Real Submarine Technology & History Q&A [Archive]

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DaveyJ576

01-29-09, 08:18 PM

Hello everyone!

The purpose of this thread is to discuss and explain actual submarine technology and history. It was felt that in order to keep game related threads uncluttered and easy to use, discussions related to real technology and history should be in a separate thread.

The deeply engaging and interesting gameplay of SHIV undoubtedly raises a lot of questions about the real world counterparts of the boats you play and this thread is aimed at answering those questions.

Suggested topics for this thread include (but are not necessarily limited to):

*How a real submarine works, how it dives, surfaces, maintains depth, shoots torpedoes, etc. Periscopes, radar, sonar, gun armament, hull types, auxiliary systems, engines, etc.

*Attack and defensive techniques.

*Life as a crew member of a submarine.

*Submarine Force history.

*WWII and the impact of submarine operations on the war effort.

If you have specific questions related to game play issues or mods, search the existing threads or create a new one. One of the experienced players will be happy to assist you.

I am a Chief Petty Officer in the United States Navy and a qualified submarine sailor. I served aboard the USS Darter SS-576 during the Cold War, a diesel boat very similar to the fleet boats played in SHIV. I am also the co-founder and author of a submarine history website.

In no way do I claim to be all knowing or all seeing. Therefore, I highly encourage anyone with information relevant to the discussion to contribute.

Okay, let's get started. Ask away !!

Dave

Rockin Robbins

01-29-09, 08:41 PM

Good. I'll lead off with a question that you might not be able to completely answer. In Clear the Bridge, Dick O'Kane mentions setting up the PK and when he's happy with the solution, he sets up for a constant bearing attack. He points the scope at the shoot bearing and turns the bearing crank backwards to stop the bearing. However the AoB keeps updating and the speed of course, remains the same. This way he can shoot as juicy parts of the target cross the wire.

All this implies that there was a direct connection between the periscope bearing and the TDC, such as modeled in the U-Boat for SH3 and SH4. In addition, Nisgeis has reported that such an automatic TDC input from the periscope did exist.

What do you know about all that? And do you know if it was there in WWII?

Pvt. Public

01-29-09, 08:53 PM

ReallyDedPoet

01-29-09, 08:57 PM

DaveyJ576

01-29-09, 09:30 PM

Great. A hard one to start off with! Thanks! :doh:

Anyway, you are correct. Based on electronic input from the gyro compass, there was an automatic input to the TDC from the scope. A dial on the TDC showed the bearing the scope was on.

Pre-war doctrine for torpedo spreads called for a seemingly unusual tactic. One fish would be aimed to slightly miss forward. One would be aimed to miss slightly aft, and one (or two depending on the size of the target) would be aimed to hit amidships. Why? Well, one of the hardest things to estimate, but extremely important to the firing solution is target speed. If your target is going faster than what you estimate, the fish will miss astern. If it is going slower than estimate, they will miss ahead. Aiming one a little forward an one a little aft eliminates uncertainty in target speed, virtually guaranteeing at least two hits out of three. But it also virtually guarantees that at least one, and maybe two of the fish will miss! Kind of a wasteful practice if you ask me. One way of reducing the uncertainty was repeated observations of the target so that your solution could be smoothed. The flip side to this (there is always a flip side!) is that you have to expose your scope more and thus have more chances to be sighted.

As training intensified after the war started, our skippers got better and better at estimating target speed by observing the bow wave generated by the target, and the sonar operators got better at counting propeller revolutions for speed estitmates. Dick O'Kane and his crew were masters at this and he aimed all his fish to hit. His constant bearing method was part of this firing doctrine.

Dave

DaveyJ576

01-29-09, 09:55 PM

CDR Resser

01-29-09, 10:03 PM

Could you provide the web address of your website. Thanks for all your info.

DaveyJ576

01-29-09, 10:04 PM

Nice idea for a thread :yep: Thanks for doing this.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f0/USS_Darter_%28SS-576%29.jpg/300px-USS_Darter_%28SS-576%29.jpg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USS_Darter_(SS-576).jpg)

Always great to hear from folks who are doing, or did this in real life, look forward to seeing
this thread progress. I am sure I'll have a question or two to ask at some point.

RDP

I love this shot of the ol' Darter Maru. This one was taken not long after I left the boat. She is pulling into the Maebata Ordnance Facility in Sasebo, Japan were we were homeported. Notice that the forward torpedo loading skid is rigged up on the forward deck

Dave

DaveyJ576

01-29-09, 10:11 PM

Ric Hedman is the webmaster of our site www.pigboats.com (http://www.pigboats.com). A third co-founder, Rick Larson passed away last year. Ric also has a tremendous companion site called Through the Looking Glass: A Photo Essay of Submarines 1900-1940, a link for which is on the right side of the main page. Check it out as well.

Both sites are non-profit and ad free.

Surf back to them often. New material is added as often as we create it! :)

Dave

CDR Resser

01-29-09, 10:31 PM

Thanks Dave. Looks like a great site. Can't wait to go through it in more detail.

Respectfully Submitted;
CDR Resser

Rockin Robbins

01-30-09, 08:06 AM

how well could a sub mask its signature if it sat as close to the bottom as possible in water shallow enough? i understand that a sandy bottom wouldnt echo, but what if its really rocky? and somewhat related, has a submarine ever settled on the bottom to avoid detection?
I can provide further info from an extinct website of the United States Submarine Veterans of World War II. Supposedly it is moving to another website administered by veterans, but these people are literally dying off quicker than they can shore up their websites and they haven't reached outside their own WWII subvet community. I think they don't believe we'd be interested and that this information is theirs alone. I'm going to quote the entire story rather than reference the Wayback Machine. This may be the only place left that will contain this story of the Tambor and the bright idea of grounding to avoid an escort. Let's just say it didn't work out too well. They were nearly killed by the escort and they very nearly couldn't surface after the hours long attack was over. I apologize for the long quote but it is necessary.

We Remember The Tambor
By: The Crew
and
Presented by: Ray Werbrich

It is truly said "War experiences are never forgotten." We may try, and try, but we can't forget. And even when we succumb to gentle urgings of friends to describe incidents that hold special meanings in memory, we tend to minimize the actual happenings -- often narrating things in a light vein lest we appear boastful.

Well, December 7th in 1941 came upon us all without warning. The TAMBOR, under the commend of Lt. Cdr. John Murphy, was the flagship of the Sixth Subron, patrolling off Wake Island. The TAMBOR was one hell of a good boat, and today, after some forty-five years, it somehow still feels strange to use the word war. We who served in her, can recall the many engagements she endured, and her ways of always somehow managing to come out in one piece. Well, nearly one piece. The TAMBOR was the first to report the location of the approaching Japanese task force off Midway island and this, for the TAMBOR and her crew, was the beginning of action -- action which today reflects a unique achievement, and well-deserved glory.

In the "Midway Battle" the TAMBOR received half-credit for sinking the Japanese cruiser Mikuma, and also for causing heavy damage to the cruiser Mogami without firing a shot. When the Japanese made a concentrated effort to salvage parts of the heavy cruiser USS Houston, the TAMBOR was dispatched to stop that operation. Further, the TAMBOR transported ammunition, medical supplies, and guerillas to the Philippines, laid mines in Hainan Strait, and engaged in many "wolfpack" operations.

Attesting to these exploits, as we all remember, TAMBOR's part in the Midway Battle was featured in Life magazine. Landing the guerillas at Pagodian Bay in Mindanao became a motion picture with John Wayne in the leading role. In another action, when the TAMBOR sank a Japanese gunboat; we made the front page of New York's Daily News and were written up and pictured in newspapers across the entire United States. The depiction of these actions can be read quickly and effortlessly, but the reading and visualizing can in no way be a substitute for the physical and emotional stresses endured by the Captain and the crew. Not to mention feeling the inherent quality and character of a submarine like the TAMBOR. We remember the TAMBOR for what she was. She survived more than seventy depth charges in just one attack in the China Sea! She could almost be heard to console us -- "Don't worry -- I'II bring you home."

With Lt. Cdr. R. Kefauver in command, we were making an end-around run to get ahead of a small Japanese convoy of one freighter, a tanker, and one brand new destroyer. The calculation was that the convoy would reach its destination the following day, and therefore, we had to close in, in a hurry for our attack. With the sky brightening in the east, we knew we had a now-or-never situation.

The tracking group began its work. Bill Shoop was on the radar in the conning tower calling out readings to William Wood and Elmer Atchison. Plotting officers, Vito Vitucci, radar officer, and Walter Post, T.D.C. operator. Battle stations were sounded at 0400.

In a flooded-down approach, we closed for the attack. Captain Kefauver, with the Executive Officer, Ed Spruance as Assistant Approach Officer, were on the bridge. Bill Reynolds was on the port side of the periscope shears, Tom Lampley on the starboard, and Clarence Erich to the stern.

Bill Reynolds was facing directly at the convoy. Later he said he got a queasy feeling in his stomach and a trembling in his hands and legs as he heard the target ranges shorten and the targets became discernable. The freighter and the tanker loomed into view, but the escorting destroyer was hidden by the haze.

The order to fire was given, and there was the usual gentle tug on the boat as the high-pressure air expelled the torpedo from the tube. Bill Reynolds' glasses were on the freighter. Ariake Maru. He saw the first hit ... a plume of sea water spewing upwards and a split second later ... the loud explosion! One Japanese freighter consigned to the deep.

Bill Reynolds shifted his glasses to the tanker, Goyo Maru. The methodical calculations, the torpedo on its way. Then the geyser and the explosion. Bill said he saw a flicker of flame appear from the stack, and then it died down completely but in the next instant there was a sight never to be forgotten. The whole horizon turned into day as the tanker exploded, lighting up the whole China Sea.

While our radar had picked up the relative position of the escort destroyer, we at last saw her in the brightness of the exploding tanker.

Radarman Bill Shoop's voice rose to high pitch. The angle on the bow was 90 degrees starboard. Within seconds it was 0 degrees. The range was closing fast.

The claxon sounded, Dive! Dive! All hands below! The bridge was cleared, the last man closing the hatch. Vents were opened and all eyes were on the depth gauge: The needle seemed to just hang there ... an eternity before the bow got on the down angle and we headed below.

But that Japanese destroyer had no intention of losing us. Even as we were diving, he was right on us. On his first run, he dropped about a dozen depth charges. We were thus forced to take evasive measures and race for deeper water.

Gordon "Red," Mayo was on the sound gear and he heard the destroyer change to short scale pinging, and increasedher speed. It meant that we could expect another run.

Captain Kefauver decided to head for the sea floor. Down...down...and we finally settle on sand at 268 feet. We were now a completely silent submarine just sitting and waiting.

The next string of charges were too close, far too close. Something was betraying our position to the destroyer up there. And that destroyer was stubborn -- for the next fifteen hours the TAMBOR was taking depth charge after depth charge. Every man was wondering how much pounding the TAMBOR could take without splitting her hull.

The depth charges came, one on top of another, and with the most uncanny accuracy! It was Bob Freedman who asked "Was that one closer than before?" Sitting next to him, Claude Brown just shrugged and didn't bother to define close or closer.

We were in shallow enough water to hear the destroyer's screws above us: the sound was like a train crossing a railroad trestle. First a distinct sound, like a hum, then increasing rapidly in volume to a roar as he approached, and then the sound decreasing quite rapidly. And on each run we had to take two depth charges. We could hear them hit the water, then, came the click of the firing pin, the snap of a detonator, and then the loud rumble of the depth charge. The sound and implication of a depth charge landing on the deck, rolling slowly, thump, thump, thump, across the deck, bouncing on the outer hull and then sloping in the sand can only be understood from experience. Just thinking of it... Pause, and then the renewed attack. We can think of it now, forty-five years later, and it still produces chills up and down your spine. Any one of those depth charges could have been the last one we would ever hear ...

The movie depictions of a depth charge attack, with the violent rocking of the boat (in the studio setup) and the crew being tossed around, is ludicrous. In reality, it just doesn't happen that way, as anyone in the crew can tell you. What really happens is something like an instant concussion! A shock! It can cause a lightbulb, hanging from a six inch cord, to burst. The shock of the concussion will cause pipe connections, gauge glasses, and mirrors to break.

Enginemen Ray Bouffard and Warren Link were standing at the throttle area of the engine room when one of the blasts went off and in that instant they found themselves staring at a wall of water.

"This is it!" they thought. Jack Semmelrath and John Scaduto, standing alongside Ray and Warren, thought the same thing. "Trapped ! No Escape! "

But the strange thing was that the wall of water didn't move. Reacting automatically, the men put their hands out to stem the flow, but their hands went right through the water! Then they realized that what had happened was the cooling water gasket flange on number two main engine had been forced loose and water was shooting across the entire area of the engine room.

Ray resolved the problem almost as quickly as it had happened. We waited, and we listened. The sound of air escaping under pressure was definite and unmistakable. We agreed that we had ruptured a line to our air bottles in the fuel ballast tank located just off of the battery compartment bulkhead. The situation was serious, because escaping air would indicate our position to the enemy. Knowing the depth, and the run of the current, that destroyer could figure out our exact location.

Captain Kefauver came through later for a personal assessment of our problems and the boat's condition. We had done the best we could under the circumstances, and the Captain knew it. He took the time to speak to each man individually. When living in close confinement for a long period of time you get to know unique characteristics that lock a man in memory, and Captain Kefauver added to that moment a remark that fitted the occasion and made the incident very special for us. As the Captain was turning to leave, he gave us a long look, then said. "Good luck. I'm proud to be your shipmate.

Yes, sir. We were proud to be in the TAMBOR, with him!

Topside, that destroyer was making perfect runs, dumping depth charges all the time. He just wasn't going to stop until he was sure he'd done a complete job.

In the TAMBOR everything was a mess. The conning tower and pump room bilges were full of water. With the air conditioning out, we were breathing humid air. Cork was everywhere. No need to say the situation was wearing us down. The crew members, in sleeping areas not assigned to specific duties tried to get what sleep they could.

But rest was impossible. Two depth charges were laid right on top of us! The destroyer turned and put two more so close that our ears rang. This was a contest -- who would stand the hammering best, the crew or the TAMBOR. It was definitely not the time for humor, but there's always one in every crowd. Fred Richardson said, "When you hear the rumble of the depth charges you know the TAMBOR has made another attack." He was right -- we never sank an enemy ship without getting depth charged.

Carlos "Nip" Howard, a very popular and valued shipmate, just five days earlier had saved us from being rammed. During a lull, after Fred's wry humor, we had time to reflect how Nip had fired his 20mm gun at nearly point-blank range at the bridge of the Shunai Maru, with the startling result that the enemy lost control and gave us the momentary advantage and time in which to sink him. Now Nip was sitting on the floor of the control room, staring into space. "Hey. Bill." Nip called out. "Are you scared?"

"Bill Reynolds said "no" in a flat voice. "l'm not either." Nip retorted dryly. Everyone laughed. At this point the only thing we had was a kind of suppressed bravado.

We went back to sweeping cork, paint chips, and glass on the control room deck. It was better to keep busy than to wonder how many more depth charges would be dropped on us, and how we would react to them. As two more depth charges went off, one of the men shook his head in wonderment, said, "Some boat -- she sure can take it." Now, thinking back, the remark certainly did justice to the glory of the TAMBOR.

The maneuvering room was having its troubles. The packing glands on both screw shafts were leaking. Long ago we had conceded that Roy "Foo" Rausher was the strongest man on the boat -- when Foo tightened something, it always took two men and a boy to loosen it. Yet even his strength was of no avail as he struggled to crank tight the nuts in an effort to stop the shaft leaks. When the water reached the motor room deck plates, we had to form a bucket brigade to the after torpedo room with Charles. "Chesty" De Bay, Rex Harvey. Robert Galloway, Robert Koostra, and Foo. They worked feverishly, bailing and passing buckets as fast as they could after every depth charge attack. Anticipating the next depth charges, they would shut the water tight door and wait out the attack.

The after torpedo room was having water problems. They had to chain-fall the escape hatch as well as the torpedo loading hatch because the latch dogs wouldn't hold tight after a close depth charge. The torpedo room bilges could accept more water than the maneuvering room, and the above procedure was necessary to protect the main motors from getting wet.

By now it was getting late in the day and we were counting on the telltale escaping bubbles to be difficult to spot by the enemy. Also, we felt our silence on the sea floor should make him believe he had destroyed us. After all, what boat could withstand seventy depth charges, placed quite accurately, and survive?

The hours passed. The TAMBOR lay silent on the ocean floor. All we could do was remain silent, and wait...

No sound was reaching us from above for quite some time, and Captain Kefauver decided to risk surfacing. Was the enemy cunning enough to be waiting for us? There was no way to tell. We went into action. But deciding to surface, and really surfacing were two different things. The TAMBOR had been sitting on the bottom for over fifteen hours, and the sand had locked her in solidly. Instead of being at 268 feet, we had settled to 280 feet! Even with all the tanks blown, she couldn't be budged. Power to the screws had to be used cautiously. The screws couldn't turn. We were stuck!

All stations had to be manned to react to surfacing and other necessary underway operations. We moved water. We pumped bilges. We even blew the heads. Inch by inch, and with thanks to William Blankenbaker, Chief of the boat, and his skill as a diving officer, he resorted to using air bubbles in the tanks for added buoyancy, and at last we broke loose. It was then a tense few minutes to the surface, all the while maintaining control of the boat. Blankenbaker had two compartments still partially flooded, so that keeping the TAMBOR level was far from an ordinary job.

With most of the gauges inoperative, we did not know how much pressure we had in the boat. The gauges were either not reading correctly because of the shocks from the depth charges, or broken glass had shifted the original setting.

When the Conning Tower hatch was finally opened, the pressure almost carried the man up the ladder. The sudden change in air pressure was far more than we had ever before experienced. In an instant the conning tower air turned to a smokey blue vapor, and topside the odor of diesel fuel was heavy. As we scanned an empty horizon, we breathed a sigh of relief.

When the engines were called on the line we found the governor base on Number 2 engine cracked. With some extra coaxing, the other engines responded. The seven hundred KW. auxiliary engine was put on battery charge, and, with some jury rigging, we finally got the governor to perform and eventually had all four engines putting distance between us and that unlucky location.

The time had arrived to assess our damage in detail, and then attempt to restore the TAMBOR to fighting trim. Even a casual glance told us that nothing had escaped serious damage, so we set to work.

It took many hours of concentrated work, with Bob Hunt directing the forward torpedo room repairs to restore the most crucial part to use and reload the torpedoes into the tubes. The turbo blower had been ripped off its base, the bolts totally gone. Gus Builder, Auxiliaryman, worked with Warren Link to fashion bolts on the boat's lathe from raw stock. Gus hand-filled the hex-heads on these bolts and retapped the old holes, making it possible to refasten the blower to its base.

Both our compressors were destroyed, almost beyond use, which meant we could not jam air. We would be restricted to the use of whatever air remained in the stored bottles for dives and torpedo shots. Not a good prospect. In the end. Gus and Art Stickle cannibalized two compressors into one good one. It goes without saying that the motor on the turbo blower needed repair. This was efficiently handled by "Chesty" De Bay.

There were two serious leaks in the high pressure line in the battery well, threatening a dangerous rise in pressure in the boat. William Wood and Gus Builder, with no concern for their own safety, stretched themselves flat on a rubber sheet placed over the battery cell tops. They repaired the leaks all right, but they also received several severe shocks before completing the job. Our air conditioning system was so full of line leaks that it could not be repaired. The refrigeration for our food freezer was also finished -- the food had already started to defrost. Number one periscope was flooded, as was the S.D. radar mast. The radio antenna was gone.

The radio compartment itself was not in bad shape, except for the damaged antenna allowing water to leak onto the transmitter. Bill Shoop. Harvey Rebensterf, and "Red" Maya divided the work into areas of expertise, and went to it. They somehow succeeded in getting a weak signal by running a lead from the transmitter through the control room and out the conning tower hatch. We stationed a man there with an axe -- just in case we had to dive in a hurry. Another antenna was rigged in make-shift style across the deck as far as its length allowed. Incidentally during this work "Red" Mayo discovered he was deaf in one ear from listening to depth charges on the sound gear. His condition lasted exactly ten days.

Robert Dye sat on the control room deck, struggling to fix the S.D. radar. The filament leads of the tube that drives the spark coil were shorted. Our cipher keys were outdated, and we had no reception from Pearl Harbor. Since our messages were not being received by our operational commanders, the TAMBOR, ten days overdue, was presumed lost. "Tokyo Rose," reported us as being sunk! This presumption was brought to the attention of Vito Vitucci's wife while she was on duty at the Naval Communications Station in Washington, D.C. But soon, as our weak radio transmissions were picked up, our real fate was known.

The conning tower, to keep the record straight. was a near total wreck. Glass. cork, charts, and anything else that could be torn loose was on the deck. The Torpedo Data Computer was hanging from its fastenings: two dials were missing, but we located them in the periscope well ! How to fish them out? Walter Post and Elmer Atchison made a yoke out of a pillow and two heaving lines and lowered Warren Link with a flashlight hanging from his neck to the bottom to pick up the much needed dials. Then, working continuously for fourteen hours. Post got the computer into operation and "Atch" managed to get the navigational and plotting gear in order.

The five inch fifty-one gun on the after deck was off its trunnions. Imagine the power of the depth charge that lifted such a weight! And with the muzzle bracketed in place.

The depth charges that went off real close to the TAMBOR left several large grey-white blotches on the superstructure. Subsequent examination revealed a twenty-one inch split in the port side of the fuel ballast tank. We had thus lost a few thousand gallons of fuel oil, along with the air we heard escaping from the air bottles. At the time the destroyer kept hammering us, that vast amount of fuel oil must have convinced the enemy that he had done us in completely. The TAMBOR, we felt, seemed to have her own way of fooling the enemy -- to protect us.

Now we shifted fuel, but soon realized that the only way to rid ourselves of the oil leak was to flush the tank, and this could be accomplished only by reconverting the valves in the superstructure. John Scaduto, our "Oil King." and Warren Link volunteered to make the conversion, which meant crawling among a jumble of lines and removing the blanking plates so the tanks could be blown and then be operated as a regular ballast tank. Captain Kefauver warned the men that he could not jeopardize the boat in the event of being spotted, and that he would dive if it become absolutely necessary.

