SSI01]

I remember that's why they were called "fleet submarines" - their targets, in pre-war thinking, were meant to be enemy surface units and they were supposed to attack these targets IAW overall fleet strategy. In light of how the Kaiser's navy nearly starved Great Britain in WWI using U-boats against merchant shipping, it's hard to see how pre-WWII US naval strategists arrived at the conclusion the big, long-range boats we were developing - ideal commerce raiders - should be used to function as an extension of the battle line rather than operate independently and eliminate an enemy's merchant marine. It could be seen that using this method, there would still be the opportunity for the periodic shot at enemy capital units around naval bases and in rear areas, which would obviously still help America's overall naval strategy.

There are a lot of things hindsight makes 20/20 - one of them was that an earlier emphasis and high priority should have been placed on sinking Japanese tankers. I won't even go into the fiasco about the depth control and exploders on US torpedoes.

[TorpX]

They did give some thought to commerce raiding, but, the U.S. was obligated to abide by signed agreements about unrestricted submarine warfare, and had a lot to loose, if such a war came to pass. The U.S. declared war on Germany in WWI partly about this.

In a way, we were somewhat fortunate to have a fairly capable submarine fleet ready in '41.