"Yes, sir." And you can be sure a record was set for that type of conversion. The bolts had to be removed and kept in shirt pockets, and then reinstalled and tightened sufficiently to hold the pressure of the entire tank. All this was done by the light of a battle lantern which a man handled from the deck. When the job was completed, the valves were quickly tested -- when the high pressure air hit those valves there was a roar like the sound of a boat diving. As our "Oil King" ran past the men on deck on his way to the conning tower, he yelled. "Don't get in my way." So, with the fuel ballast tanks converted and flushed, the oil hazard was presumably, overcome.

The maneuvering room was under "Chesty" De Bay's care, and he had serious problems there. When we started the battery charge, it was with a full voltage ground. We had survived seventy depth charges, and now we faced a possible battery explosion that could wipe us out. "Chesty's" men scurried through the boat trying to resolve all kinds of electrical problems, and many days later, when we reached Midway, they were still chasing problems and fixing them !

In spite of our continuous efforts to pull the after torpedo room hatches tight, they were still leaking. A spirits tank had ruptured from the bulkhead where it had been secured with 3/4 inch bolts. The torpedo tube spindles were bent by the concussion and there was no way we could make them operational. The after tubes were useless. Ole Claussen George Venditelli, and Carl Johnson worked tirelessly to regain use of even one tube so we would have stern protection, but all their efforts were unsuccessful. To think that seventy depth charges could do this to the TAMBOR.

Nine days later the Captain's voice came over the P.A. system. "Boys. I've just completed a thorough inspection of our boat -- as you well know we're in one helluva shape. But I think she's good enough for another shot at "OL Tojo." so if you'll back me up I'd like to see what we can do to another convoy out there. I promise -- one more try and then we'll head for the barn." Objections? You kidding?

We sank another ship, the Ronsau Maru, with one good hit out of the torpedoes spread -- and we received the usual reply of depth charges for our audacity. But this time we were in deep water and our evasive action put us well in the clear. There was not even a close one. At last, we were heading for Midway.

The "Three Musketeers" from Philadelphia, Bill Raymond. Jack O'Brien, and Bill Shoop, finally got a chance to get together. They said they felt as if they were each returning from another world. Their experience had transformed them into true believers. There was only one thing they could say, the one thing all of us could say.

"Thank God -- and the TAMBOR.
How's that for lousy ASW by the Japanese? Who do you believe, the bean counters after the war (the Japanese sucked) or the Tambor crew (they never gave up and only left after they thought they killed us)? The ussubvetsofworldwarii.org site was full of stories like that and they are gone. Only the smug conclusions of the bean counters will remain soon. We spend a lot of energy preserving the boats. Many who did not sail them are working on them.

The stories are many times more precious. But they are dying daily. I have spent dozens of hours on the "Through the Looking Glass" site. I've seen half of it. If these subvets don't look and trust some people outside their own rapidly dwindling number, all these stories will die with them. With the stories will go the truth about how they fought on both sides of the war.

ReallyDedPoet

01-30-09, 08:12 AM

AVGWarhawk

01-30-09, 08:21 AM

DaveyJ576

01-30-09, 09:02 AM

LukeFF

01-31-09, 02:10 AM

DaveyJ576

01-31-09, 08:47 AM

Dave,

In the "Through the Looking Glass" section of the website, there is a picture of what is said to be the S-42 fitted with what is obviously the slotted antenna of SJ-1 radar. Flanking it are what appears to be to S-18 subs, also with the SJ-1 radar antenna. Do you or your cohorts know when that pic was taken? I've pored through the patrol reports for the S boats and can't find any mention of SJ-1.

The pic in question is this one:

http://www.pigboats.com/subs/s42conn.jpg

You have stumbled across a rare photo! I missed this one myself! The advanced age and limited capabilities of the S-boats relegated them mostly to training and secondary patrol duties after 1943. Because of this, they received a much lower priority for receiving advanced gear like the SJ-1. Most of the S-boats didn't receive any radar at all until 1943! This is what leads me to believe that this photo was taken later in the war, probably late '44 or early '45. By that time, enough of the SJ-1 sets would have been available to warrant their installation in the S-boats. S-42 received her last major overhaul in Brisbane in October, 1944 and this is when this radar set may have been installed, but it is possible that she got it as early as March '44 in Pearl Harbor.

DaveyJ576

01-31-09, 10:29 AM

Silent Hunter IV is pretty accurate historically. For a game developed in Europe, I have been impressed with all the things they got right, especially in some of the minor details. But one thing they really goofed on is Midway Island.

Every time I have run a SHIV patrol out of Midway or stopped off for fuel, there have been dozens of warships present, including carriers and battleships. Sometimes the number of ships present exceeds that of Pearl Harbor! NEVER, at any time during the war, was Midway a major fleet anchorage or base. It is only 2.4 square miles in size and has no source of fresh water. None of the three islands of the atoll are large enough to support a major fuel facility or repair yard. Only a major construction project enabled the basing of submarines there, and even then the repair "facilities" only consisted of submarine tenders, floating drydocks, and a few tugs. Having 3 or 4 subs in port for refit along with the tender crews almost overwhelmed the atoll's meager facilities.

Despite these limitations, Midway proved to be a valuable advance base for our submarines. It was 1,300 miles closer to the patrol areas off Japan and thus saved our boats valuable transit time and fuel, allowing longer patrols in Empire areas.

Platapus

01-31-09, 01:37 PM

I have a question that has been bugging me for a while.

While in a submarine, what are the rules about wearing your cover (hat)?:shucks:

NEON DEON

01-31-09, 03:06 PM

The S 44 and her refit.

http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/08155.htm

"S-44 (SS-155), was one of six E.B. boat's extensivley modernized during WW II. The refit included installation of air conditioning, with the unit installed in the crew space abaft the control room, alongside the refrigerator.
S-44 was fitted with radar (SJ forward, SD abaft the bridge), a loop antenna built into the periscope shears for underwater reception, & a free flooding structure carrying a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun, with a box for 4-in ready-service ammunition below it.
A JK passive sonar, probably installed at Philadelphia during a refit between November & December 1941, was located on the forward deck. On the keel below it was a pair of oxcillators."

There are pictures of the S-44 dated June 11, 1943 on the web site linked above.

DaveyJ576

01-31-09, 04:44 PM

I have a question that has been bugging me for a while.

While in a submarine, what are the rules about wearing your cover (hat)?:shucks:

Rules?! In a submarine??!! :rotfl:

Well, here goes another popular misconception down the drain! Once clear of the harbor, covers get stowed in your locker and don't come out again until the maneuvering watch is set inbound. Many of the CO's had fairly lax "rules" when it came to underway attire. Covers were the first piece of formality to be disposed of once underway.

During the Cold War on the Darter, my usual underway uniform was a ratty blue t-shirt, a pair of diver's shorts, and my high top boots. I have a few photos of my shipmates that make us look like a bunch of pirates!

That was a little on the extreme and the last CO that I had insisted that we at least wear a uniform. Today's navy is a bit more formal!

thor headsplitter

02-01-09, 01:34 AM

How can you remember how to plot if you're face down on the floor Heh Heh Good Times. March ET1/SS:arrgh!:

Platapus

02-01-09, 08:54 AM

Once clear of the harbor, covers get stowed in your locker and don't come out again until the maneuvering watch is set inbound.

Thanks for clearing that up for me.

dangerclose

02-01-09, 11:40 AM

I am a Chief Petty Officer in the United States Navy and a qualified submarine sailor. I served aboard the USS Darter SS-576 during the Cold War ....

Oh wow! Navy brat here. My dad served aboard the USS Darter between 1982-1985. We lived in Sasebo, then Subic Bay Phillippines during it's overhaul then back to Sasebo. Small world.

dangerclose

02-01-09, 11:45 AM

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f0/USS_Darter_%28SS-576%29.jpg/300px-USS_Darter_%28SS-576%29.jpg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USS_Darter_(SS-576).jpg)

Whoa, nostalgia alert. I used to ride my bike up that mountain in the background. Well, at least to that lodge on the right side.

LukeFF

02-02-09, 01:53 AM

You have stumbled across a rare photo! I missed this one myself! The advanced age and limited capabilities of the S-boats relegated them mostly to training and secondary patrol duties after 1943. Because of this, they received a much lower priority for receiving advanced gear like the SJ-1. Most of the S-boats didn't receive any radar at all until 1943! This is what leads me to believe that this photo was taken later in the war, probably late '44 or early '45. By that time, enough of the SJ-1 sets would have been available to warrant their installation in the S-boats. S-42 received her last major overhaul in Brisbane in October, 1944 and this is when this radar set may have been installed, but it is possible that she got it as early as March '44 in Pearl Harbor.

Thanks, Dave. :) My detective work says that it would have been sometime in late 1943-early 1944. Given that the caption says the photo was taken at Dutch Harbor, I came to that date range based on the following info we do know:

The presence of the 3"/50 gun: the patrol report covering its last 1943 patrol (ending in early October) mentions that the 4"/50 was still installed.
The conning tower configuration was first used on the above-mentioned September-October 1943 patrol.Additionally, we can extract the following info:

The boat to the left is an S-18 class boat, probably S-35.
The boat to the right of S-42 is a mystery. It looks to have a 3"/50 gun in addition to SJ-1. My guess is it's either S-30 or S-41.Whatever the case, it's a very fascinating photo and the only one I've seen of S boats fitted with SJ-1 radar. :yep:

NEON DEON

02-02-09, 01:57 AM

LukeFF

02-02-09, 02:08 AM

Post 19 in this thread:yep:http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0815510.jpg

Different boat, different radar. ;)

NEON DEON

02-02-09, 02:12 AM

Post 19 in this thread:yep:http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0815510.jpg

Different boat, different radar. ;)

X marks the spot!

NEON DEON

02-02-09, 02:17 AM

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/08155101.jpg

DaveyJ576

02-02-09, 11:32 AM

Given that the caption says the photo was taken at Dutch Harbor

Actually, having looked very carefully at the photo, and comparing it to the one immediately ahead of it, I think both photos were actually taken at the same time in Milne Bay. The background just doesn't look like Dutch Harbor. Take a look at the gangplanks, the people on deck, and the shadows in both photos. I have found that sometimes 60 year old memories can play tricks on people and the Dutch Harbor caption was a simple error by the person submitting the photo.

With that said,

The boat to the left is an S-18 class boat, probably S-35.

Assuming that both photos were taken at the same time, the boat on the S-42's starboard side is actually a 20 series S-boat (S-18 and S-20 to 29), not the S-35. If you look at the bow plane pivot housing on the forward superstructure for the boat in question, it is the angular shaped housing of the 20 series boats, not the rounded one of the S-19 and S-30 to 41. I agree that there is not enough to go on for an ID of the boat on S-42's port side.

If I lost anyone on this, let me know and I will explain it further. :06:

LukeFF

02-03-09, 02:52 AM

Good catch there, Dave. You're right it doesn't look like Dutch Harbor at all and most likely Milne Bay. That would put the time of the picture and the one immediately above it to any time from 19 March 1944 onwards.

Those two S-18 boats are indeed a mystery. The longest a "20-something" S boat remained in combat service was the ill-fated S-28, which terminated her last patrol in October 1943, yet she eventually went on to Pearl. I've not read of anything that says she put in training time at Milne Bay. We'll probably never know the ID of those two boats, sadly.

Captain Vlad

02-03-09, 08:20 PM

Urge

02-04-09, 12:01 AM

DaveyJ576 wrote...
Rules?! In a submarine??!!

During the 60s when I was on a diesel boat the uniform of the day on the Carp when we were at sea was shorts, t-shirt and sandals. A few of the crew had earrings and hair was definitely longish by navy standards. Back then sub sailors were the only ones in the navy who could have beards and moustaches and we were also the only enlisted men who could wear civilian clothes off the boat when we were overseas. I remember one weekend in San Juan around 2AM or so the captain brought a woman of very questionable morals back to the boat and she spent the rest of the night in his cabin. Where else in the navy could a lowly seaman get drunk in a bar with the captain.
I had the best %#@?&! time on subs as an 18yr old kid.
Reading the stories on that site that Dave linked to, I knew a bunch of those characters and I lived in Bells when we weren't at sea. Ah, great memories.

Urge

Rip

02-04-09, 12:51 AM

-snip-
-snip- The very ends of the boat at the forward and aft torpedo rooms are single hull sections with the pressure hull exposed. Hit a rock outcropping and puncture the hull here and you have massed quantities of water in the "People Tank", also a very bad thing.

-snip-
Dave

Had to stop and say thanks for saying "People Tank" I haven't heard that term in far to long.

Rip

DaveyJ576

02-04-09, 10:20 AM

Here's a weird one I've always wondered about: When operating in Arctic or otherwise cold conditions, can you feel the difference in temperature while submerged. IE: Through the hull, the ballast tanks, and other insulating stuff.

When running on the surface in northern waters, the boat will get very cold. The main engines draw a lot of air through the boat. I remember many times having to wear a foul weather jacket while on watch in the control room.

But, once you secure the engines and pull the plug, the boat will get very warm. There are a lot of sources of heat inside: electrical systems, batteries, still warm engines, radar, sonar, 80 bodies, etc. While submerged there is no place for the heat to go as no air is exchanged with the outside. What cold that is radiated inward from the hull is quickly negated by these heat sources.

The major problem in northern waters is condensation. The increased heat loads and humidity levels lead to heavy condensation on the cold hull. This condensation then drips into everything, the biggest problem being fires from electrical shorts. The S-boats operating out of Dutch Harbor suffered terribly from this problem. There was cork insulation placed in many areas, but this didn't help much.

This is were air conditioning comes in. Contrary to what some people think, the A/C systems were installed primarily to control humidity levels and reduce condensation, not for crew comfort, although this was a happy side effect. This was a HUGE benefit and it greatly increased reliability in electrical systems and thus resulted in much higher operational readiness.

Wilcke

02-04-09, 04:00 PM

Good information, links, pics and stories! Thanks!

Captain Vlad

02-04-09, 05:12 PM

When running on the surface in northern waters...*snipped for brevity*

Ah, thanks. Like I said, I was curious, and sometimes when writing stories and such I wondered if alluding to the temp would be appropriate.

Nisgeis

02-05-09, 07:28 AM

DaveyJ576

02-05-09, 08:33 AM

Hi Dave,

Do you know what shape the Main Ballast Tanks No. 1 and No.7 that are part of the forward and after torpedo rooms were internally? The drawings in the fleet boat manual has them shown as a U shaped tank, with the outer sides being rounded and the top and middle sections being flat plates, the upper two parts of the U forming the deck of the torpedo rooms. This doesn't seem like a very good shape to withstand pressure, from an engineering point of view as they have large flat surfaces and sharp angles in the corners. There is no signs of any extra thickness in the pressure hull at the top/deck of the torpedo room to compensate for this shape.

Are the fuel ballast tanks actually built as a U shape, with flat sides to the pressure hull?

Wow! Will asked a pretty good question that I will have to answer in a couple of parts. Here is part one:

On the Gato and Balao class boats, the pressure hull was not a perfect cylinder. In order to accomodate the necessary tankage in the forward and after ends of the boat, the designers were forced to radically alter the shape of the pressure hull to accomodate the tankage. Thus, the pressure hull had several kinks in it at the ends. Obviously this was not an optimal situation from an engineering point of view, but it still worked pretty damn well.

MBT #1 was u-shaped and this was done to create a "pit" under a removeable deck in the forward torpedo room. This allowed access to the lowest torpedo stowage racks and provided some stowage for torpedo handling gear. When you were in the pit, you were standing on the pressure hull. MBT #7 was flat topped.

All main ballast tanks are always either completely full or completely empty. Thus, their structure on three side does not have to resist sea pressure. Only the fourth side does and this will be part of the pressure hull. In the case of MBT's 1 & 7, the pressure hull portion of the tank formed the deck you walked on in the torpedo rooms. In other words, the top of the tank was also the bottom of the pressure hull. All other MBT's were in the void space between the inner pressure hull and the outer hydrodynamic hull amidships. A cross section of the hull would make these tanks appear like giant U's, but in reality they were divided into two separate tanks at the keel.

Open flood ports at the bottom let water into the tanks when vents were opened at the top, allowing air that was holding the water back to escape. MBT's #1 & 7 were located under the pressure hull and did not extend up the sides of the hull like the other MBT's. The problem here is that there was no place to put the vents! The solution was to attach large vertical pipes (called risers) to the outboard sides of the tank inside both torpedo rooms. The risers ran upwards through the rooms and out of the top of the pressure hull into the superstucture. Vent valves were placed at the top end of these riser pipes. Once the vents were opened, the air in the tanks would vent through the risers and the tanks would flood.

This was not an optimal design because when the boat was submerged, you had full sea pressure inside these riser pipes, which were inside the pressure hull in the torpedo rooms! Any damage at all to these risers from depth charge attack and you had a big flooding problem really fast (water in the "people tank" = very bad).

As with any problem, there was a solution. The subsequent Tench class boats had their tankage re-arranged. MBT #1 was moved forward so that it could vent directly overhead, eliminating the risers from the forward torpedo room. MBT #7 was found to be redundant and was converted to a variable fuel oil tank.

For a visual representation of what I am refering to click here:

http://www.maritime.org/fleetsub/app...es/figa-04.htm (http://www.maritime.org/fleetsub/appendix/pages/figa-04.htm)

And here:

http://www.maritime.org/fleetsub/chap4.htm#4A

Scroll down to figure 4-1 and you will get an idea of what I am talking about.

DaveyJ576

02-05-09, 10:25 AM

Are the fuel ballast tanks actually built as a U shape, with flat sides to the pressure hull?

Oh yeah I almost forgot. The conversion process for Fuel Ballast Tanks to Main Ballast Tanks was to remove some blanking plates - I'm assuming these were over the vents, as you wouldn't be able to replace ones over the flood ports at sea. The question is why have blanking plates - were the vent valves not secure enough?

Okay, part two.

Fuel ballast tanks are a U-shaped, but the side that is against the pressure hull is not flat. It is contoured to match the curvature of the hull.

The necessity of having long range in the fleet boats really drove the design of the boats. In order to achieve the long ranges needed to conduct Pacific patrols, a vast amount of fuel needed to be carried. The voids between the inner and outer hulls provided excellent storage areas for fuel.

The problem that arose was one of compensation. Fuel oil has weight. As you burn fuel the boat gets lighter. If you burn enough fuel, you would eventually get to the point were you would be so light that you couldn't submerge. So, all the Normal Fuel Oil tanks are compensated with sea water. As fuel is used, water is let into the tanks to make up weight for the used fuel. Fuel floats on water so your fuel suction is at the top of the tank.

But now the exact opposite situation occurs. If all of the fuel tanks were set up like this, eventually you would get so heavy that you may not be able to surface! The solution was ingenious. A portion of your fuel tanks were made into a combination of fuel tank and ballast tank. Once the fuel was used up, you could convert the tank into a Main Ballast Tank which could be blown or flooded like any other MBT.

A Fuel Ballast Tank (FBT) has many of the same features as a MBT. It is shaped the same, it has flood ports at the bottom, and vent valves at the top. It has blowing connections so that it can be blown with high pressure air to surface the boat. Because it carries fuel for part of the voyage, it has some major differences too. Of course it will have suction lines at the top so that fuel can be drawn off as needed. However, unlike an MBT, an FBT has valves at the bottom that will close off the flood ports. This prevents a loss of fuel when the tank is full due to the rolling and pitching of the boat in heavy seas. A FBT also has a sea water compensation system to make up for fuel useage.

Once all the fuel in the tank is used up, converting it to a MBT is fairly simple and can be done at sea by the ship's crew. The flood valves at the bottom are opened and locked in the open position for the remainder of the voyage. Vent valves, which had their operating mechanisms disconnected to prevent accidental opening, are reconnected to the system. The vent valves themselves are located outside the pressure hull in the superstructure. Blank flanges are placed over these vents to prevent them from being unseated during a depth charge attack. If this happened on an MBT it was no big deal. If the vent became unseated on a FBT fuel would leak out through the vents (remember fuel floats on water and is always at the top of the tank). As part of the conversion process, a crewman would have to go into the superstructure (obviously while the boat was on the surface!) and remove these blank flanges from the FBT vents. Once this was done, high pressure air valves for the blowing system were unlocked and made ready for use. The last step in the conversion process was flooding and blowing the tank several times to flush out any residual fuel. Once done, your FBT was now a MBT and was operated in exactly the same way.

DaveyJ576

02-05-09, 07:49 PM

Also, after having a look at the pictures of the sections being constructed before assembly, it appears that the bulkheads are a single sheet welded at the ends of the pressure hull. Were the bulkheads made to fit inside the pressure hull, or were they the same diameter as the pressure hull. IE, when two sections were joined was it pressure hull - pressure hull, or was it pressure hull - bulkhead - pressure hull?

I also have a question about Normal Fuel Oil Tank number one. Was it completely sealed externally, with only valves to drain and fill from the inside in the forward topedo room? Even the fuel filling lines seem to be routed throught the torpedo room, so were there any hull openings at all through the pressure hull where Normal Fuel Oil Tank number one is?

Finally, how thick are the dividers between the ballast tanks? The drawings seem to indicate that they are fairly thick - were they?

Okay here is part three:

1. The bulkheads were built internal to the pressure hull sections and those sections were welded directly to each other. To do it the other way would have effectively doubled the number of critical welds. For obvious quality control reasons, this number was sought to be kept as low as possible.

2. NFO tanks were "sealed" from the sea. They did not have vents or flood ports like a FBT. However, as mentioned before these tanks were compensated to sea pressure in order to maintain proper ballast. Thus they did not have to be built heavy to resist full submergence pressure. Keep in mind though, that one side of these tanks was the pressure hull.

3. I do not have specific figures for the thickness of the divider between MBT's. Note that this "divider" was actually the ship's keel, so being a primary strength member for the boat it was pretty strong. There were limber holes cut in the keel so that the water could freely move from one side of the tank to the other, so in essence the tanks were not really divided.

Whew! That was a long series of questions. Time for a nap! :D

DaveyJ576

02-05-09, 08:27 PM

Before you guys get too amazed at my seemingly inexhaustible supply of submarine minutia, I have to admit that I had to do quite a bit of research to answer the questions above effectively. I even conferred with a few of my fellow submarine veterans. One of these guys was Bill Parker, a docent at the USS Pampanito museum in San Francisco. In picking his brain, he reminded me of something that I already knew, but that justifies repeating. I quote Bill:

"After many yard periods including major overhauls, the one thing I learned above all else is that 2 boats could be built by the same yard at the same time to the same set of plans and still hit the water with different configurations.

Some differences were cosmetic, often resulting from the PCO and commissioning crew's preferences, (e.g. main deck gun forward or aft, where a locker was placed, etc.) and others were more significant because shortages of various equipment during the massive building program of WWII forced dockside changes in order to maintain a production schedule."

In considering this stuff it is important to understand that literally no two boats were exactly identical. Publications like The Fleet Type Submarine (NAVPERS 16160) and authors like John Alden, Norman Friedman, and Norman Polmar even though highly respected and very accurate were by necessity forced to generalize when writing about the boats. They simply could not account for every variation or modification. This will sometimes account for "mistakes" they made or for differences in "facts" from one author or publication to the next.

For those of you who have not already done so, I would highly encourage you to visit one of the many fleet boat museums around the country. It is a fascinating and rewarding experience that will leave you with a whole new appreciation for what the sub vets went through during their service to the country. For those of you who live in other countries, there are several submarines from other navies on display around the world, too. Stop and talk to the docents if you have a chance. They love to talk about their boats and are happy to educate people.

For a list of submarine and naval museums around the world, check out the Historic Naval Ships Association at http://www.hnsa.org/index.htm

Okay, now it is time for a nap! :D

Nisgeis

02-06-09, 06:22 AM

Thanks very much for the info. I've done a lot of research, but some of it I have to assume certain things that may or may not be true. Sometimes it turns out that something I assumed was right and other times not. It's great to get the info from the someone who has knows, or knows someone that knows.

Do you know how thick the bulkheads were? OK, I'll lay off the questions now :).

Thanks again.

LukeFF

02-07-09, 02:44 AM

Dave,

Is the watch system simulated in SH4 (4 hours on, 8 hours off), similar to what was practiced during WWII, and if not, how was it different?

DaveyJ576

02-07-09, 05:48 PM

Do you know how thick the bulkheads were?

The internal bulkheads on the wartime boats that separated the different compartments were rated to the same strength as the pressure hull. As to the exact thickness I don't have the figure.

On some of the post-war submarines (like my Darter) the bulkheads were thinned out to save overall weight. This resulted in a crush depth for the bulkheads of about half what the outside pressure hull was. In other words, as long as the boat was dry internally, you were okay. But flood a compartment and the bulkhead would collapse long before the rest of the pressure hull would. It kind of invalidated the whole reason for having a watertight bulkhead to begin with, if you ask me.

Well, as we used to say, as long as the number of surfaces equaled the number of dives, you were good to go!! :DL

DaveyJ576

02-07-09, 05:55 PM

Is the watch system simulated in SH4 (4 hours on, 8 hours off), similar to what was practiced during WWII, and if not, how was it different?

Luke,

You are correct. All hands (except the captain) were divided into three watch sections and this continuously rotated 4 on, 8 off the whole time you were at sea. Unfortunately, you rarely got a whole 8 hours in the rack. You were lucky to get 2 or 3 uninterupted hours of sleep at a time.

Post-war the Submarine Service changed things up a bit and the watch rotation changed to 6 on and 12 off. Even still, sleep was at a premium and you got it in when you could.

neotekgeek

02-07-09, 06:27 PM

Davey,

Firstly, thank you for your service. Secondly, hi everybody, my first post. :DL

I'm reading the reports from: http://www.subvetpaul.com/52BoatsIndex.htm. Very often it's indicated that a radio transmission was sent to a sub, requesting it give status. Sometimes ordering it to respond, it would seem. Given the nature of a sub having little to no contact during radio silence, being submerged or other various reasons; how is it they receive the message? Was the message rebroadcast at intervals or relayed from other ships?

If it was simply rebroadcast, who was privy to the information? I can only imagine the hit morale would take if you kept receiving radio traffic for another sub to make contact.

Again, thank you for your service!

DaveyJ576

02-08-09, 12:16 PM

I'm reading the reports from: http://www.subvetpaul.com/52BoatsIndex.htm. Very often it's indicated that a radio transmission was sent to a sub, requesting it give status. Sometimes ordering it to respond, it would seem. Given the nature of a sub having little to no contact during radio silence, being submerged or other various reasons; how is it they receive the message? Was the message rebroadcast at intervals or relayed from other ships?

If it was simply rebroadcast, who was privy to the information? I can only imagine the hit morale would take if you kept receiving radio traffic for another sub to make contact.

Neo,

Welcome! I think there should be some sort of prize for a "Stump the Chump" question on your first post! Communications was a little outside my area of expertise and information on this subject is rather fragmentary. If anyone else can answer this question more completely, please contribute.

As I understand it, there was a regular encoded broadcast called the Fox sent out containing information for all boats at sea. The Fox sched was repeated several times a day in case a boat was at deep submergence and could not receive. Each boat had a four digit call sign. The radiomen would tune their gear to the proper frequency at the proper time and listen for their call sign. After taking down the letter groups, they would decode it and get the message to the captain for action. Any replies were encoded and sent out as soon as possible.

With the volume of traffic on each Fox broadcast, it was not feasible for the radiomen to decode the entire broadcast. They listened for their call sign and passed on the rest. Radiomen however, are kind of a tight bunch and they usually knew each other's call sign. Repeated calls to a certain boat were usually the first sign that there was a problem. Most of the time, though, the first you knew of a missing boat was when you returned to port.

Not responding to a message was not necessarily a bad sign. Radio antennas and aerials were kind of fragile and were easily damaged by depth charges or bad weather. Many times the Radiomen had to make jury-rigged repairs to their gear at sea and sometimes the boats lost all comms and could not report in until they reached port. For this reason, unless some sort of independent confirmation was received ahead of time (which was rare) no official word was put out until the boat was several days overdue in returning.

The above info is based in part on educated guesses. If anyone has more or better info, please contribute.

DarkFish

02-08-09, 12:59 PM

Given the nature of a sub having little to no contact during radio silence, being submerged or other various reasons; how is it they receive the message? Was the message rebroadcast at intervals or relayed from other ships?First of all welcome to subsim:up:
I don't think receiving radio messages was a big problem. Submarines sailed surfaced most of the time and only dived when really necessary. So the chance of a sub being submerged on the rare occasion a message was sent to it was really minor.
I don't know what they did if a sub failed to reply, but my guess would be to rebroadcast the message after a couple of hours if it was an important message.

Bosje

02-10-09, 09:51 PM

fantastic thread
how does one add those appreciation stars to threads?

dave, could you gloss over this thread and correct me/us where I/we went wrong?
http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?t=143174

much appreciated

kudos, bosje

AVGWarhawk

02-11-09, 10:38 AM

I'm reading the reports from: http://www.subvetpaul.com/52BoatsIndex.htm. Very often it's indicated that a radio transmission was sent to a sub, requesting it give status. Sometimes ordering it to respond, it would seem. Given the nature of a sub having little to no contact during radio silence, being submerged or other various reasons; how is it they receive the message? Was the message rebroadcast at intervals or relayed from other ships?

If it was simply rebroadcast, who was privy to the information? I can only imagine the hit morale would take if you kept receiving radio traffic for another sub to make contact.
Neo,

Welcome! I think there should be some sort of prize for a "Stump the Chump" question on your first post! Communications was a little outside my area of expertise and information on this subject is rather fragmentary. If anyone else can answer this question more completely, please contribute.

As I understand it, there was a regular encoded broadcast called the Fox sent out containing information for all boats at sea. The Fox sched was repeated several times a day in case a boat was at deep submergence and could not receive. Each boat had a four digit call sign. The radiomen would tune their gear to the proper frequency at the proper time and listen for their call sign. After taking down the letter groups, they would decode it and get the message to the captain for action. Any replies were encoded and sent out as soon as possible.

With the volume of traffic on each Fox broadcast, it was not feasible for the radiomen to decode the entire broadcast. They listened for their call sign and passed on the rest. Radiomen however, are kind of a tight bunch and they usually knew each other's call sign. Repeated calls to a certain boat were usually the first sign that there was a problem. Most of the time, though, the first you knew of a missing boat was when you returned to port.

Not responding to a message was not necessarily a bad sign. Radio antennas and aerials were kind of fragile and were easily damaged by depth charges or bad weather. Many times the Radiomen had to make jury-rigged repairs to their gear at sea and sometimes the boats lost all comms and could not report in until they reached port. For this reason, unless some sort of independent confirmation was received ahead of time (which was rare) no official word was put out until the boat was several days overdue in returning.

The above info is based in part on educated guesses. If anyone has more or better info, please contribute.
Sometimes the skippers did not respond because they were "busy":hmmm: Flukey did not answer on the patrol he was using rockets for the very first time. As DaveJ stated, it was not always a bad sign. Flukey would not return until every last weapon was exhausted....period. The patrol Flukey used the rockets on, he ignored the calls because laying waste a village and other targets of opportunity were not going to escape his sights.

AVGWarhawk

02-11-09, 10:39 AM

Bosje

02-11-09, 05:17 PM

yeah i got it by experimenting with the buttons :smug:
thanks :)

DaveyJ576

02-12-09, 10:46 PM

I will be on a family vacation all next week, so here is a long post to keep you busy:

In general, USN submarine skippers in the pre-war period were by and large a very cautious group. This led to some serious issues when the war started. There were several reasons behind this:

1. Being Lieutenants or Lieutenant Commanders they were too junior to have any experience from WWI. Even if they had, our contribution submarine wise to the first war was very limited and nothing on the order of what the Germans and British had. We just didn't have the time to develop comprehensive and cohesive strategies and tactics for the sub force during the first war. With the exception of this less than one year limited taste of combat, the U.S. Submarine Force was completely untested.

2. Several notable submarine accidents with the resultant losses of the boat and/or the crew in the interwar years (S-5, S-51, S-4, and O-5 among others) had focused a lot of negative publicity on the force. The problems in the Submarine Service mirrored what was going on in the rest of the Navy (USS Mississippi turret explosion, Point Honda disaster). Pressure on the Navy Department from the press and the Congress to stop the accidents caused a new emphasis on safety and caution to creep into operational orders. Placing your boat in any situation that smelled of danger was frowned upon to put it mildly.

3. Despite the problems of caution noted above the Navy was eager to showcase what it could do. Heavy emphasis was placed on the annual Fleet Problem (a fleet wide exercise), various smaller exercises, and the Presidential pass-in-review. These things were hyped up and promoted and the desire to have them come off seamlessly and problem free was foremost in the minds of the admirals. Excellence in performance during these exercises became one of the prime considerations for promotions. Aggressive sub skippers were judged to be reckless and their boats were ruled as “sunk” in the exercises. Given the relatively small size of the Navy after the post-WWI draw down and the lack of promotional opportunities this provided for officers, the desire to not screw up and follow the script became paramount in the minds of many sub skippers. Innovation had been effectively stifled.

4. The Navy at the time was dominated by the "Gun Club", a group of like-minded senior officers that had staked their long and distinguished careers on the idea of the primacy of the big gun battleship. They believed (not without reason) that the battleships and cruisers were the center of the fleet and that their long range guns would carry the day in any battle. Unfortunately, these ships were extraordinarily expensive and getting large numbers of them built was hard to push by an isolationist and passive Congress. They placed in jeopardy a great deal of their personal reputations, literally placing their careers on the line, to convince everyone that this was the way to go. These admirals held virtually all the senior positions in the fleet. They made almost all the major decisions, including the format of the fleet exercises. With the best of intentions in mind, and sometimes with not, weight in the exercises was placed on the gun line, other elements such as aviation and submarines were de-emphasized and sometimes the rules were even skewed to make the gun line virtually omnipotent. These men were not stupid; they fully understood that the airplane and submarine were tremendous threats to their precious battleships and in some cases vehemently opposed them. Submariners were bullied into a supporting role for the battle line, and had been cowered into a position of impotency in the face of destroyer opposition by the Gun Club officers, mostly to preserve the idea of the battleship as the queen of the fleet. Eventually the restrictive and unrealistic nature of the exercise rules became so prevalent and accepted that many of the submariners themselves came to believe in their supposed vulnerability. These false beliefs were reflected in some of the tactics that became standard in the pre war years and that proved to be totally useless or unwarranted once the war started. Some of these false beliefs included:

Attacking on sonar bearings only from 100 feet depth or more. This was done to remove the potential of the periscope being sighted. Unfortunately, the fairly primitive sonar gear of the day and the lack of emphasis on proper sonar training produced information that was not accurate enough to allow precise fire control solutions to be generated.
Unwarranted and unjustified fear of aircraft and destroyers and their ability to detect you. It is actually very difficult to visually detect (remember, no radar in the pre-war years) a surfaced submarine in most conditions. This led boats to dive too early and thus loose their all important asset of surface speed and maneuverability.
Depth charges held tremendous destructive power, were instantly fatal, and one or two is all it takes to destroy a sub. This is actually true, but only if the depth charge explodes less than 75 feet away from the boat! Actual tests showed that much beyond that range, a depth charge may give you a good shake and scare the hell out of you, but they rarely caused fatal damage. Only a large accumulation of damage over time caused by these far off misses would prove fatal. That is not to say that depth charges were not dangerous. Indeed they were. You still had to fear them, but not to the extent that was previously believed. They were very hard to accurately target and only very near misses or direct hits would be instantly fatal.When the occasional submarine skipper raised the bull**** flag and tried something different, he was quickly hammered back into place by the exercise referees. These sore thumbs were quickly reported up the chain and the only thing that saved their careers was the occasional sympathetic squadron commodore.

Were am I going with this? Sub skippers of the USN in the late 1930’s and early 40’s could be broken into three main groups.

Some understood that the state of affairs prior to the war was complete rubbish, but kept their mouth shut and only rarely spoke out or acted on their beliefs. They understood that banging their head against the unmoveable wall of the Gun Club was useless. They worked from within the Submarine Force to improve things the best they could and bided their time until the conditions were right (the war) then unleashed their beliefs in a cold hard fury against the Japanese. Strange as it may seem, this group produced some outstanding skippers early in the war. They also mentored and trained the junior officers who commanded boats later in the war that shot the bottom out of the IJN and the Japanese Merchant Marine.

Another group spoke out strongly against the silliness of the policies and tried radical new tactics during exercises. They were determined to change the system and felt that they had the best interests of the Navy at heart (and they did). They sometimes proved their point, but they didn't last. The Gun Club wielded enormous power; they did not like being proved wrong and often squashed these mavericks like a bug.

The last group were the careerists and ladder climbers. They were so immersed in the system that they couldn't see the faults. They were utterly confident in their ability to drive a submarine effectively and believed their tactics to be sound. When the reality of war hit them like a sledgehammer, proving their entire belief system to be horribly flawed, they couldn't handle it and failed miserably. If the Japanese didn't get them then our Navy did and they were relieved of command.

As the USN moved into 1941 and the inevitability of eventually getting into the war became clear, a new attitude of getting ready came to the forefront of naval policy. This provided an avenue to implement some of the long sought changes in tactics and doctrine that some submarine officers had been wishing for. Unfortunately, it proved to be too little, too late and the U.S. Submarine Service entered into war on December 7th woefully unprepared for the battle that awaited them.

This post may seem like an indictment of the USN. It is not meant to be. I actually find a great deal of pride and inspiration in this. Despite terribly inadequate tactics and doctrine, and despite torpedoes that were one step away from being useless, the U.S. Submarine Service and the men who served it learned quickly from their mistakes, corrected their mechanical problems, and in three short years utterly destroyed one of the world’s largest merchant fleets and the navy that implemented their enemy’s draconian policies. It is this rapid progress up a very steep learning curve that I am the most proud of.

eljeffo41

02-13-09, 08:40 PM

I have read many books about the submarine war in the Pacific,but your post sums up our prewar state of readiness (or the lack thereof)better than any of them!I have read this entire thread with great interest and look forward to perhaps picking your brain a little bit myself.Unfortunately nothing comes to mind right now,mostly because many of my questions have already been asked and answered! Thanks for giving your time and knowledge so freely!

Steeltrap

02-18-09, 12:09 AM

DaveyJ

Fantastic series of posts. As others have said, it's great to hear from those who have actually "done it". Maybe you could convince some of your other vet friends to pay us a visit: you won't finds a more appreciative and welcoming crowd than here. I'll go so far as to say I think this community is the best 'wargame' community I've ever found, which is why I'm still an active member 8 years after joining (hell, has it been that long?? :o ).

One thing I've wondered is how people like Dick O'Kane were regarded by the rest of the service, both those who served in WWII and those who came after (such as yourself).

On another tack, your post about the pre-war deficiencies in US sub doctrine and training was a great one. O'Kane himself made some similar points in his book Wahoo. Mush Morton seems to be one of the first - if not the first - to "toss the manual overboard", with others soon catching on. You're quite right about regarding the achievements of the sub service as even more remarkable given the handicaps under which it started the war.

It's odd that so much misery should provide so much fascination for those of us who have never had to experience it. I'd like to think I have a high level of repect and regard for anyone who served in the wars, irrespective of their side (most service people of most nations were doing it because they believed it was what they were meant to do....excepting the outright bastards and sadists bound to crop up).

Again, thanks for the info. Like many others, I've read a great deal about this subject, but it always pales compared with hearing it from those who lived it.

Cheers

:rock:

Aramike

02-18-09, 03:37 AM

My .02.

Good stuff, keep it coming!

I wish I had some questions for you, but I enjoy reading your offerings!

Rockin Robbins

02-18-09, 08:54 AM

Davey, the variety and quality of your posts is amazing. Keep it up. I agree with eljeffo41 that your last post is the single best short format account of the prewar and early war situation that I have ever read. I've read a lot. Have a great vacation and keep up the good work.:salute:

ReallyDedPoet

02-18-09, 09:41 AM

That is one of the best posts I have read here at SUBSIM Davey :yep::up:

eljeffo41

02-19-09, 03:50 PM

Q3ark

02-19-09, 05:17 PM

I believe that all Fleet type submarines could fire a mark 10 torpedo,but could the S-boats fire a mark 14? I have never heard of one doing so.I assume there must be more to it than just having the correct diameter!Also wanted to say thanks for the cool thread.

The S boats had shorter torpedo tubes (same diameter 21''), as the Mk10 torpedo was quite a bit shorter than the Mk14. So no, historicaly the S boats couldn't fire the Mk14 torpedo. :salute:

Platapus

02-19-09, 07:04 PM

The Mk 10 measured 15' 3" long or 4.95 meters long
The Mk 14 measured 20' 6" long or 6.25 meters long

My question is that if a Fleet Boat loaded Mk 10's did some sort of spacer have to be used to make sure all the spindles lined up? Or were the spindles on the Mk 10 and the Mk 14 in the same position as measured from the rear of the torpedo?

eljeffo41

02-20-09, 01:35 PM

Thanks for the quick response! I really appreciate you clearing this up for me,it was just one of those things you wonder about but don't know where to look to find the answer.:salute:

DaveyJ576

02-23-09, 05:11 PM

One thing I've wondered is how people like Dick O'Kane were regarded by the rest of the service, both those who served in WWII and those who came after (such as yourself).

Well, we made it back from Orlando after saying hello to the Mouse. We had a lot of fun but the place was packed. Big advice: go to Disney on an off season!

Anyway, if there was a pantheon of gods in the U.S. Submarine Service, then Richard Hetherington O'Kane would be right there on Mt. Olympus. His skills as a submariner are beyond question, he was a tremendous leader and motivator of men, he was supremely intelligent, and his moral character and personal courage are an inspiration to all.

One of the truly remarkable things about O'Kane is that in the early days he was brash, impulsive, almost reckless, and tended to speak his mind openly, sometimes when inappropriate. These types of traits were not good ones for a naval officer, and when leading a submarine into battle they can get you killed.

Under normal circumstances, if he had survived the war O'Kane may have been destined to be a footnote in history. Fortunately for him and the submarine force, he came under the tutelage of the Zeus of submarine gods, Dudley Walker Morton.

Here is a man whose contributions to the Submarine Service are incalculable. Not only was he possessed of an indomitable fighting spirit and the skills of a true natural born leader, he was a submariner to the core and was determined to carry the hurt to the enemy. "Mush" Morton took command of the USS Wahoo (SS-238) at perhaps one of the lowest points in the war for the sub force and provided a much needed shot in the arm and the perfect example of what a fighting submarine was capable of.

As his Executive Officer (XO) O'Kane came under Morton's wing. Mush guided and taught him and O'Kane sucked it up like a sponge. Morton took a talented but not yet fully formed officer and in a few short months transformed him into one of the greatest submarine sailors of all time. O'Kane went on to achieve great things and never forgot what ol' Mush had taught him.

What is even more remarkable is that Morton spawned another great officer, George William Grider. After serving as Morton's Engineering Officer on the Wahoo, Grider went on to command the USS Flasher (SS-249) and earned a reputation as an ace ship killer.

Morton, O'Kane, and Grider were just a few of the many men who made such a difference. There is a natural tendency to give the credit to the skippers, but none of those men would have achieved what they did without superb enlisted sailors. The Torpedomen, Gunner's Mates, Motor Macs and others are what made the sub run. They fixed the gear when it broke, plugged the holes made by depth charges, and carefully maintained the torpedoes. Without them the war could not have been won. O'Kane accepted his Medal of Honor on behalf of those men whom he had unwavering respect and admiration for.

Steeltrap

02-23-09, 06:42 PM

I've read both Wahoo and Clear the Bridge. One thing that is evident in reading it was that O'Kane (and Morton) weren't "glory hounds". O'Kane goes so far as to say he believed the loss of a large number of skilled and experienced crew might have contributed to Wahoo's loss, and other subs besides. He makes it clear how much a submarine was reliant on good teamwork with all the key positions knowing what to do and when to do it. He frequently pays tribute to all members of his crew (obviously more often the officers with whom he had the most contact).

At any rate, I found both books real eye-openers. If there's a single episode in either book that had me going "holy ****!!" it was when Tang was going full astern to back off from grounding while firing torps at a target!!!

"One of the truly remarkable things about O'Kane is that in the early days, he was brash, impulsive, almost reckless, and tended to speak his mind openly, sometimes when inappropriate. These types of traits were not good ones for a naval officer, and when leading a submarine into battle they can get you killed."

I remember a passage in Wahoo where O'Kane was reading the regulations regarding the potential need for him to relieve the skipper (not Morton, obviously!!) due to the skipper making a hash of an attack and/or failing to do all that was reasonable to sink a target. The skipper saw the book open in the conning tower and thought it was instructions for servicing some piece of equipment - I think it was packing the scope, but I'm going from memory - and read it, only to find it open at the relevant section of Rocks and Shoals.....talk about an "Ooops!!" moment.....and rather ballsy from O'Kane (still prone to speaking his mind I guess!).

I've heard it suggested quite a few people thought people like O'Kane were nuts, but I got the impression he was supremely aware of what could be done and what couldn't, and was prepared to tiptoe right along the divide between the two. His confidence and apparently brazen performance seemed, at least to me, to stem from that awareness.

Again, thanks for your reply - I've found this is to be one of the most interesting threads in all the years I've been at SubSim.

p.s. did you ever meet any of the surviving 'gods' during your service?
p.p.s. I don't know if it's an age thing, or a reflection of what you've done in your life, but you write very well, with a sophistication of language not seen very often these days (I'm a self-confessed language nut....). It's a bit like finding Tolkien in the middle of Tom Clancy!!

DaveyJ576

02-23-09, 10:11 PM

Steeltrap,

Thank you for the kind words. I truly appreciate it.

Unfortunately, I never had the honor of meeting any of the WWII skippers. I did have the opportunity to talk to a bunch of enlisted vets during a one day cruise that we did on the Darter in 1985. We were in Pearl Harbor for a Tactical Readiness Evaluation and hosted some WWII vets that were in town for a reunion. The opportunity to go to sea with these men was priceless. I talked to one man who served on the Nautilus (SS-168) when she participated in the destruction of the original Darter (SS-227) after she ran aground on Bombay Shoal. These heroes were thrilled to be able to go to sea again on a diesel boat after 40 years and we were happy to oblige them. It was a great day.

I would have given my eye teeth to have had a few hours with Dick O'Kane, Gene Fluckey, Lawson Ramage, or one of the other skippers. It would have been humbling to converse with what I consider to be truly great men.

Rockin Robbins

02-24-09, 07:53 PM

Guys asking questions about the Mark 10s and the S-Boats, remember that our S-Boats and Mark 10s are brand spanking new, with not even a scrape on the paint topsides. The REAL Mark 10s had been fired so many times their bearings were all sloppy, the motors worn out and they weren't nearly as much fun as our Mark 10s.

Same for the sugar boats. They were all corroded, to the point that at any time, even at periscope depth, the outer hull could bust wide open, making it impossible to blow a ballast tank at best, or killing all on board at worst. I just read the account of an S-Boat that had a ballast tank blow out because the corrosion was so bad the sub was like a beer can. They, after 15 hours of struggle, got the boat up to surface, started the engines, refused a tow and drove her up the east coast to scrap her. Her squadron mates were all in the same shape but there was no investigation to see if those boats were seaworthy. They continued to serve all the way up to and through World War II.

I'll have to look for the account. It'll grow hair on your chest for sure. Those S-Boats were pretty near suicide.

LukeFF

02-25-09, 12:36 AM

I'll have to look for the account. It'll grow hair on your chest for sure. Those S-Boats were pretty near suicide.

What exacerbated the problem with the S boats was that the build quality was very poor. With the end of WWI the United States went into an isolationist stance, and with it went funding for the Navy. The end result was problems like the rampant fires from excessive condensation in the boats.

LukeFF

02-25-09, 12:38 AM

Dave,

In the Fleet Submarine Manual, it mentions that the helmsman was stationed in the conning tower on the surface, yet it doesn't mention anything about where he was stationed when the boat was submerged. Given that the OOD was stationed in the conning tower when submerged, I gather this is where the helmsman was as well. Do you know anything more about this?

DaveyJ576

02-25-09, 12:41 PM

What exacerbated the problem with the S boats was that the build quality was very poor. With the end of WWI the United States went into an isolationist stance, and with it went funding for the Navy. The end result was problems like the rampant fires from excessive condensation in the boats.

The actual quality of workmanship in the construction of the S-boats was no better or worse than any other submarine. The issue was the immaturity of the submarine design process. You have to remember that when the S-boats were designed, the USN, and indeed the entire world, had been operating "modern" submarines for less than 20 years. There was an extraordinarily steep learning curve for the designers at this point; they were literally making it up as they went along. There was little precedent, and no vast body of experience or data to draw upon. The requirements for the S-boat design was quite ambitious for the day and the technology to implement the requirements barely existed, or in some cases didn't exist at all.

It is true to say that the S-boats did not live up to their designer's, and the Navy's, expectations. But this is hardly surprising given what I have stated above. They did, however, provide valuable experience in design and construction. We learned what worked and what didn't and that experience served to lessen the steep curve the designers faced.

The corrosion issue was a well known problem on the S-boats, but it is more of a function of the "primitive" materials being used, as opposed to a quality of workmanship issue. Corrosion resistant materials were virtually nonexistant at this time. I had a science teacher in high school that called water the Ultimate Solvent. There has never been a more accurate statement. Sea water is insidious. It will destroy anything it touches if given enough time. Even modern nuclear submarines have to be very carefully monitored for corrosion and proper preservation techniques have to be stringently applied. It is a tremendous overstatement to say that all the S-boats were as badly corroded as Rockin Robbins states. Some were and they were decommissioned in the 30's. The rest that served during the war were obviously not in that bad shape as they survived numerous war patrols, depth chargings, and storms. The incident that RR refers to was I believe the S-10 (SS-115) and she was decommissioned for this very reason in 1936. This was an isolated incident as the rest of her near sisters, S-11, 12, and 13 all served to the end of WWII.

Electrical fires from short circuits caused by condensate dripping into electrical equipment was a recurring headache for ALL submarines of ALL navies prior to the introduction of air conditioning. I addressed this issue in a previous post. The problem was mitigated to a certain extent by careful engineering practices and thorough cleaning. I would not classify the issue as rampant, and it had little or no relation to quality of workmanship or design.

The S-boats, and the men who sailed them, have earned a lot of respect. Some of the boats served the USN quite well, despite a less than optimum design, until 1946! This is an unheard of longevity for the time and is very remarkable. :yeah:

virtualpender

02-25-09, 07:15 PM

Luke, I don't know if this will help or not but in CTB O'Kane mentions that the control room helm was the Auxiliary Steering Station. That is also supported by this description from the USS Pampanito site:

Auxiliary Steering Station: The steering station is located amidships against the forward bulkhead. Under normal conditions, the steering wheel in the conning tower was used to control the rudder. This wheel was used in emergencies. In this area are:

Steering wheel or helm
Auxiliary gyrocompass
Underwater log indicator
Gyrocompass repeater
Rudder angle indicator
Dead reckoning analyzer indicator (lower forward)
Motor order telegraph which transmitted speed orders to the Maneuvering Room where the motors were controlledIt looks like you are correct and that the helmsman would normally be in the CT, whether submerged or surfaced.

Dave - please correct me if needed.

LukeFF

02-25-09, 08:39 PM

DaveyJ576

02-25-09, 10:01 PM

DaveyJ576

02-25-09, 10:15 PM

Dave,

Thanks for the reply re: S boat construction. You are indeed right about the time and circumstances surrounding the development of the S class. When I made my remark about the poor workmanship, I had this quote in mind from Norman Friedman:

Designed for the Atlantic, the S-boats entered service just as U.S. naval attention turned to the far vaster Pacific. Despite their poor wartime workmanship and obsolescent designs, they were the only existing U.S. submarines likely to be useful to a Pacific battlefleet. Most were completed just as U.S. naval funding collapsed after the Washington treaty, so many of their deficiencies were not even addressed.

(Page 133, U.S. Submarines Through 1945)

Luke,

I too rely on Friedman quite a bit, but I have learned to read between the lines in his stuff. His writing style is very choppy and sometimes hard to interpret. It is true that the S-boats had some construction problems, but so did all yards that built subs from one time or another. Cramp Shipbuilding in Philadelphia built some fleet boats during WWII and ran into some serious quality control issues for a variety of reasons. Several of their boats had to be towed away and finished at Navy shipyards. Even the mighty Electric Boat Co. has taken criticism at times. The construction problems with the S-boats were not pandemic and I will stick to my assertion that most of the issues with these boats were design related. Friedman is completely correct, however in stating that the boat's basic deficiencies were not corrected due to the gutting of the fleet following the Washington Naval Treaty.

NEON DEON

02-27-09, 05:08 PM

The S boats were the largest submarine class in the fleet at the start of the war and comprised 1/3 of the total submarine fleet. The S class seemed to suffer from running into things. Of the 6 S boats lost in WW II, only one was due to enemy action the S-44. Three ran aground, one collided with a USN ship, and the last by accident during a training exercise off the coast of Hawaii. Despite the S boats age, they still managed to do over 240 war patrols.

Since three of these S boats ran aground my question is:

Were the S boats equiped with depth finding equipment at the time they were lost?

DaveyJ576

02-27-09, 07:44 PM

Since three of these S boats ran aground my question is:

Were the S boats equiped with depth finding equipment at the time they were lost?

My resources are pretty vague on this issue. Electronic echo-sounding fathometers came into existence as early as 1924, but the indications that I am getting is that the S-boats did not have them until they received wartime modernizations in 1943 and 44. Apparently, they did have a wire-weight sounding line that could be used from inside the boat. This is a long wire with a weight on the end that could be payed out until it struck bottom. The amount of wire payed out indicated depth. This is just a slightly more sophisticated version of the old seaman's lead line, an example of which can be seen in the recent version of King Kong, in the scene where the ship approaches the island.

The problem with this is that it could only be used when the boat is moving fairly slowly, and is only as accurate as the skill level of the man using it.

The Pacific Ocean was actually pretty poorly charted overall in the 1940's. Navigational charts for many areas were based on information gathered by Captain Cook in the 1700's. It was not uncommon to find islands that were several miles from where the chart said it was, and sounding information was scarce and inaccurate. Given this situation, it was a miracle that more boats didn't run aground.

Celestial navigation is a true art form and must be practiced constantly to maintain a safe skill set. When compared to modern GPS based systems, it is actually fairly inaccurate. Under optimum conditions, a highly experienced celestial navigator can develop a fix with an error of about a half mile in any direction. A circular error of one to three miles is normal. In the open ocean this isn't a problem and is good enough. But go into restricted waters with a half mile fix error and use a chart based on 150 year old data and you can go on the rocks pretty quick.

On her third patrol, USS Wahoo (SS-238) penetrated Wewak Harbor on the northern coast of New Guinea, despite the fact that they didn't even have a chart for it! One of the crew members produced a high school atlas and an improvised chart was drawn up. This is extraordinarily ballsy, given the navigational limitations that I outlined above. Then again, this was Mush Morton and his gang and I would not have expected anything less from them! :arrgh!:

Arclight

02-27-09, 09:20 PM

Great thread, I've been following it with great interest. :up:

Here's one for you that came up in another thread:

It's been said that some fleet-boats left port with stocks of the older Mark 10 torpedo due to shortages of the Mark 14. Can you confirm this? And if so, how long and to what extend was this a problem?

LukeFF

02-28-09, 03:04 AM

It's been said that some fleet-boats left port with stocks of the older Mark 10 torpedo due to shortages of the Mark 14. Can you confirm this? And if so, how long and to what extend was this a problem?
I'll confirm it for you: ;) yes, many patrol reports document the use of Mark 10s by fleet subs early in the war. This is not even close to being debatable.

As to how much of a problem the torpedo shortage was, boats either were forced to go on patrol with Mark 10s, or they were forced to wait until another boat returned from patrol with unused Mark 14s, which would then be loaded onto the outbound boat. Wartime torpedo production for the Navy simply didn't catch up with demand until 1943.

Platapus

02-28-09, 08:58 AM

... they were forced to wait until another boat returned from patrol with unused Mark 14s, which would then be loaded onto the outbound boat.

This is most interesting.

I wonder if it was common for the Mk 14s of one sub to be directly transfered to the other ship without going through depot maintenance?

If this is true, I am sure it added to the problems of the Mk 14 as in effect subs were going out with "old" (not maintained by shore factories) torpedoes. I can imagine with a series of unlucky captains it might be possible they were carrying Mk 14's that have not undergone depot maintenance for 120 days or more?

By the way which is correct?

Mk 14
Mk XIV

Sailor Steve

02-28-09, 11:49 AM

Apparently, they did have a wire-weight sounding line that could be used from inside the boat.
Gotta love modern technology!:rotfl:

By the way which is correct?

Mk 14
Mk XIV
As far as I can find the US Navy has always used Arabic numerals for designations, as opposed to the British who used Roman numerals until late in the war. Mk 14 should be correct.

DaveyJ576

02-28-09, 11:56 AM

DaveyJ576

02-28-09, 01:18 PM

As to how much of a problem the torpedo shortage was, boats either were forced to go on patrol with Mark 10s, or they were forced to wait until another boat returned from patrol with unused Mark 14s, which would then be loaded onto the outbound boat. Wartime torpedo production for the Navy simply didn't catch up with demand until 1943.

At the start of the war, Naval Torpedo Station Newport, RI was the sole producer of torpedoes for the USN. Despite employing 3,000 workers and working around the clock, they were only producing about three weapons per day. They were barely able to keep up with pre-war demands. Once the war started and rate of expenditures began to skyrocket, Newport fell drastically behind demand. To make matters worse, 233 Mk 14's were lost when Cavite was bombed on the first day of the war. The sub force compensated for this shortfall in several ways:

1. Going out with reduced loadouts.

2. Loading out with a mixed complement of Mk 10's and 14's.

3. Loading out with a mixed complement of Mk 14's and mines.

4. Reducing the number of torpedoes fired per target.

5. Swopping torpedoes between boats between patrols (as Luke noted above).

None of these compensation methods were popular with the crews, as it limitied what they could do. The Mk 10 was a fairly well liked weapon, but the range was short and the warhead relatively small. In mid 1942 when the shortage was at its' height, there was a lot of pressure placed on the skippers to be conservative with the number of torpedoes used. When combined with the gross unreliability of the Mk 14, this policy only served to lessen the number of ships sunk.

By January 1943 the crisis was over, although some shortages were still encountered in the Southwest Pacific command until the summer due to longer transport times. The problem had been solved by expanding Newport, reopening NTS Alexandria, starting up NTS Keyport, and bringing in civilian contractors.

The swopping of fish between boats presented no real problems in maintenance or reliability. The Torpedomen on the boats were superbly trained and capable and could take care of most problems. If anything major was suspected, the fish could be sent to the tender for overhaul. You have to remember that most of the time the fish just sat on its skid in the torpedo room and did nothing, requiring little or no maintenance. If the fish got bounced around in a depth charge attack, or if it sat in a flooded tube for a long period of time, it might require some careful checks. But again the TM's aboard the boat could handle many of these tasks. The boat TM's were somewhat distrustful of the tender pukes anyway and redid most of the maintenance checks themselves just to be sure. After all, your life depended on it.

EDIT EDIT

I forgot one thing. On a few rare occasions, boats went to sea with Mk 15 destroyer torpedoes onboard! The Mk 15 was similar to the 14 in many ways, but it was longer, had a larger warhead, and a longer range. The problem was that it was too long to fit the the standard fleet boat torpedo tube! The solution was to fit the smaller Mk 14 warhead on it and this shortened the fish just enough so that it would fit in the tube. Even with this mod, it was still too long to fit down the loading hatches and on the in room stowage skids. To accomodate them into the boats, the fish would be craned into the water, the outer door of the tube opened, the fish was floated into the tube, and the outer door closed. Once loaded, the weapon could not be completely removed from the tube and taken into the room. They were carried this way into battle and were the first fish fired.

The Mk 15 was more plentiful due to a much lower rate of expenditure by destroyers. Even still, this type of loadout was rare due to the problems outlined above.

Platapus

03-01-09, 10:34 AM

Two books I can recommend if you are interested in the history of the torpedos and their problems

“HELLIONS Of The DEEP" The Development of American Torpedoes in World War II. - By Robert Gannon. This book pretty much slams the NTS

Iron Men and Tin Fish: The Race to Build a Better Torpedo during World War II
by Anthony Newpower. This book addresses how different countries addressed (or did not address) their respective torpedo problems.

Torplexed

03-01-09, 12:07 PM

DaveyJ576

03-01-09, 08:22 PM

Here's a question which has come up a few times on the forum and never seems to get answered to anyone's satisfaction.

What keeps the deck gun(s) from rusting into uselessness during a patrol? I've heard that were made from corrosion resistant steel and that the more delicate optical parts were taken below. But some seem to dispute that there is such a thing as corrosion resistant steel.

Excellent thread by the way. Makes for informative reading. :salute:
I can absolutely guarantee that USN submarines use great quantities of Corrosion Resistant Stainless Steel (CRSS). I have polished enough of it to last a lifetime! :DL

Naval guns contain a large percentage of CRSS, copper-nickel alloys, and chromium in their construction for just this purpose. Despite repeated dunkings, the guns held up well. However, the key word here is "resistant". The guns required careful maintenance whenever possible or over a period of time they would cease to function.

The early 3"/50 and 4"/50 had the inner bore sealed by the breech block and a tampion in the muzzle. The tampion was easily removed before action. The later 5"/25 was made entirely of CRSS and other resistant materials and did not require the bore to be sealed.

For more information, surf over to the following links:

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Main.htm

and

http://www.oldsubsplace.com/Submarine%20Deck%20Guns.htm

These pages contain more info than you will ever want to know about naval guns. Enjoy! :up:

One other interesting method that the USN uses for corrosion control is the placing of zinc anodes in certain areas on the external part of the boat. When pure zinc comes into contact with steel, it greatly slows the process of oxidation and prolongs the life of the surrounding steel or ferrous metal. The zinc anodes will vary greatly in size, running from the size of your thumb to the size of a brick.

LukeFF

03-01-09, 10:18 PM

As far as I can find the US Navy has always used Arabic numerals for designations, as opposed to the British who used Roman numerals until late in the war. Mk 14 should be correct.
Absolutely correct. The USN does not use Roman numerals thank god.

But, even so, many captains used Roman numerals in their patrol reports when documenting the use of torpedoes. :doh:

Torplexed

03-02-09, 04:13 AM

Arclight

03-02-09, 06:12 AM

Thanks Luke and Davey for clarifying about the Mark 14 shortage. :yeah:

Small question :D :

I read US periscopes were fitted with colored filters in the rayfilter-assembly (red, green and yellow). How were these used? (red in bright light, yellow at night, etc?)

I'd also be interested to know what, if any, colorfilters were present in U-boats, but I guess I'm asking the wrong people. :hmmm:

Rockin Robbins

03-02-09, 02:05 PM

The incident that RR refers to was I believe the S-10 (SS-118) and she was decommissioned for this very reason in 1936. This was an isolated incident as the rest of her near sisters, S-11, 12, and 13 all served to the end of WWII.
Darn! Note to self: don't leave thoughts unfinished and then go on vacation, even if it is to gather photons from remote celestial objects. Where would such a story, written by a crewmember who survived the incident, reside? The story was excellent and well-worth putting a link in here. He was very worried about his sister boats and stated that no investigation into their seaworthiness was conducted.

My information shows that S-10 was SS-115. Confusing at best.

In this boat's case, it was an MBT that sprung a leak (more than sprung a leak, lost a section of beer can there) and they were unable to blow ballast from a full tank that contained the entire ocean! Ballast tanks, being open to the sea don't normally resist much pressure, as pressure inside and outside are the same. As such their resistance to depth charging would be unremarkable until a section of the tank just corroded out, leaving the boat unable to surface. I'm off to ferret out this terrific account, even though I have lost any trace of where it came from. Don't try this at home.

Holy Cow! Looking for the above story, turned up an even more enlightening story about the plight of the poor crews stuck in the sugar boats at http://www.subvetpaul.com/SAGA_8_96.htm (http://www.subvetpaul.com/SAGA_8_96.htm). It's the story of THE SAGGING SAGA OF THE SUGAR BOAT. by Dr. Charles W. Gibbs, published in POLARIS August 1996. It's too long for me to cut and paste, it and its owner may not live for long, but here it is, the story of the sugar boat, the hidden enemy and the sagging sugar boat. If you never follow another link, please follow this one.

Holy Something or Other than a Cow! Found it. The Final Cruise of USS S-10 (SS-115) (http://www.subvetpaul.com/SAGA_4_00.htm), by Dale A. Danielsen, Published in POLARIS April 2000. Check this out and the entire lost until rescued by SubVetPaul, Polaris Sagas (http://www.subvetpaul.com/SagasIndex.html), selected articles of interest to submarine veterans published in the Polaris, official bulletin of the US Sub Vets of World War II.

Damn. Losing the boats is tragic, but losing the men and their stories is infinitely more so. I think I'm going to capture all of SubVetPaul's site to my hard drive too. Who knows when it will be gone.

Rockin Robbins

03-02-09, 06:18 PM

One other interesting method that the USN uses for corrosion control is the placing of zinc anodes in certain areas on the external part of the boat. When pure zinc comes into contact with steel, it greatly slows the process of oxidation and prolongs the life of the surrounding steel or ferrous metal. The zinc anodes will vary greatly in size, running from the size of your thumb to the size of a brick.
Bravo! Thanks for the deck gun answer and clearing this one up. I've seen the zinc plates on the keels of boats in dry storage at marinas and always wondered what they were about. :salute:
Floating a boat in sea water is equivalent to floating it in battery acid. It eats everything, and what it doesn't eat it cruds up with mineral encrustation. I worked for awhile as a marine mechanic on salt water and you wouldn't believe the number of Mercaturkey Outboard lower units we opened with air chisels because they were eaten up with corrosion and encrusted so that they could not be disassembled normally.

At any rate, just like battery acid, salt water acts as an electrolyte. When two dissimilar metals are bathed in it, one of the metals becomes a cathode and has crap added to it (yum!) and the other acts as an anode and is eaten for lunch by the action of the electrolyte and the cathode. The way to stop this temporarily is to find a metal that acts as the anode for just about all other kinds of metal and attach it electrically to the other metal. It so happens that zinc is an anode for all the different kinds of metals used in boat, ship and submarine construction. So you bolt these zinc anodes to prop shafts, decks, whatever, one per electrically isolated amalgamation of metal parts and only the zinc is eaten for lunch, not your precious prop shafts, ballast tank metal, guns or whatever else you thought would be good to go for a bath in a battery electrolyte.

Periodically, the zinc anodes are inspected and replaced if they are depleted. If you miss one lousy piece of metal that is electrically isolated from the rest of the boat, it STILL gets eaten. Yum! Salt water is fun! Zinc anodes stop electrolytic corrosion, but oxidation is a chemical process not affected by anodes. Paint, muchas chipping and grinding are about the only tools you have there.

Torplexed

03-02-09, 10:24 PM

I must admit it's pretty clever. Sacrificing one cheap piece of zinc to help preserve the more valuable parts. :cool:

Yeah salt is nasty stuff. Drive a car through enough midwest winters and it slowly gets eaten too.

DaveyJ576

03-03-09, 12:49 PM

My information shows that S-10 was SS-115. Confusing at best.

And the Oops of the Year Award goes to...:doh:

Me.

USS S-10 is indeed SS-115. It was a typo...yea...that is my story and I'm sticking to it! :D

Great links, RR! I had read that S-10 story as well but misplaced the link.

Rockin Robbins

03-03-09, 01:06 PM

No problem. Computers take human error and replace it with a lot harder to find random typos.

Now the question has to be asked, because of the rank of the author of the S-10 story. Is his info accurate or was there indeed an investigation of the condition of the sugar boat fleet. Just guessing here, but since its stablemates were all of the same age in the same environment, it is likely that if an investigation were held they would have found other boats in the same shape. Either that or there was something unique about S-10 that was so obvious to them that no investigation was necessary.

I have no doubt that we're getting the truth about what the author saw and experienced. But that might not be the whole truth about the upper level follow-up.

In any event our sugar boats are brand spankin' new from the factory and never malfunction, the one most glaring omission in Silent Hunter 4. I clearly remember reading an account (Enright of Archerfish?) where he had a radar malfunction and basically wrote, "Damn, there goes half my torpedo load to waste." Malfunctions were indeed the "hidden enemy" not present in our games.

DaveyJ576

03-03-09, 01:24 PM

Zinc anodes stop electrolytic corrosion, but oxidation is a chemical process not affected by anodes. Paint, muchas chipping and grinding are about the only tools you have there.

RR, thanks for clearing that up! High school chemistry was 25 years ago for me!

I was in the Deck Division on the Darter when I first reported aboard and chipping and painting was a never ending task. Every time we pulled into our home port of Sasebo the first evolution was a fresh water washdown. We would rig up a hose from the pier and hose down the boat in an attempt to remove as much salt residue as was possible. Almost immediately the needle guns and chipping hammers would come out followed closely by the paint brushes. Most of the time it was just touch ups, but twice in one year we completely repainted the boat from the water line up! It was dirty, hot, nasty work and we all hated it, but fully realized that it was vital.

One other nasty job assigned to Deck Division was the cleaning of the zinc anodes. I don't remember the periodicity (I think it was twice a year), but we would have to find every zinc block above the waterline and scrape off the powder left behind by the process that RR described. At first we used wire hand brushes and this took forever. One of my shipmates had a bright idea of using a wire wheel attached to a pneumatic gun. This spun the wire wheel pretty damn fast and it made quick work of the zinc block, but produced a white cloud of dust everywhere. We were rigged up in full protective gear with respirators and sweated our butts off, but it was worth it as it saved a lot of time.

Navy...it's not just a job, it's an adventure!

DaveyJ576

03-03-09, 01:54 PM

Now the question has to be asked, because of the rank of the author of the S-10 story. Is his info accurate or was there indeed an investigation of the condition of the sugar boat fleet.

I have been around and associated with sailors my entire adult life, and I can tell you that no one ever has the whole "big picture", especially enlisted sailors. They might like to think they do, but they usually don't and sometimes make assumptions. If you think that gossip flows well at a women's club meeting, try hanging out with sailors! Half truths and rumors flow like beer. The more sensational a story may be, the more sailors like it. It is a actual form of entertainment on most boats and ships.

The author of the story may have truly believed that no inspections were made, but may have not known the whole story. All USN ships are periodically inspected (approximately every 5 years) for seaworthiness and condition of equipment by the Board of Inspection and Survey, the dreaded INSURV. Believe me when I tell you that these guys are extraordinarily thorough in their inspections and a boat as bad off as the S-10 was would not escape detection for long.

I myself can not implicitly state that inspections were done, but the simple fact that some of the S-boats served until 1946 indicates that they were not in as bad a shape as is indicated. The S-boats were leaky, smelly, mechanically tempermental, and suffered from their fare share of design flaws. They were a real challenge to take to sea, but were not inherently unsafe.

Once the war started, however some of these rigid inspections went by the wayside. We were desperately short of boats and anything that was even remotely seaworthy went to sea. By 1942, the S-boats were pretty well shot and if the war had not come along they would have been long gone. It really wasn't until large numbers of Gato and Balao class fleet boats began hitting the water that the good ol' S-boats could get a well earned rest.

DaveyJ576

03-03-09, 06:38 PM

I read US periscopes were fitted with colored filters in the rayfilter-assembly (red, green and yellow). How were these used? (red in bright light, yellow at night, etc?)

Arc,

I wasn't ignoring your question, I just had to do a little reading. I came up with the following link:

http://www.maritime.org/fleetsub/pscope/chap4e.htm#fig4-40

It describes the rayfilter assembly in great detail, but not how it is used. You may have seen this already. Unfortunately, I am not an optics expert, so I would have to direct you to photographer or someone with that level of expertise. I have a feeling they were used for photography applications. On the Darter our #2 scope had a similar assembly, but we didn't use it much.

Platapus

03-03-09, 07:45 PM

I have a general naval question that may pertain to submarines.

Chipping Irons

Donald Morris wrote a lot about Chipping Irons and so did Daniel V. Gallery.

Does the US Navy still use Chipping Irons? If not, when did they stop?

Arclight

03-03-09, 10:10 PM

momo55

03-04-09, 07:40 AM

I have been around and associated with sailors my entire adult life, and I can tell you that no one ever has the whole "big picture", especially enlisted sailors. They might like to think they do, but they usually don't and sometimes make assumptions. If you think that gossip flows well at a women's club meeting, try hanging out with sailors! Half truths and rumors flow like beer. The more sensational a story may be, the more sailors like it. It is a actual form of entertainment on most boats and ships.
:har: This is very true en nicely told and seems to be universal DaveyJ576 . In the navy i served in ....it was the same . Oooh..and the beer flowed alot in those day's .

The 2 MSO's (American build b.t.w. - Aggressive class ) i served on , had the nickname "beercarrier" among the other european navy's because we had our beerbarrels stocked around the smokestack . Still we had a famous reputation worldwide and knew our job when it came to minesweeping and hunting because we had (still have i think) a little navy , so we specialized in that business .

Can't remember all details of how things where done and worked , buth the stories ,the true ones and the "coctails" , ..those i do ..even 30 years later :yep:

Thanks for sharing your RL experience on a sub with us , i salute you sir :salute:

(sry for my poor English)

Nisgeis

03-04-09, 08:40 AM

Yellow filters cut out the blue end of the light spectrum. When you are target shooting a black circle on a white background, you get a kind of bluey halo around the black centre. Using a yellow filter on your scope / sights or even wearing a set of yellow glasses will cut down that out and give a clearer circle. I have heard, though never having shot outdoors I can't say, that a yellow filter helps increse sharpness of edges through mist.

Rockin Robbins

03-04-09, 12:52 PM

Being an amateur astronomer I can shed a little light on the filter situation. As Nisgeis said, yellow is useful in low light or low contrast situations to kill the green to blue end of the spectrum and emphasize edges. It almost looks like everything goes black and white.

Similarly there are other rule of thumb applications for other colors.

However, in practice, we have a tendency to try out everything in the box and see whether each one brings out something we need to see. I'm sure the real sub captains, since it was so easy to switch filters, did the same, twiddling compulsively with the filter wheel no matter which filter the rules said would work best. And I'll bet that they, as we do, often found that the random applications often brought out details that were unsuspected until they were tried.

DaveyJ576

03-05-09, 07:36 AM

Does the US Navy still use Chipping Irons? If not, when did they stop?

If you are referring to the implements used for chipping away rust and old paint, then the answer is yes and no.

As I stated in a previous post, preservation of the boat is a never ending task, even in today's Navy. The older style chisel type irons that were used in conjunction with a hammer for the removal of paint chips and rust have been mostly replaced with a hammer that has a chisel type end. In most cases however, today's sailors use pneumatic wire wheels and needle guns. A needle gun contains about two dozens steel rods about half the diameter of a pencil. These rods are vibrated at a high rate of speed by a pneumatic attachment. It is like having two dozen mini jackhammers in your hand. It is very effective at removing paint and rust. The noise it makes when used against the steel hull is nothing short of deafening.

AVGWarhawk

03-05-09, 09:43 AM

Rip

03-05-09, 10:09 PM

Zinc anodes stop electrolytic corrosion, but oxidation is a chemical process not affected by anodes. Paint, muchas chipping and grinding are about the only tools you have there.
RR, thanks for clearing that up! High school chemistry was 25 years ago for me!

I was in the Deck Division on the Darter when I first reported aboard and chipping and painting was a never ending task. Every time we pulled into our home port of Sasebo the first evolution was a fresh water washdown. We would rig up a hose from the pier and hose down the boat in an attempt to remove as much salt residue as was possible. Almost immediately the needle guns and chipping hammers would come out followed closely by the paint brushes. Most of the time it was just touch ups, but twice in one year we completely repainted the boat from the water line up! It was dirty, hot, nasty work and we all hated it, but fully realized that it was vital.

One other nasty job assigned to Deck Division was the cleaning of the zinc anodes. I don't remember the periodicity (I think it was twice a year), but we would have to find every zinc block above the waterline and scrape off the powder left behind by the process that RR described. At first we used wire hand brushes and this took forever. One of my shipmates had a bright idea of using a wire wheel attached to a pneumatic gun. This spun the wire wheel pretty damn fast and it made quick work of the zinc block, but produced a white cloud of dust everywhere. We were rigged up in full protective gear with respirators and sweated our butts off, but it was worth it as it saved a lot of time.

Navy...it's not just a job, it's an adventure!

Not much has changed. I spent a year in Deck Division on the USS Jacksonville and another year as leading seamen, the process remains. Makes me wonder about the changes in the paint process and formulation process and how it has changed. We used a two part epoxy that left you with a window for application after mixing and a nice long period to fully dry. A lot of planning was required or there would be much paint wasted. Quite costly paint as I recall.

LukeFF

03-13-09, 02:56 AM

Dave,

Norman Friedman mentions that two boats of the S-42 class received "Mark 14 torpedo directors" in their modernization overhaul in 1943. By that term, does he mean TBTs and if so, how did they feed data to the torpedoes?

DaveyJ576

03-13-09, 04:36 PM

Norman Friedman mentions that two boats of the S-42 class received "Mark 14 torpedo directors" in their modernization overhaul in 1943. By that term, does he mean TBTs and if so, how did they feed data to the torpedoes?

Luke,

I believe the brief mention on page 145 in Friedman's U.S. Submarines Through 1945 to be a typo. I too thought he might have been refering to the Target Bearing Transmitters (TBT) mounted on the bridge to send bearing info to the tracking party. Research showed, however that the TBT was designated Mk 8.

More poking around showed that there was a Mk 14 gun director (or gun sight) that was used for 20 and 40 mm guns. This gyro stabilized sight produced a lead/lag angle for the guns which greaty improved accuracy. This is probably what Friedman was refering to. It could be that an editor mistook the Mk 14 reference to mean torpedo and changed the text.

The TBT's are essentially a pressure proof binocular mounted on a gyro repeater display. As the TBT is rotated to the target bearing, a transmitter mounted underneath sends an electrical signal to a bearing repeater in the conning tower and that repeater shows the bearing to which the TBT is pointed. On the left side of the TBT is a simple buzzer button that when pressed makes a sound in the conning tower indicating that the TBT is on the target bearing, and that the fire control team needs to use that bearing in their solution. That data is then manually fed into the TDC by the operator.

BTW, I haven't confirmed it yet, but I don't believe that the S-boats were ever fitted with TDC's. Both the control room and the conning tower were small and jam packed with gear and even the later models of the TDC would have been too big to fit. The crews of the S-boats continued to use hand held manual slide rule style devices known as the "Is-Was" and the "Banjo" to determine fire control solutions until the end of the war. An experienced and well drilled tracking party could still do well with these devices, and they were retained on the fleet boats as back up in case the TDC went down.

Nisgeis

03-13-09, 05:10 PM

I have not heard of any S-Boats receiving a TDC. A TBT is only a measuring instrument and cannot really be confused with a torpedo director, in terms of calculated output. Torpedo directors were common on destroyers (with torpedo tubes) and the director would sit atop the tubes. They were nowhere near as advanced as a TDC, but I think it's possible that the 'Mark 14 torpedo director' was in fact a torpedo director whose mark was 14, rather than a director whose function was to direct mark 14 torpedoes (especially as the S-boats were a bit short). At the start of the war the torpedo directors were up to mark 7(?) and by 1947 they were at mark 27, so the number fits.

Isn't it more feasable that it refers to a torpedo director system that is a fire control system for torpedoes, rather than a fire control system for guns, which would be of very limitted value on an S-Boat, especially in 1943, before deck gun fire control systems were put aboard fleet boats with the guns to utilise them.

DaveyJ576

03-13-09, 06:18 PM

Torpedo directors were common on destroyers (with torpedo tubes) and the director would sit atop the tubes. They were nowhere near as advanced as a TDC, but I think it's possible that the 'Mark 14 torpedo director' was in fact a torpedo director whose mark was 14, rather than a director whose function was to direct mark 14 torpedoes (especially as the S-boats were a bit short). At the start of the war the torpedo directors were up to mark 7(?) and by 1947 they were at mark 27, so the number fits.

Isn't it more feasable that it refers to a torpedo director system that is a fire control system for torpedoes, rather than a fire control system for guns, which would be of very limitted value on an S-Boat, especially in 1943, before deck gun fire control systems were put aboard fleet boats with the guns to utilise them.

I considered this very issue as I was researching my earlier post. One thing that was not mentioned was that in the same sentence Norman Friedman mentioned that the Mk 14 torpedo director was "a modification also extended to many R-boats." The R-boats were a smaller precursor to the S-boats. None of them made war patrols and were used strictly for training stateside. I asked myself the question: Why put a fairly sophisticated piece of equipment on a boat that would not go into combat? These torpedo directors would have been unique to the R-boats and just 2 S-boats. They would have been of little value to a non-combat boat, and as these boats were used to train fleet boat crews, the directors would have been of NO value as a training device as they did not exist on the TDC equipped fleet boats! This argument is what led me down the path to a simple typo.

However, I fully admit that the same line of logic could be applied to the existence of these directors as gun directors. The gun director typo just made more sense to me.

This issue is illustrative of the choppy nature of Norman Friedman's writing style. Many times he drops these interesting research morsels, then utterly fails to explain them! It is kind of frustrating and will leave you scratching your head.:hmmm:

Nisgeis

03-14-09, 03:09 PM

Yeah I know what you mean, he's very brief in some areas and packs in a whole chapters worth into a paragraph. Sometimes reading the notes section is more revealing that what he put in the main text. That book needs to be much larger :-).

The thing that struck me about the gun directors was from something I read in 'The Fleet Type Submarine in the US Navy' where he talks about a stable element and a gun director (I think it's a gun director anyway) being installed in Sennet, Lagarto and erm Razorback(?) in March 1945. The way it is written, it implies that a fire control device was needed to co-ordinate the two deck guns as it was no longer one gun captain aiming one gun. That's the only reason I have for not thinking it means a gun director at that date, as it doesn't seem they were needed. Was it the Narwahl that had dual 6" guns? I wonder if that had a fire control system, or was manned as two seperate guns.

I find this detective an deductive stuff fascinating, as it could be a year from now and I'll read something that points me in the right direction. It's also amazing that for technology not that old, it's already a bit of a mystery. Th einformation is probably out there somewhere in some archive.

Nuc

03-15-09, 06:45 AM

The R-boats were a smaller precursor to the S-boats. None of them made war patrols and were used strictly for training stateside.

I don't think that is strictly true. I believe several R boats made Anti U-Boat patrols out of Bermuda, Key West and St Thomas. Dudley Morton in command of R5 attacked a U-boat on February 10, 1942. See Roscoe p 89-91

DaveyJ576

03-15-09, 10:29 AM

I believe several R boats made Anti U-Boat patrols out of Bermuda, Key West and St Thomas. Dudley Morton in command of R5 attacked a U-boat on February 10, 1942. See Roscoe p 89-91
Nuc,

You are absolutely correct. I was going a bit fast when I wrote that post. My intent was to show that none of the R-boats made any Pacific war patrols. The USN never took the Atlantic anti U-boat submarine patrols very seriously and relied on air and surface ship patrols to do the job. This is why the sub force mostly assigned the ancient R-boats and the obsolescent S-boats to this job. These boats could be spared. The Atlantic fleet boats spent much more time in training exercises than they did on patrol. While they did get a few upgrades, they never got the much more extensive upgrades that some of the S-boats in the Pacific theater received.

DaveyJ576

03-15-09, 10:55 AM

Was it the Narwahl that had dual 6" guns? I wonder if that had a fire control system, or was manned as two seperate guns.
Actually, Argonaut (SS-166), Narwhal (SS-167), and Nautilus (SS-168) all had the big 6"/53 cal guns. As far as I can tell, there was no central fire control system, each gun was pointed and trained separately. This limited their usefulness somewhat. The shells were big and heavy enough that power hoists had to be installed to lift the ammo from the magazine underneath crew's mess to the gun platforms on deck.

Narwhal's guns still exist. They are on display outside of Morton Hall on the Submarine Base in Groton, CT. Check out this link: www.navsource.org/archives/08/0816718.jpg (http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0816718.jpg)

I took this pic when I was at the base last year. They are damned impressive.

I sure wish the game developers had included these three boats in SHIV.

Torplexed

03-15-09, 11:25 AM

I sure wish the game developers had included these three boats in SHIV.
I wish they had too, although with a surface battery like that I probably would succumb to the temptation to tackle targets on the surface I probably shouldn't. Going by your picture of the Narwhal's guns I'd be real nervous about patronizing that Subway's sandwich shop across the street. ;) Was Argonaut the only one fitted to lay mines, or could all three?

DaveyJ576

03-15-09, 11:54 AM

Was Argonaut the only one fitted to lay mines, or could all three?
Of those three boats, only Argonaut was equipped specifically as a minelayer. She had two large tubes aft for the 40 inch wide Mk 11 mines. She could carry 60 of them and they were developed especially for her. The mine launching and compensation system was complex and required constant training and careful maintenance. The minelaying mission was never a popular one with submariners and the system fell out of use by WWII. Argonaut was eventually refitted with two standard 21 inch torpedo tubes mounted externally to the hull. Narwhal and Nautilus were outfitted from the start as cruiser submarines and had two standard torpedo tubes were Argonaut had her mine tubes.

Mine R&D had, by the start of the war, developed a mine capable of being launched from the standard 21 inch torpedo tubes of any submarine. Thus the whole need for a specialized minelaying submarine evaporated. Indeed, the torpedo shortage in the early months of the war forced some of the fleet boats to go on patrol with partial mine loadouts.

eljeffo41

03-20-09, 04:28 PM

DaveyJ576

03-22-09, 08:08 PM

How long did a fleet boats battery last? Did they have to cut a hole in the hull to replace them? I would imagine the individual batteries were very large and heavy! Probably not a job anyone would look forward to!:o

A fleet boat battery cell was 4.5 feet high, and 21 x 15 inches wide. It weighed a little over 3/4 of a ton. Not your average Duracell by any means! There were 252 of these cells in two separate battery wells. Normal life span was about two years, but this could vary depending on operating conditions.

These Exide and Gould lead acid batteries achieved this fairly long life at the expense of power output. Their German counterparts had a much higher output resulting in a greater submerged speed. But, the German batteries took longer to charge, they produced high amounts of hydrogen gas, and had a much shorter life (and thus were much more expensive).

The cells themselves are contained within a multi-layer hard rubber jar. The inner layer is an impermeable soft rubber membrane about the thickness of a balloon. This membrane contains the battery acid if the outer layer of hard rubber cracks due to battle damage. This type of jar greatly increased the reliability of the battery and thus the survivability of the submarine and was a key feature of the USN boats.

Changing out a battery was normally only done during overhauls in the states. A section of the walking deck in the forward and after battery had to be removed and each indivdual cell craned out one by one. In the after battery they were simply hauled up through the access hatch and off the boat. The forward battery, however, did not have a hatch and thus a hole was cut in the top of the pressure hull so that the cells could be removed. This was a long, difficult, and somewhat dangerous process and was only done when really necessary.

gimpy117

03-22-09, 09:58 PM

Q: I was told by my grandfather US subs had an early IFF system...is this true??

DaveyJ576

03-23-09, 06:21 PM

Q: I was told by my grandfather US subs had an early IFF system...is this true??

Yes, it is true, but only to a certain extent.

For those that do not know, IFF stands for Identification Friend or Foe. It is a radar/transponder based system designed to determine if a particular unit (ship or plane) is friendly. A radar type pulse of a specified frequency is sent out from your unit to the approaching unit. The pulse activates a transponder and it pulses back at a different frequency. This pulse is received at the sending unit and identifies it as friendly. While better than nothing, the system is not perfect as it will not positively identify a unit as unfriendly. If no pulse is received from the transponder, the contact is considered unfriendly. However, a friendly unit's transponder may be out of commission or damaged in battle and thus unable to respond.

The Naval Research Laboratory developed the first IFF system, the XAE, as early as 1937. Radar in general was in its infancy at the time and radar systems were poorly understood and mistrusted by the USN in general until about late 1942. The exception was the Submarine Service. It was seen as a valuable tool and was quickly embraced as soon as the technology became available. IFF systems were slower to be introduced, with the first system installed on the USS Angler (SS-240) in late 1943. Many boats still did not have IFF installed at the end of the war.

Arclight

03-24-09, 09:18 AM

Probably a dumb question, but was it possible to exchange torpedoes between the fore and aft torpedo rooms?

I've been wondering that since SH3; U-boats had external storage for fish, which made me wonder if it was feesible to cart one around the conning tower across the deck. Doubt it was possible to cart one the length of the sub internally. :hmmm:

Morpheus

03-24-09, 12:03 PM

Probably a dumb question, but was it possible to exchange torpedoes between the fore and aft torpedo rooms?

No. Neither on U.S. Subs, nor german Subs ...

Sailor Steve

03-24-09, 02:30 PM

The Germans very occasionally did transfer one from front to rear, using the same method the used for transferring them from a supply boat (milk cow): inflatable life rafts. It was very labor-intensive, time-consuming and exceedingly dangerous in that it left the crew exposed on the surface for a couple of hours.

LukeFF

03-24-09, 03:12 PM

No. Neither on U.S. Subs, nor german Subs ...

Bzzt! Wrong! It is documented in a couple of Salmon/Sargo class boats where torpedoes from the aft deck storage were moved to the forward torpedo room.

DaveyJ576

03-24-09, 07:44 PM

Bzzt! Wrong! It is documented in a couple of Salmon/Sargo class boats where torpedoes from the aft deck storage were moved to the forward torpedo room.

Okay, let's slow down a little here. Externally (deck) mounted torpedo tubes of any sort were very rare in USN submarines. Aft facing tubes were even rarer. They were well intentioned attempts at increasing firepower, but the submarine crews came to heartily dislike the tubes for a couple of reasons:

Once the tubes were loaded in port, the fish could not be withdrawn at sea for maintenance. With Mk 14 fish failing at alarming rates, the Torpedomen were keenly interested in ensuring that the fish were perfectly maintained. Torpedoes were "routined" as often as time permitted.
Torpedoes contained inside these deck tubes were very vulnerable to depth charge damage. Nautilus had one fish in a deck tube damaged during a depth charge attack at the Battle of Midway and it started a "hot run", i.e. the torpedo engine running inside the closed tube. This is an extraordinarily dangerous situation.
Once shot, the external tubes could not be reloaded at sea and thus were a one shot deal until the boat returned to port.
The following boats had two externally mounted forward firing tubes located in the superstructure forward of the diving planes: Narwhal, Nautilus, Porpoise, Pike, Tarpon, Pickerel, Permit, and Stingray. These tubes were not part of the original design and were added after the war commenced. In the case of Stingray, the tubes were removed before the end of the war. In addition, Narwhal and Nautilus were fitted with four non-firing stowage tubes under the raised forward gun deck. Using deck mounted davits and handling gear, these fish could in theory be withdrawn from these tubes, moved forward, and struck below to the forward torpedo room.

The following boats had two externally mounted aft firing tubes added during the war: Argonaut, Narwhal, and Nautilus. Note: Nautilus' tubes were mounted under the aft gun deck and angled outward, Argonaut and Narwhal had theirs mounted next to each other at the very aft end of the superstructure. Narwhal and Nautilus also had four non-firing stowage tubes mounted under the aft deck gun platform as part of their original design. Narwhal retained her aft stowage tubes, Nautilus had two of hers converted to firing tubes as noted above. Dolphin had two external stowage tubes on her aft deck as well.

No other Fleet Boat had aft mounted external tubes of any sort! Luke, I do not mean to call you out, but I would have to see your references that show that Salmon/Sargo boats had aft deck stowage tubes. With a very high degree of certainty I can say that they did not.

As for transferring torpedoes from the forward torpedo room to the aft torpedo room or vice-versa: it wasn't done. Internally it was impossible. Fish loaded forward had the warheads facing forward. How do you turn a 21 foot long, 2000 pound torpedo around inside a submarine, then move it all the way aft to the aft tubes? On the Darter we actually tried this as a gag on a new guy. We had him running all over the ship gathering gear for moving a torpedo from forward to aft, getting permission from the CO, etc. all the while snickering under our breath. After about an hour of making an a** of himself he finally caught on and realized it was impossible.

Doing this evolution topside is, in theory, possible but still faced tremendous problems in handling. Both the forward and aft loading hatches would have to be open with the loading skids raised. Getting the weapon up to the deck and back down into the room is not the problem. But again you have to turn the weapon and somehow find a method to move the 2000 pound, 21 foot long torpedo almost 300 feet, around the conning tower fairwater, all the time on a pitching, rolling, slippery deck. From personal experience I can tell you it would take about an hour just to rig the rooms, skids, and the handling gear. Actually moving the torpedo (assuming it could be done) would take at least an hour under optimal conditions. Two hours on the surface unable to submerge in enemy held waters just to move one torpedo? It is not worth the effort. Just turn the boat and point the needed tube in the right direction. A lot easier.

The external stowage tubes on the Narwhal, Nautilus, and Dolphin were a good idea in peacetime, but transferring torpedoes from these tubes to below faced many of the same problems that I outlined above and in practice proved to be a very bad idea. That is why it wasn't repeated in the later fleet boats. Once again in theory it was possible to maintain the torpedoes stowed in these tubes, but do you really want to try this very delicate work on a wet, pitching, rolling, slippery deck in enemy waters?

Morpheus

03-24-09, 08:04 PM

Bzzt! ...

Did you just say something? :har:

@ Davey: Thx for that pleasuring post

LukeFF

03-25-09, 01:23 AM

Luke, I do not mean to call you out, but I would have to see your references that show that Salmon/Sargo boats had aft deck stowage tubes. With a very high degree of certainty I can say that they did not.

It's talked about in Norman Friedman's book, and the patrol reports (for Salmon and Sargo class boats) also mention these external storage tubes. We also talked about it on the RFB forum here:

http://forum.kickinbak.com/viewtopic.php?f=29&t=877

Page 201, U.S. Submarines Through 1945:

At their 1934 conference, the submarine officers asked for (and got) more torpedoes: one per tube, two reloads forward, one aft, plus one reload for each after tube carried externally under the superstructure).

Arclight

03-25-09, 03:24 AM

Apparently there's more to that question then I thought. :doh:

Very interesting, thanks for all the input guys. :up:

DaveyJ576

03-25-09, 07:36 AM

Okay, so who is right here, Luke or myself? The answer is both of us...to a point.

In the very first post in this thread I stated that in no way am I all seeing or all knowing and Luke's post showed this to be true. If it seems that I prevaricate or waffle on some of my answers I do so with good reason. Just when you think you have the definitive answer, something else pops up. This is actually a good thing as it shows you are learning.

John D. Alden's superlative book The Fleet Submarine in the U.S. Navy makes four brief references to topside stowage tubes on the Salmon/Sargos. He also states that the four tubes were mounted forward of the conning tower fairwater and that they were later removed (when is not stated). I have read these passages numerous times and I either missed it or it didn't stick in my brain.

Having these stowage tubes mounted forward makes more sense than having them aft. The superstructure is wider and deeper forward. This makes for more space to place the tubes, makes it easier to place the davits and handling gear, and provides more space to move the fish around. The much narrower and shallower after superstructure was filled with induction and exhaust piping for the main engines, vents for the ballast tanks, five access hatches, loading skid, etc. and space was at a premium.

Immediately after the war began, the boat skippers began to realize that their boats had many peactime frills and extras that could be eliminated and by doing so would increase the reliability and survivability of the boat. A list of this unneeded stuff was drawn up, submitted, and approved by the General Board and the changes began in January 1942. The list I have access to is a general one for the Gato class, but it is likely that the topside stowage tubes for the Salmon/Sargos were eliminated during this purge. Per Luke's link above the tubes lasted on some boats at least until March/April 1942.

Why would you want to get rid of four extra torpedoes?? To answer this I refer back to my earlier post. This would have been a highly dangerous, time consuming evolution in enemy waters. The high degree of trepidation that Mendenhall and the crew of the Sculpin had concerning this task bears this out (see Luke's link above). What was a good idea in peacetime when no one was shooting at you turned out to be a bad idea in wartime when the enemy was anywhere and everywhere. The risks simply outweighed the benefits.

Luke, if you can find any more instances were these tubes were used during the war I would love to see them. I would like to get a good feeling for how often they were used.

Thanks for the correction!

LukeFF

03-25-09, 05:04 PM

No problem, Dave. :) Though, I am learning far much more from you than I am teaching others. :88)

As for documented instances of when these external tubes were used, I can only recommend reading through the patrol reports. I have only scanned through the Salmon and Sargo reports at this point, but I do recall the general opinion of the skippers being that these external containers were more trouble than they were worth. I'll see if I can find some specific instances and post them here.

LukeFF

03-25-09, 05:32 PM

From the third war patrol of the Salmon:

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v258/LukeFF/SalmonP3_1.jpg

From the same patrol, in the "Major Defects" Section:

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v258/LukeFF/SalmonP3_2.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v258/LukeFF/SalmonP3_3.jpg

Then, in the patrol endorsement, Lockwood himself comments on the matter:

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v258/LukeFF/SalmonP3_4.jpg

In the following two patrols, references are made to crewmen breaking out stores from the external tubes, but no direct reference to striking external torpedoes below. The prologue to Salmon's first war patrol following her 1943 overhaul, curiously, does not mention anything about the external tubes being removed.

DaveyJ576

03-27-09, 07:57 AM

There is an interesting story from WWII, somewhat apocryphal in nature, that humorously illustrates the destructive nature of seawater. Be forewarned that although verified to be true, as with any sea story some of the “facts” may have been stretched and distorted by inebriated sailors during its many retellings.

The USS Seadragon (SS-194) was under the command of LCDR W.E. “Pete” Ferrall on 08 December 1941 when Japanese forces attacked Cavite in the Philippines. Moored alongside the USS Sealion (SS-195) and undergoing overhaul at the time, she was not hit in the attack, but received shrapnel damage from bombs that fatally damaged the Sealion. Heat from the explosions blistered the paint on her starboard side. In the ensuing days she quickly made repairs and got underway for Java.

Over the next several months, Ferrall and the Seadragon were kept constantly on the move conducting aggressive anti-shipping patrols and running special missions back and forth to the Philippines. Operating out of several different ports in Java and Australia, there was little time to conduct proper maintenance and many items of concern had to be put by the wayside. One of these items was paint. In mid January 1942, surfacing after a depth charge attack, the crew noticed that the black paint she normally wore was flaking off in large splotches, revealing the red primer underneath. There was little that could be done at the time and the ‘Dragon stayed on patrol and continued to push back against the Japanese, paint job be damned.

Towards the end of her 2nd patrol, sometime in late March, strange reports began circulating on the air that really mystified the whole Navy, especially the normally reticent Submarine Service. Radio Tokyo, along with its infamous mouthpiece Tokyo Rose boldly announced that the U.S. Navy was contravening the rules of civilized warfare by unleashing a fleet of red pirate submarines on the South China Sea. These “Red Pirates” as she called them would be hunted down and exterminated by the forces of Imperial Japan. “Death to the Red Submarines!” became a Tokyo Rose rallying cry.

While the rest of the Navy scratched their heads and wondered what the heck ol’ Rose was talking about, the crew of the Seadragon were laughing hysterically! It was them! By that time the boat was in full lobster red mode. Her basic black had all but completely shed itself and the red primer announced her presence rather garishly. Apparently during her forays she had been spotted several times by the Japanese and her unusual paint job had left a deep impression on the enemy.

Being the Navy’s sole red submarine was actually quite a liability and Ferrall ordered a return to the basic black at the next opportunity. By this time, though, the legend of the “Red Dragon of the South China Sea” had been firmly established.

NEON DEON

04-08-09, 02:42 AM

Davey,

Here are some pictures that might clear the location of external tubeson on Salmon and Sargo.

I am going to guess here and say the best place to put the external tubes is as close to the torpedo loading hatch as possible. I am further going to guess and say that they would want to do it for the forward room.

Skematic of Salmon/Sargo:

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/SalmonSargoDiagram.jpg

Note the position of the forward torpedo load hatch as opposed to the gun support.

Picture of the Seal's deck forward of the Conning Tower:

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/Sealdeckforward.jpg

Notice the two Hatches to the port and starboard of the gun. Also take a look at the rail and deck expanding the width of the deck just forward of the gun to accomadate the hatches and not the gun.

A picture of the deck aft of the Seal conning tower:

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/Sealdeckaft.jpg

Notice that there are no cuts in the deck for external torpedo load and Look at the four rises along the edges of the deck to accomadate enlarged engine mufflers. The aft torpedo loading hatch is just past the last set of deck rises. No visible sign of cutaways in the deck to store external torpedoes and no room to put em because of the mufflers.

Last pic of Squalis construction:

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/Squalisunderconstruction.jpg

Notice the big cutouts in the deck with the wooden planks over them. The picture is looking aft from the bow.

A picture of Seal after a 4 inch deck gun was added:

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/Sealafteradding4incher.jpg

Notice after adding the 4 inch gun the cutaways are no longer there and the deck has been widened around the gun where it wasnt in early pictures of the Seal.

It would appear from these pictures the external storage tubes were forward of the Conning tower and they were removed when adding a four inch gun. Well at least for the Seal.

Anyways thats me story and I am sticking to it.

DaveyJ576

04-08-09, 04:52 PM

Notice the two Hatches to the port and starboard of the gun. Also take a look at the rail and deck expanding the width of the deck just forward of the gun to accomadate the hatches and not the gun.

Neon,

The hatches and deck cutouts you are seeing in these photos are actually for two small boats that were used for running sailors ashore for liberty. They were stored under the deck forward and these deck hatches covered them up. In the pre-war years, submarines would frequently anchor out when in port and sometimes liberty launches were not available. One of them would have been for the crew and one for the officers and the captain. The hatches would be removed and the boats lifted out and put over the side using the torpedo recovery davit. Most of the fleet boats up through the early Gatos had these launches.

As I stated in a previous post, once the war started the sub crews realized that they had a lot of frills and extra stuff on their boats that really did not contribute to the completion of the mission of sinking ships. Very quickly a list of desired equipment deletions was drawn up and submitted to the General Board. The request to remove the liberty launches was approved on 10 May 1942, but many of the boats had already removed them.

The 1943 photos of Seal above show the forward deck as it was originally built, with the hatches and cutouts to accommodate the launches. They had probably been already removed at this point. The last photo, taken after the war, show the forward deck modified and the hatches removed. This was done because the larger 4"/50 cal gun required more deck space in order to be safely trained. This necessitated altering the deck and thus the unused boat hatches were removed and the space decked over.

This brings us back to the original point. Where in the heck were these torpedo stowage tubes located? You must remember that these torpedoes were 21 feet long! In order to pull them completely out of the tube and get them on deck so they could be struck below, you would need an additional 21 feet in front of the tubes (probably 25 feet would be more like it)!

Look at the photos of the Seal's forward deck. With the deck gun (it had a substantial foundation hidden under the deck) and the boats, were would they fit? Remember you need 50 feet of unobstructed space. The only thing I can think of is that they were arranged two to a side on either side of the conning tower. The fish were then extracted and hoisted up on deck through the deck hatches for the boats. The problem here is that you would have to remove both boats, put them in the water alongside the sub, extract the torpedoes, then replace the boats! Sounds like a real Rube Goldberg setup to me.

I have done a little more reading and I trust that the tubes actually existed on the Salmon/Sargo boats, but I am having the devil of a time figuring out how they were used.:06: I have handled torpedoes as part of a loading party several times on the Darter and I can tell you the process is little tolerant of haste, poor planning, or mistakes. I'm stumped on this one. What do you guys think?

NEON DEON

04-09-09, 01:23 AM

Hi davey,

I think you are spot on about the boats. However, based on the reports requesting external torpedoes and the logs luke posted show the torpedoes were loaded externaly plus the fact the torpedoes were so darned big and heavy and the fact the torpedo loading gear was used to pull the boats out in the first place I am thinking they pulled the boats and put the torpedoes right there where the boats would have gone in the first place. Also the 3 inch gun in that picture was an add on in that overhaul. The original placement was aft of the conning tower.

DaveyJ576

04-10-09, 06:01 PM

Also the 3 inch gun in that picture was an add on in that overhaul. The original placement was aft of the conning tower.

This is true. Many of the senior submarine officers in the pre-war period took a dim view of deck guns as they felt that they encouraged reckless and dangerous surface engagements. This is part of that over-cautious mindset that I referred to in an earlier post. This thinking led to the selection of the 3"/50 cal as the gun of choice as it was felt that the smaller gun would discourage everything but purely defensive actions. Also, the gun was sited aft so that it could be used defensively as the boat was running away from the enemy! This line of thought on tactics just stuns me.

However, some of the more level headed officers (like Charlie Lockwood) argued for better gun armament and were able to work a compromise with the General Board. Even though the dinky 3"/50 was to remain aft, they were able to get approved two gun mount foundations (one forward and one aft), each capable of handling up to a 5"/51 cal gun. This proved to be a key decision because once the war started this allowed the quick move of the gun to the forward position (could be done by a tender at a forward base), and allowed for the mounting of the larger 4"/50 cal and the later 5"/25 cal weapons, both much more capable and powerful guns.

The only question that I haven't answered completely yet is exactly when these twin mounts were approved. I am pretty sure that all of the fleet boats from the Porpoise/Shark class on had them, although my references are somewhat hazy on this point. At the very least they started with the Tambor/Gars.

If a boat didn't have the forward deck mount, it would have been a fairly extensive mod to add one. A large portion of the forward superstructure would have to be removed and the foundation would have to be fabricated and welded to the frames and pressure hull. The superstructure and deck would then be replaced, highly modified to accept the bulk of the foundation. While this type of work would have been no sweat for a major shipyard like Mare Island or Hunters Point, it may have been beyond the capability of a tender.

To get back to point, if the Salmon/Sargos had this forward gun mount as part of the original design (and I believe they did), the placement of the torpedo stowage tubes inside of the forward superstucture would have been very problematic for the reasons that I pointed out above. I am still scratching my head on this one. :doh:

NEON DEON

04-10-09, 07:28 PM

I see your point. But if you look again at the three inch gun on the seal and note the positions of the hatches forward and to the left and right of the gun.

Here are a few picks of the Squalus while under construction in 1938.

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/Sqaulisforwardgunmount.jpg

Note that the foward gun mount is there (that flatheaded mushroomy thing). Also note that under the surface of the platform the support for the mount are actually smaller than what sits flush with the deck. Now refering back to the seal picture and the location of the boat hatches.....

Here is the aft section of the Squalus showing that she was indeed constructed with two deckgun mounts in 1938 when she was being built.

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/SqualisRearmount.jpg

So both platforms for the guns are there and the supports to the platforms are less intrusive underneath the deck which, for me at least, still points to the boats were pulled and replaced with external tubes.

Going back to the Seals ovehaul picture the gun is positioned right at the end and inbetween the boat hatches.

If they didnt use the hatches then the only other place to put them would be to lash them down above the deck.

Sledgehammer427

04-10-09, 09:18 PM

Real submarine Technology Q&A -> Real submarine Technology Arguments, in session now!

good thing its constructive arguing, very interesting to read and look at all the pics you guys fish up (with no pun intended to the current argument)

LukeFF

04-10-09, 11:45 PM

Part of the answer as to where the external torpedo stowage was at can likely be found in this quote from Submarine Diary:

29 March This was a quiet Sunday spent patrolling the northeast approaches to Staring Bay. Nothing was sighted. Having used seven fish from the forward torpedo room, we made plans to move south about forty miles to be near a small island named Ruduma, away from the traffic lanes, so the torpedomen could move the four fish from the deck storage to the forward torpedo room. We needed calm weather to make the transfer. The moon would be bright. The captain wanted to be near land so that those working on deck could swim to safety should they be left in the water if Sculpin had to dive to avoid a Japanese ship or airplane.

Transferring the fish would require opening a section of the topside decking. A king post and boom would be rigged, with chain hoists to help jockey the fish out of storage and lift them up to deck level. The angled torpedo loading hatch to the forward torpedo room would be opened, and the fish, one by one, would be gently snaked along the deck to a position where they could be further skidded down to the torpedo room.

Nisgeis

04-11-09, 04:05 AM

Note that the foward gun mount is there (that flatheaded mushroomy thing). Also note that under the surface of the platform the support for the mount are actually smaller than what sits flush with the deck. Now refering back to the seal picture and the location of the boat hatches.....

Sorry Neon, I can't see what you mean by the flat mushroomy thing. I can't make out the forward gun mount in that picture, could you circle the bit you are talking about?

Here is the aft section of the Squalus showing that she was indeed constructed with two deckgun mounts in 1938 when she was being built.

They are both pictures of the aft?

Nisgeis

04-11-09, 04:10 AM

If a boat didn't have the forward deck mount, it would have been a fairly extensive mod to add one. A large portion of the forward superstructure would have to be removed and the foundation would have to be fabricated and welded to the frames and pressure hull. The superstructure and deck would then be replaced, highly modified to accept the bulk of the foundation. While this type of work would have been no sweat for a major shipyard like Mare Island or Hunters Point, it may have been beyond the capability of a tender.

Was Subic Bay a major yard? From reading patrol reports, the foundation ring was added at the same time the second gun was. I believe the mounts were installed ready to take a 5" gun, but only the foundation ring for the one that was needed was installed.

NEON DEON

04-11-09, 04:47 AM

http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/08192a.htm

Ok thats the website where the pictures came from.

There are two pictures there in various states of construction.

One taken in April and one taken in July.

I thought they were bow and aft but you are correct they are both aft.

The captions wrongly identified them.

Photo 19 N 109862:

Squalus (SS-192), under construction on the building ways at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, Kittery, Maine, 7 April 1938. View looks aft, with forward torpedo tube supporting structure in the foreground.

It should say looks forward.

Cirlcle them:hmmm:

I will give it a try.

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/Squalusrearmount2222.jpg

DaveyJ576

04-11-09, 06:08 AM

Was Subic Bay a major yard? From reading patrol reports, the foundation ring was added at the same time the second gun was. I believe the mounts were installed ready to take a 5" gun, but only the foundation ring for the one that was needed was installed.

I am not entirely sure of their exact capabilities, but Subic Bay and/or Cavite would have most likely been able to conduct major overhauls and do the rework that I described. Obviously, these yards were lost at the beginning of the war, leaving only Pearl Harbor west of the mainland. Strangely, Pearl generally did not handle overhauls and left the major work to the west coast yards in Bremerton (in Washington state), Mare Island, and Hunters Point (both in San Francisco), with submarines going mostly to Mare Island.

DaveyJ576

04-11-09, 06:42 AM

The circled item in the pic above is the after torpedo room access hatch, not the aft gun mount. The angled torpedo loading hatch would be immediately forward of this hatch and is obscured in this photo. The access hatch was left out of the diagram that Neon posted above, leading to some of the confusion.

The earlier photo where the pressure hull is incomplete was taken from very nearly the same spot. What you are seeing here is the aft end of MBT #4 and the inside of the after torpedo room. Just below where the worker is standing and below the wood plank you can see Fr 176 written on the tank wall in chalk. This means frame 176 and this frame is in the far aft end of the boat. The difference in the two photos is that in the 2nd photo the aft torpedo tubes and the WRT tank have been added and the pressure hull completed.

The hatch trunk itself is 26 inches in diameter all the way to the top. The "mushroomed" portion at the top is metal flashing attached to the trunk so that the teak decking can be attached once installed.

In the earlier photo you can see that none of the aft superstructure has been installed. Looking forward from the hatch you can see the framing ribs of the top of the pressure hull, with the main ballast and fuel tanks already completed on the port and starboard sides. The small horizontal cylinder offset just to port is an engine muffler and just forward of that is a vertical cylinder that is the engine room access hatch. Beyond that it gets harder to make out what the structures are, but the large one on the center line is probably the support structure for the conning tower. The aft gun mount would be just aft of the conning tower and is completely obscured in this photo.

The later photo shows the aft superstructure installed right up to the aft torpedo loading hatch. There is a large section yet to be installed, the portion around the hatches and aft all the way to the tip of the stern, just below the bottom edge of the photo. Just aft of the hatch you can see four attach points (two per side) were the superstructure supports will be welded to. Going back much further forward, you can see the horizontal cylinder of the conning tower installed right on the center line. The fairwater and periscope shears have not yet been installed.

Nisgeis

04-11-09, 06:43 AM

Cirlcle them:hmmm:

I will give it a try.

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/Squalusrearmount2222.jpg

That's the after torpedo room's escape hatch. It's flared out like that so a rescue bell can get a pressure seal.

Nisgeis

04-11-09, 08:04 AM

Just below where the worker is standing and below the wood plank you can see Fr 176 written on the tank wall in chalk. This means frame 176 and this frame is in the far aft end of the boat.

Interesting, I didn't know the earlier boats had more frames than the later boats. Was that to do with increased pressure hull strength by switching to higher strength steel?

Platapus

04-11-09, 09:00 AM

Speaking as a spectator way back in the cheap seats, I really enjoy this discussion. No personal attacks, just a passionate academic argument. :salute:

DaveyJ576

04-11-09, 10:57 AM

Interesting, I didn't know the earlier boats had more frames than the later boats. Was that to do with increased pressure hull strength by switching to higher strength steel?

I don't have a definite answer for you, but I believe it had to do with weight. Squalus was one of the Sargo class boats that ended up being badly overweight when completed. Portsmouth Navy Yard had to go back and cut away portions of the superstructure framing (amongst other changes) to bring the boat into specs before the Navy would accept it. This experience was an unpleasant surprise for Portsmouth and from that point on they became real weight watchers (Electric Boat and the other builders followed suit). The designers took a very careful look at the design and probably decided that they could safely eliminate some framing without compromising the strength. These weight saving measures were a good thing as the boats built up such a weight margin that during the war when new gear was added it could be done so with out problems.

NEON DEON

04-11-09, 05:55 PM

That's the after torpedo room's escape hatch. It's flared out like that so a rescue bell can get a pressure seal.

There is too much hull behind the pedestel to be the tropredo room hatch and it is too tall.

Picture of the Seadragon with aft torpedo hatch and torpedo loading hatches open.

http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/Seadragonreartorpedohatchopen.jpg

The torpedo room chamber has a pronounced curve to it. The hull continues almost straight well past the pedestal. Look at the picture of the diagram and you can see the angle decrease sharply before where the aft torpedo hatch is.

Nisgeis

04-12-09, 04:44 AM

NEON DEON

04-12-09, 07:55 PM

If you look closely at the photo of the Seadragon, at the after most hatch, you can see two features of the torpedo room escape hatch. One is the large metal flange that sticks out, to facilitate docking with a McCann rescue bell and the other is the lugs used to attach the cables that the rescue bell would use to pull itself down. You can see both of these features in the previous photo showing the almost complete sub.

Unlike later designs, the early designs have the deck superstructure blended in to the hull, so it does make it look like the deck is flush with the hull, but it isn't. If you follow the line of the ballast tanks and the deck superstructure down, you can see that the line where the deck superstructure meets the ballast tanks is clearly defined and stops just forward of the torpedo tubes. Also, if you look aft of the capstan, you can see that there is a taper down instead of the harder lines of the later boats.

Ok then why is there not a steep rise in the bottom of the hull in the April picture? The one with fr 176 on it?

Diagram of the after section of Salmon/Sargo:http://i680.photobucket.com/albums/vv170/NEONDEON1955/SalmonSargoDiagram22222.jpg

The green arrow shows the hull rise and the circle covers the torpedo room hatches. The rise in the hull starts in the aft engine room.

Take a look at the july picture and imagine the propeller shafts clearing the bottom of the hull at the pedestal. Wouldnt those be some very long prop shafts?

Also. Just what does FR 176 mean?

Nisgeis

04-13-09, 05:40 PM

Ok then why is there not a steep rise in the bottom of the hull in the April picture? The one with fr 176 on it?

Diagram of the after section of Salmon/Sargo:

<SNIP, as it's just above>

The green arrow shows the hull rise and the circle covers the torpedo room hatches. The rise in the hull starts in the aft engine room.

Take a look at the july picture and imagine the propeller shafts clearing the bottom of the hull at the pedestal. Wouldnt those be some very long prop shafts?

Also. Just what does FR 176 mean?

Davey said that FR 176 is Frame 176. I thought it might have meant that, but I initially discounted that, as I didn't know the early boats had so many frames!

The hull rise at the green arrow is there in the April pic. If you look at the relative distance from top of the hull, to the deck in the centre to the distance to the bottom of the hull, then the lower section is about 2/3rds the height of the upper section. The upper section is the after torpedo room and the lower section is MBT #4. Looking at the diagrams, this fits nicely with what the diagrams show, that the section at end of MBT #4 is about 2/3rds of the height of the torpedo room.

The way to be 100% sure is to get hold of a book of general plans, that lists the frames numbers, then it will be very easy to see where that part is. Unfortunately, I only know of a Balao class booklet online and no Sargo.

The props are fairly long, as they have to go all the way to the machinery room, which is about 40 feet I think. On one of the earlier diagrams you posted, it shows the prop shafts externally and there's a measuring box showing what 20 feet looks like. The prop shafts are easily longer than the 20 foot sample box.

MonTana_Prussian

04-13-09, 07:09 PM

Just want to say,this is a great thread guys! Lots of real good stuff,keep it comming!:salute:

Hitman

04-14-09, 08:48 AM

I arrive a little late for the periscope colour filters question that Arclight posed some time ago, but if it's still of some help, I'd like to point out that german WW2 submarines had two exchangable colour filters in the oculars: Deep neutral and orange. Orange was used to allow looking at a target against sunset/sunrise, as the orange blocked the intense orange sun rays, while the deep neutral (Looking like fog, soft grey) was used specifically to eliminate the disturbing small light reflexes in the peak of the waves in bright sunny days. :up:

As for moving torpedoes from the stern to the bow torpedo room, I have no idea if someone actually did it, but if I had to (And I find it highly impractical, since it's easier caluclating a solution for a stern shot than taking the pains of moving the torpedoes around:haha:) I would do somethings more simple:

1.- Eject the torpedo from the stern torpedo tube into the water, ensuring it is set to float
2.- Tow it along the hull forward and
3.- Submerge the boat until the bow torpedo tube aligns with water level
4.- Push it backwards in

No really, I know this won't work in real life, but it feels cool to have found a solution :har:

Nisgeis

04-14-09, 10:13 AM

As theories go, it's a nice one. I'm no expert, but I think I read that only the practice torpedoes float and that's because they have a cannister in them that expels the water in the dummy warhead after the fuel is spent and the run complete and they bob to the surface. Live torpedoes float in the water just like bricks don't (sorry Douglas).

DaveyJ576

04-14-09, 12:25 PM

I would like to take this opportunity to once again strongly encourage everyone who plays and enjoys SHIV to visit one of the many submarine museums throughout the country. There is nothing like being in the boat to provide you with the perspective necessary to truly understand how things worked and what the submarine sailors went through on patrol. A lot of this left field stuff we talk about in this thread will make sense if you can see it in person and put your hands on it.

Some of the boats had post war Guppy mods and some (like the Albacore, Blueback, and Nautilus) are "modern" post war designs. But all of them will provide the basics necessary for understanding the fine points of submarine design and history. Some of the boats are in mint condition, and some are showing the ravages of time. All of them desperately need your support in order to keep operating.

The following link: www.hnsa.org (http://www.hnsa.org), will direct you to the Historic Naval Ships Association website. There you will find a comprehensive list of all the boats on display. Obviously most of them are on the coasts, but for those who live inland, don't despair! There are boats in unusual places like Michigan, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and upstate New York! For those of you in other countries, several submarines from other navies are on display around the world and these boats are listed as well.

All of the boats are worth visiting (I myself have been to six of them), but for the true experience I recommend the USS Cod (SS-224), located in Cleveland, Ohio. She is the only boat that has not been altered for ease of access. You have to go up and down the vertical ladders and through the trunks just like the real crew did. She is in great shape and even has a fully functional TDC.

If you live near one of the boats, they are always looking for volunteers to help with maintenance and cleaning. They would be happy to get your help.

Please visit one of the boats. It is a great time and you won't regret it!

MonTana_Prussian

04-14-09, 12:33 PM

being from the SF Bay Area originally,I have visited USS Pampanito SS-383 on several occasions. Very cool,and if you are in the area,you might want to take a hop over to the former NAS Alameda and vist USS Hornet CV-12.:up:

DaveyJ576

04-14-09, 02:28 PM

1.- Eject the torpedo from the stern torpedo tube into the water, ensuring it is set to float
2.- Tow it along the hull forward and
3.- Submerge the boat until the bow torpedo tube aligns with water level
4.- Push it backwards in

Actually, Hitman's procedure, even though totally and utterly impractical (sorry!), is technically doable. It just needs a little massaging. Torpedoes are designed to be neutrally buoyant, so you don't have to worry to much about them sinking, just very carefull. So, a modified procedure would look something like this:

1. Flood the tube and open the outer door. Attach a line to the nose of the weapon and pull it out of the tube. If you eject it it will go a long way, even if the engine doesn't start, then you would have to run it down. Pulling it out of the tube at sea will be a problem, though. Even though neutrally buoyant, it still has about 2000 pounds of mass, making it hard to move.

2. Tow it along the hull forward. Pretty good, but you got to be careful not to bang it around.

3. Submerge the boat until the bow torpedo tube aligns with water level. Oops. Remember, the forward tubes on a fleet boat are underwater at normal trim. Therefore, you would have to raise the bow to get the tube to surface level. On the surface all main ballast tanks are already dry, so it is hard to raise the bow. You would have to flood down the stern and pump dry the forward trim tank, and then probably move a lotta stuff aft to trim up the bow enough. It would be far easier to push the fish downward (remember, the fish is neutrally buoyant) until it lined up with the tube, flood down the tube, open the outer door, then...

4. Push it backwards in. Perfect.

In 1985 on the Darter, we were in Pearl Harbor and had to unload some Mk 37 warshots to storage. The way our after torpedo room was arranged, it was a lot easier to just float them out of the tubes and hoist them to the pier with a crane. So with a couple of divers in the water we did just that. It took about a quarter of the time. We were alongside the pier at the submarine base, though and not at sea.

I have to say one more time that while the procedure described above is completely impractical and unnecessary, it is technically feasible. :timeout:

Hitman

04-14-09, 03:15 PM

You mean it actually could work on that variant you explained? :o LOL not bad for someone who studied humanities and not sciences :rock:- I'm a jurist, but Gene McKinney and a few more also were and didn't fare bad at all :D

Torpedoes are designed to be neutrally buoyant, so you don't have to worry to much about them sinking, just very carefull

Yes, that I knew, hence the idea :up:

Oops. Remember, the forward tubes on a fleet boat are underwater at normal trim. Therefore, you would have to raise the bow to get the tube to surface level.

Ahhhh my bad, in the U-Boats a pair of the tubes are above the water
, so I didn't think in the US boats it wouldn't. Well come to think of it, actually in the boats equipped with external firing tubes they certainly are

:hmmm: I have a nice photo of USS Permit showing them just below the deck level, and also look at my signature :DL, so in those it would work out I suppose. Or in the other boats you could put the torpedo on the deck and surface the boat having it aligned with the hatch for torpedo loading :O:

I have to say one more time that while the procedure described above is completely impractical and unnecessary, it is technically feasible. :timeout:

Cheers :yeah: As I already said, a stern shot is always the best option.

I also wanted to add that it is a HONOUR and a PLEASURE to be able to talk with submarine and surface ship veterans like you or Steve and be able to learn so much and enjoy your comments. I love subsim.com :salute:

Sniper31

04-14-09, 03:30 PM

I am REALLY enjoying this thread! It's chock full of great information and history. I am a career US Army Infantryman, so not much real world experience with ships and such, other than some Zodiac small boat ops:03:
That said, I keep learning more and more from this thread with every post. Thanks guys, and keep it coming.:salute:

Nisgeis

04-14-09, 05:18 PM

Hmmm, I'm not convinced the larger torpedoes floated. I think they are a couple of hundred pound heavier than the water they displace according to my highly accurate napkin and pencil calculations :DL.

In 1985 on the Darter, we were in Pearl Harbor and had to unload some Mk 37 warshots to storage. The way our after torpedo room was arranged, it was a lot easier to just float them out of the tubes and hoist them to the pier with a crane.

OK, so the Mk. 37 is a 19" swim out torpedo, like the cutie? There'd be no suction holding it in the tube, like there would be for a 21" torpedo. Would it still be possible with a 21" torpedo? Would you have to have the flood or vent valves open to let air or water in behind the torpedo, or you'd have a bit of a job on your hands?

DaveyJ576

04-14-09, 07:32 PM

Hmmm, I'm not convinced the larger torpedoes floated. I think they are a couple of hundred pound heavier than the water they displace according to my highly accurate napkin and pencil calculations :DL.

Sigh...Folks, the operative word here is feasible... I knew I was going to get in trouble with that post! :har:

OK, so the Mk. 37 is a 19" swim out torpedo, like the cutie? There'd be no suction holding it in the tube, like there would be for a 21" torpedo. Would it still be possible with a 21" torpedo? Would you have to have the flood or vent valves open to let air or water in behind the torpedo, or you'd have a bit of a job on your hands?

The inside diameter of a Mk 32 torpedo tube on a fleet boat is actually 21.125", which is slightly larger than the diameter of a Mk 14 torpedo. Spread out along the bottom of the tube are four rollers that the fish actually rests on. With the tube vented to sea pressure, any suction effect would be minimized.

However, with almost 2000 pounds of mass and using nothing but Armstrong Engineering to get it out of the tube, just getting it moving and then controlling it once you are moving is a tall order.

Once again guys...feasible, not practical or realistic. :D

Nisgeis

04-15-09, 06:51 AM

Great stuff, something else for the memory bank :DL. I never knew there was a slight gap. This thread is great.

U-boat luver

04-15-09, 09:14 PM

wow, what a thread this is!:salute: I can't play SH3 due to loss of computer so I haven't come here often.

My questions are: How would a sub (German or American) pump water in the sub to the outside. For example when taking on water from an explosion.

Also when a destroyer pings for a sub wouldn't the first thing the ping hits underwater come back? How would the radio man at the helm know if it is a sub or not?

DaveyJ576

04-16-09, 07:15 PM

How would a sub (German or American) pump water in the sub to the outside. For example when taking on water from an explosion.

Water can accumulate inside a submarine for a variety of reasons, only one of which is battle damage. The propeller shaft seals may leak (fairly common), condensate water drains from the refrigeration and A/C plants, water drains from the access trunks after surfacing, etc. All this water goes into the bilges in the lowest levels of each compartment. Let it accumulate long enough and it interferes with the operation of equipment and of course it will effect the buoyancy of the boat.

In the appropriately named Pump Room underneath the Control Room, is the Drain Pump. This is a very large and powerful reciprocating type pump (sorry, the specs and capacities are escaping me right now). It is powered by an electric motor. It is connected to a drain line that runs all the way to the forward torpedo room, and one that runs all the way to the aft torpedo room. Along the way, attached to this drain line are various suction valves, at least one in every compartment. The pump operator will contact the compartment that needs to be pumped, have someone open the appropriate bilge suction valve, start the pump, and pump the water overboard through a discharge valve.

There are many times in which the water being pumped overboard will be contaminated with oil or fuel. If this is the case, and the enemy is topside, the drain pump operator has the option of pumping the bilge to a holding tank. This will prevent oil from creating a sheen on the surface and giving away the boats' location. The holding tank will be pumped at a later time.

The drain pump is powerful enough to pump any bilge on the boat overboard, all the way down to test depth. That is a lot of water pressure to overcome.

Also when a destroyer pings for a sub wouldn't the first thing the ping hits underwater come back? How would the radio man at the helm know if it is a sub or not?

The ocean is really pretty empty, when you stop to consider the vast size. There really aren't too may things the sonar beam is going to bounce off of other than the submarine the tin-can is hunting. Trained sonar operators can easily tell the difference between a bottom bounce and a submarine and any whale or other marine life that might be in the area are easily scared off by the activity. Their soft flesh also makes for a lousy and mushy return.

Since the boats' radiomen had the best electronics training of anyone on the boat, they sometimes doubled as sonar operators. As the war progressed, specially trained sonar operators replaced them. Helmsman drove the boat and usually did not operate the sonar or the radio.

LukeFF

04-17-09, 01:34 AM

Since the boats' radiomen had the best electronics training of anyone on the boat, they sometimes doubled as sonar operators. As the war progressed, specially trained sonar operators replaced them. Helmsman drove the boat and usually did not operate the sonar or the radio.

To add to this: the Navy created the rating of Soundman in 1942 and was merged with Sonarman in 1943. However, these ratings were almost always found on surface ships and only very rarely on submarines, as the Radioman rating was also used for operating the sonar on submarines (I've found only one submarine that had a Sonarman-rated man on board). Correct me if I'm wrong on this, Dave, but that's my understanding of how it worked.

LukeFF

04-17-09, 01:36 AM

Nisgeis

04-17-09, 06:06 AM

There are many times in which the water being pumped overboard will be contaminated with oil or fuel. If this is the case, and the enemy is topside, the drain pump operator has the option of pumping the bilge to a holding tank. This will prevent oil from creating a sheen on the surface and giving away the boats' location. The holding tank will be pumped at a later time.

OK, this may be a stupid question, but if you pump to the holding tank, is that full of clean water to start with which is replaced with contaminated water? I'm just thinking that pumping the bilge to an empty tank won't make the boat lighter, so could you lighten the boat and still keep the contaminated water contained? Would you just pump a different trim tank to sea?

DaveyJ576

04-17-09, 09:41 AM

Now another question for you, Dave: the early patrol reports mention the use of "open sights" on the 3"/50 as an alternative to using the scope when engaging targets (such as when the lens was damaged or fogged up). Are there any pics out there that show what those "open sights" looked like?

Go to the following link: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_3-50_mk10-22_pics.htm

Scroll down through the page and you will come across a couple of photos that will show the sights. They are a circular ring with a spider web looking reticle in the center. You will also see a couple of good shots of the telescopic sight being used. Not all of these photos are from submarines. The 3"/50 was a popular anti-aircraft weapon and was used on a variety of platforms.

DaveyJ576

04-17-09, 02:25 PM

OK, this may be a stupid question, but if you pump to the holding tank, is that full of clean water to start with which is replaced with contaminated water? I'm just thinking that pumping the bilge to an empty tank won't make the boat lighter, so could you lighten the boat and still keep the contaminated water contained? Would you just pump a different trim tank to sea?

That is not a stupid question at all. It is a tough concept that is actually counter-intuitive. The holding tank that the oily water is pumped to (officially called the expansion tank) is external to the pressure hull and is compensated to sea pressure. It will normally have some water in it. Thus, if you pump something to it from inside the pressure hull, you are in effect lightening the boat. Since oil and water don't mix, the oil rises to the top and the water will be at the bottom. This will effectively hold the oil in the tank and prevent it from rising to the surface. Obviously at a certain point the tank will be full and the CO will have no choice but to pump over the side. BTW, the expansion tank is normally used as an overflow tank when fuel volume expands due to temperature changes.

There was also the option of pumping the bilge into the trim system and putting the water into one of the trim tanks. For instance, if you had flooding aft (which would make you heavy aft) you could pump the bilge to the forward trim tank and thus restore your fore to aft trim. Once again, though, you could potentially be putting oily water into the trim system and if you had to subsequently pump that particular trim tank to sea to lighten the boat, the oily water could give away your presence.

The normal mode of operation for the drain system was to just simply pump the bilges over the side. The expansion tank option was normally only used during the heat of battle when evading. Back in those days, you didn't have tree huggers watching your every move and environmental rules were virtually nonexistant.

Rockin Robbins

04-17-09, 05:30 PM

Back in those days, you didn't have tree huggers watching your every move and environmental rules were virtually nonexistant.
Yes, it's vitally important that with millions of gallons of petroleum being naturally vented into the ocean due to natural processes each year that we don't allow a submarine to add ten or twenty gallons to that. Could be the straw that broke the camel's back you know!http://i196.photobucket.com/albums/aa293/RockinRobbins13/smileys/clap.gif

DaveyJ576

04-17-09, 07:33 PM

The Navy created the rating of Soundman in 1942 and was merged with Sonarman in 1943. However, these ratings were almost always found on surface ships and only very rarely on submarines, as the Radioman rating was also used for operating the sonar on submarines (I've found only one submarine that had a Sonarman-rated man on board). Correct me if I'm wrong on this, Dave, but that's my understanding of how it worked.

Very true. Radiomen did provide the bulk of sonar operators, but as more boats were commissioned, the Navy turned to other sources. Just about anyone who showed an aptitude (even unusual rates like Yeoman and Ship's Cook) could be sent to sonar school, no matter the rate. Once trained and qualified, they earned the Soundman/Sonarman distinguishing mark which was worn on the sleeve between the elbow and wrist. In some cases, junior officers were trained and stood the watch.

Post-war, as sonar became increasingly important to submarine operations, Sonarmen took over on the boats. The title of the rate was changed to Sonar Technician in 1964.

Hitman

04-18-09, 03:37 PM

Here's another one, and this is not easy :D

Since the pre-WW1 doctrine called only for submerged attacks, US submarines were not equipped with TBTs at the start of the war, it was later when they were equipped with them, first of all as custom modifications made by the crew (O'Kane in one of his book comments how he got the workshop to put a reticle in a binocular to use it on a custom pelorouse as TBT). My question is, since those binoculars and later the TBTs were not equipped with rangefinders, how did they get range to target for the plot and shot before radar was equipped, or when radar was off to prevent counter-detection? Are there any other means on board fleet boats to determine distance to target aside from radar and periscope stadimeter/telemeter? (Of course I don't count the MKI eyeball here :DL)

DaveyJ576

04-18-09, 04:35 PM

Are there any other means on board fleet boats to determine distance to target aside from radar and periscope stadimeter/telemeter? (Of course I don't count the MKI eyeball here :DL)

You could use active sonar to ping off the target. That will give you a very accurate range. Of course, if the target is escorted, this tends to give away your presence.

If you can see the target well enough to get a bearing and angle on the bow, you can see it well enough to use the stadimeter. I wouldn't count out the Mk 1 Mod 0 eyeball. An experienced CO can make a pretty good guess as to range. Once this is put into the initial tracking solution, the range can be massaged as the solution is refined over a series of observations.

Torplexed

04-18-09, 06:08 PM

I thought I'd ask this question since we had a rash of posts a while back where players were running out of gas short of their home port. They always bemoan their fate (eternally becalmed) and wonder what options would have been available in real life.

Did any US sub ever run dry on fuel during the war and find itself in need of a tow or fuel transfer? My guess is that running the tanks dry would be such a career-killing oversight that a careful eye was kept on the gauge by the skipper to ensure this never happened. But how about battle damage leading to a fuel leak?

DaveyJ576

04-19-09, 06:53 AM

Did any US sub ever run dry on fuel during the war and find itself in need of a tow or fuel transfer? My guess is that running the tanks dry would be such a career-killing oversight that a careful eye was kept on the gauge by the skipper to ensure this never happened. But how about battle damage leading to a fuel leak?

I am not immediately aware of any such occurrence, but given the nature of submarine operations, it is at least possible. Consider this though: the CO is not the only one keeping an eye on the "gas gauge". The XO, the Engineering Officer, and at least 2-3 chiefs and 1st classes are all carefully watching fuel usage. Tanks are sounded daily and the fuel state is reported to the captain. It is not like driving your car where only one person is watching the gas gauge. With so many people tracking this issue, short of the battle damage that you mentioned, it is very unlikely that the tanks will run dry.

I disagree with the notion that this would be an immediate career killer for a captain. Like everything else in the navy, it would depend on circumstances. One of the worst things you can do to a U.S. naval vessel is run it aground. Dave McLintock ran the USS Darter (SS-227) aground off Palawan and the boat was lost. But not only was the crew awarded the Navy Unit Commendation, but McLintock and the entire crew were transferred to a new boat. Why? Because the Darter was in the midst of an aggressive and well executed attack against IJN fleet units when she ran aground. In addition, wartime considerations are a lot different from peacetime. If McLintock had been entering San Diego harbor in 1947 and this occurred, he would have been hung from the highest yardarm (figuratively speaking, of course).

The same thing applies to running out of fuel. If you go dry because the CO and the crew were incompetent and forgot about it, then you are done. The CO will probably wind up commanding a weather station in Greenland. But if Slade Cutter or Gene Fluckey run out of fuel because they are chasing and sinking ships, then the worst they can probably expect is a butt chewing from Lockwood and some good natured ribbing back at the Royal Hawaiian.

I also heartily disagree with how the game handles this situation. Do you honestly think that SubPac would just write off a fleet submarine and the entire crew just because they ran out of fuel? Hardly. Another boat or fleet unit would be diverted for a tow or to transfer enough fuel to get the boat to the nearest base. Running dry is also probably going to happen on the way back from patrol and thus you will be fairly near your homeport and in reasonably safe waters.

There has got to be a way to correctly model this in the game. Just before you run out of fuel, you send a message and a fleet unit is diverted to assist. Once you get back you lose a bunch of your points and maybe even get relieved if you didn't sink any (or enough) ships. Is this doable? Maybe you could call it "Davey's Realistic Running Out of Gas Mod"! :up:

Platapus

04-19-09, 08:09 AM

There has got to be a way to correctly model this in the game. Just before you run out of fuel, you send a message and a fleet unit is diverted to assist. Once you get back you lose a bunch of your points and maybe even get relieved if you didn't sink any (or enough) ships. Is this doable? Maybe you could call it "Davey's Realistic Running Out of Gas Mod"! :up:

I think that would be a very nice and realistic mod for this game. Perhaps you would lose all your renown points if this happens. Good Idea :yeah:

Torplexed

04-19-09, 08:28 AM

Thanks again for the comprehensive response Davey. :salute:
It does seem odd that SH4 doesn't cover for this in some way. The ironic thing is there are numerous historical instances of U-Boats coming close to running dry and having to wait mid-ocean for a tanker or another U-boat to show up so they can re-fuel, and yet SH3 has a return to base free button so you never have to worry about it. The game was eventually modded to include tankers and milchkuhs, but you can still use the 'teleport home' function if you wish.

I guess it's possible that this features spoiled a lot of players who transferred to SH4. Still, assuming you're not too far behind enemy lines it's seems an oiler or tender could be dispatched your way.

@ Platapus...well I'll settle for losing half renown. At least the sub is still intact. :D

Rip

04-19-09, 02:16 PM

To add to this: the Navy created the rating of Soundman in 1942 and was merged with Sonarman in 1943. However, these ratings were almost always found on surface ships and only very rarely on submarines, as the Radioman rating was also used for operating the sonar on submarines (I've found only one submarine that had a Sonarman-rated man on board). Correct me if I'm wrong on this, Dave, but that's my understanding of how it worked.

Much the same way as EW trained personel on modern boats are rated ET and group in with the navigation and radar trained techs. Although we seemed to often qualify radio watchstations as well since we had the same security clearances. Funny to think that at one time operations didn't revolve around the sonar room. :sunny:

LukeFF

04-19-09, 06:50 PM

Go to the following link: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_3-50_mk10-22_pics.htm

Scroll down through the page and you will come across a couple of photos that will show the sights. They are a circular ring with a spider web looking reticle in the center. You will also see a couple of good shots of the telescopic sight being used. Not all of these photos are from submarines. The 3"/50 was a popular anti-aircraft weapon and was used on a variety of platforms.

Thanks!

LukeFF

04-19-09, 07:18 PM

Dave,

I know all boats were different, but, in general, how were the duty assignments handled for the diesel compartments? I have read that there were typically two men on watch in each compartment at a time. Having a look at real fleet sub rosters and taking into account the machinists needed for control room duties, this seems to be right. By my calculations, these were the typical assignments:

Control Room: 1 auxiliaryman and 1 man at the trim manifold per watch
Diesels: 2 men in each compartment per watch, plus one senior (i.e., 1C or CPO) in charge per watch.

Is this how it worked? If so, would the two men in each diesel compartment typically be a junior (e.g., a Fireman or third class machinist) and a senior? (e.g., a 2C or 1C)? What about the control room? What rates were typical there?

Rip

04-19-09, 10:56 PM

I wonder did they have a watchbill back then? I know now that is how watchstations were assigned and you assigned to a specific watch. The COB would right names into the blanks for each required watch and post it. Always a crowd in the crew's mess trying to get a look at it shortly after the maneuvering watch would secure. Some would find they were port/starboard if there was a lack of people qualified for a watchstation and three sections couldn't be supported. You would also find your battle stations and damage control assignements.

Stealhead

04-21-09, 02:51 PM

Seems to me based on several skipper written books that the watch system was diffrent from boat to boat. I think in alot of respects this is hard one to answer as the system used on each sub varied so much there are diffrent answers depending on what sub and who was in command of it how it was done. Though clearly no matter the system used it was what was felt to be most effective by the given commander.

Rip

04-21-09, 08:37 PM

I've never read any that spoke to anything other than the officer rotations and their battle stations roles. I find it hard to believe that enlisted watchstations were different from boat to boat. If so they went from no standards to totally standardized pretty fast. Shoot we had a stack of manuals that dictated watchstations that must be manned as well as EXACTLY what the interaction or orders and responses were for every evolution that watchstander might perform. Not to mention very specific responsibilities readings to take. All the way down to flushing the toilet. Procedure for everything and this is in the mid eighties.

DaveyJ576

04-23-09, 08:06 AM

Luke, Rip, and Stealhead,

I had to do some poking around on the issue of watchstanding organization. In the 1980's we had some pretty strict guidance as to how to set up the watch stations, and this continues to an even greater extent today.

In the 1940's, a Ship's Organization Manual existed (specific for each class or type of ship) that, among other things, outlined the watchstanding requirements for the ship. This was the guideline for the captain, the XO, and the COB when they organized the watches. Prior to the war, this was pretty rigidly enforced and all of the boats should have been organized the same.

Once the war started, because they had more pressing things to worry about, the navy brass kind of let some of the rigid inspections go by the wayside. As long as the captain could demonstrate that he could safely operate his boat, and as long as he could sink ships, he was given a fair degree of latitude to organize the way he wanted to. This would account for the variations that you guys have noticed. I should emphasize that the SOM was a document borne out of experience and in all reality you can't deviate a whole lot from it without becoming inefficient or unsafe.

Without having the manual in front of me, I would say that the typical fleet boat engine room would probably have a 1st Class Motor Machinist Mate in charge in the room, along with two to three assistants, 2nd class and below. This would be duplicated for the other engine room, with one Chief Petty Officer in charge of both rooms. This arrangement would be duplicated again for the other watch sections, which there was usually three.

The control room would typically have a Motor Mac at the air manifold, one at the trim and drain manifold and 1 to 2 Quartermasters at the chart table for navigation (in the Navy a Quartermaster is a navigator, not a supply clerk). Once the boat submerged, the lookouts would come below and man the diving planes (these could be any rate, it didn't matter), and a Chief or officer would become the Diving Officer, supervising the planesmen.

The Chief of the Boat (COB) was the senior Chief Petty Officer on the boat. This position was appointed by the captain and he acted as a liaison between the crew and the officers. Since he was the one who was the most familiar with the capabilities and qualifications of the crew, the COB was the one who maintained the Watch, Quarter, and Station Bill. This was a large organizational chart that divided the crew into watch sections, told them which watch station they were assigned to (for normal steaming, battle stations, maneuvering watch, etc.), which rack they were assigned to, and what their assignment was for Field Day (cleaning up the ship). The WQSB was usually posted in Crew's Mess and the Control Room.

Stealhead

04-23-09, 01:37 PM

I am basing my thoughts on two skipper written and one officer written book; "Silent Running:My years on a WWII submarine", "Thunder Below" by Fluckley(skipper) and "Take Her deep" by Galatin (skipper) and of what they each describe about this subject it is pretty clear that at this time period it was allowed by the higher ups for the skippers to have thier own watch systems and each one was quite diffrent form the next in "Running" which was mainly aborad the Jack the author describes that the XO ran a cycle shift for the lookouts where everyman elisted man in the crew had stood watch for 15 or so minutes and then the next guy came up for 15 and so and so on. While in "Take Her Deep" and "Thunder Below" the lookouts stood much longer watches so that clearly shows that there was much skippers(and his top enlisted) say in how each given sub was going to run its watchlists. based on my 12 years in the US Air Force I know that there are of course a lot regulations out there for every single thing and often for the higher ups there can often be alot of intreptaion as to how to follow them. I can recall sweating bullets once when I was a very young green airman when QA come to inspect the equipment that I had just phase inspected. The QA and my supervisor his supervisor and our E-8 where all standing over the T.O. and workcards for this device trying figure something out. In the end I learned that they had found some steps in the T.O. and workscards that did not really describe correctly how do something even the QA guys where stumped on it. But in the end after about 2 hours of talking and calling who knows over the landline they figured that I had done the procedure "correctly" and then they put in a change into the system. It was simular to the day I got married oddly enough.:hmmm: Another thing you have to recall is in a wartime situation alot of the stricter silly rules that have no real effect in combat get tossed out the window. I bet that the high brass in the Navy was more lax on the submarine force in this respect in such a small vessel you need to have the men working as a team to the max and you get that by letting the skipper,senior officers and senoir enlisted men run things a bit more in their own way. Alot of the rules a regulations are written by some desk jockey that hasent done what he is making regulations about in years. You have to know when not to go by the book.

LukeFF

04-23-09, 07:41 PM

Thanks, Dave. That means, then, that I pretty much got it right WRT RFB's crew setups. I just wanted to comment on one thing you wrote here:

The control room would typically have a Motor Mac at the air manifold, one at the trim and drain manifold and 1 to 2 Quartermasters at the chart table for navigation (in the Navy a Quartermaster is a navigator, not a supply clerk). Once the boat submerged, the lookouts would come below and man the diving planes (these could be any rate, it didn't matter), and a Chief or officer would become the Diving Officer, supervising the planesmen.

In the Fleet Sub Manual, it notes that the Quartermaster of the Watch was stationed on the bridge during surface running and functioned as an all-around lookout, along with his other duties inherent as a QM. Most rosters I have seen typically consist of only 3-4 Quartermasters/Signalmen, so that makes me wonder just how much navigation at the chart table the Quartermaster of the Watch would do while the boat was running on the surface. Of course, the Fleet Sub Manual was based on just one boat, so of course things could have been much different on other boats.

20B5. Quartermaster of the watch. The quartermaster of the watch normally is stationed on the bridge, aft when cruising, and may exchange with the OOD if ordered. He is an additional all-around lookout and does not restrict his search to any one sector unless so ordered by the officer of the deck.

The quartermaster is responsible under the direction of the OOD for the following routine duties:

Break out binoculars, dark glasses, proper flares, and blinker tube prior to surfacing; also issue lens paper to lookouts.

Obtain warmer clothing or rainclothing for lookouts.

Change flares at the proper time.

Check TBT's upon surfacing each night.

Wipe the periscope windows on surfacing and 15 minutes before routine dives.

Operate the periscope, keep the periscope officer informed of depth, and read and record bearings when submerged.

Keep the conning tower clean, and all gear properly stowed when submerged.

Check columns of deck log after being relieved to make sure that the proper entries have been made. Do this in the control room.

Once every hour on surface, check the lookouts' glasses for cleanliness and proper setting.

DaveyJ576

04-24-09, 08:31 AM

In the Fleet Sub Manual, it notes that the Quartermaster of the Watch was stationed on the bridge during surface running and functioned as an all-around lookout, along with his other duties inherent as a QM. Most rosters I have seen typically consist of only 3-4 Quartermasters/Signalmen, so that makes me wonder just how much navigation at the chart table the Quartermaster of the Watch would do while the boat was running on the surface. Of course, the Fleet Sub Manual was based on just one boat, so of course things could have been much different on other boats.

Luke,

Good info. I had not seen that part of the manual. I was basing my presumptions on procedures that we followed in the 80's. I was a qualified QMOW and the only time I went to the bridge while on watch was upon surfacing. I was the first man up the ladder to the bridge and did the initial lookout sweep. As soon as the OOD and the designated lookout arrived I went below and back to my chart table.

As for the WWII procedures on the fleet boats, probably what was going on was that the designated QMOW had an assistant that stayed below and maintained the navigational data on the chart and kept up the deck log. Navigation is a fine art and requires constant attention. Someone has to maintain the chart so I would assume (I sometimes don't like that word! :)) that there was an assistant QM on watch. This assistant could also be a non-rated Seaman or even another rate such as Yeoman that qualified for the watch. As you said, it probably varied a little from boat to boat.

eljeffo41

04-24-09, 04:56 PM

Nisgeis

04-26-09, 01:08 PM

They just removed the windows in the superstructure and left the holes there. There was a porthole in the pressure vessel of the early conning towers and they also were removed as they leaked during depth charge attacks, I can't remember if they tried patching them, but found the patches leaked, or if they went right ahead and replaced the entire end of the conning towers. Not sure about that.

Stealhead

04-26-09, 08:20 PM

I bet they just removed those little windows in the portholes not a vital part of the sub in way.

DaveyJ576

04-27-09, 07:19 PM

During wartime what did they do with the windows in the conning tower?Did they paint over them or weld them shut?They seem like they would cause trouble due to glare or being destroyed by depth charges!I think I read something about it here, I just can't remember what was said.

My family and I were in Boston this past weekend having some fun, so I couldn't reply right away.

Most of the early fleet boats (probably up to the Tambor/Gars and maybe even some of the early Gatos) had two glass eyeports that penetrated the pressure hull of the conning tower, one port side and one starboard, separate from the circular windows in the covered navigation bridge that you see in many of the pre-war photos. The intention was to let a little natural sunlight into the conning tower while the boat was surfaced. Of dubious value even in peacetime, incredibly no one thought about the liability these eyeports represented during a depth charge attack! :o

On her very first war patrol off Japan, USS Plunger (SS-179) was one of the first boats to receive a depth charging. On 04 January 1942 a destroyer dropped a string of charges on her that caused the port side eyeport to begin leaking. They solved the problem by using a hydraulic jack to force a rubber covered metal plate against the eyeport from inside. This stopped the leak, but it dramatically drove home what a dangerous and unnecessary luxury these eyeports were. The CO, Dave White, strongly recommended in his patrol report that the eyeports be permanently blanked off or removed and the subsequent endorsements of the patrol report heartily agreed. This proposal was quickly submitted to the General Board for submarine design and the removal of these ports was officially approved on 17 February 1942.

Torplexed

04-27-09, 07:37 PM

Most of the early fleet boats (probably up to the Tambor/Gar and maybe even some of the early Gatos) had two glass eyeports that penetrated the pressure hull of the conning tower, one port side and one starboard, separate from the circular windows in the covered navigation bridge that you see in many of the pre-war photos. The intention was to let a little natural sunlight into the conning tower while the boat was surfaced. Of dubious value even in peacetime, incredibly no one thought about the liability these eyeports represented during a depth charge attack! :o

Very interesting...I had never heard about this feature before. I guess the only thing more useless than a screen door on a submarine is a skylight. :D

Sensekhmet

04-28-09, 08:13 AM

Fantastic thread.
I just wanted to touch on two issues.
One is the condition of the S-class boats in WW2. One such boat was given to Polish Navy, the ORP Jastrzab (ex-S-25). According to crew accounts I found in J. Pertek's Wielkie dni malej floty (Small Fleet's Grand Days), the sub was heap of junk, with so many malfunctions it was scary. When even the Polish can't fix new leaks and break downs fast enough, you know you've got a problem :03:
Second issue is the story of USS Wahoo penetrating Wewak Harbor. Navigating with a school atlas and hand-drawn charts (for example harbor depth charts were made by crew pretending they were fishing) remined me of ORP Orzel's escape from Tallinn. Charts and navigational equipment were removed from the sub but it not only reached Scotland but also decided to 'hang around' for a bit to look for something to sink.

DaveyJ576

04-28-09, 09:46 AM

One is the condition of the S-class boats in WW2. One such boat was given to Polish Navy, the ORP Jastrzab (ex-S-25). According to crew accounts I found in J. Pertek's Wielkie dni malej floty (Small Fleet's Grand Days), the sub was heap of junk, with so many malfunctions it was scary. When even the Polish can't fix new leaks and break downs fast enough, you know you've got a problem :03:

It is quite true that many of the S-boats were in bad shape when war came. Many of these boats had seen 15-20 years of service by that point and had been run hard by the Navy. Previous posts have pointed out that the S-class also suffered from design flaws and material issues throughout their lives. Some of the S-class boats had already been decommissioned and scrapped by 1941. Others were inspected by the INSURV board and those found acceptable for continued service were overhauled and sent back to the fleet. Some were earmarked for foreign transfer and S-25 was sent to Great Britain and renamed P-551. She was subsequently loaned to Poland and named Jastrzab.

The overhauls the boats received only gave them a temporary reprieve. By 1943 these boats were simply worn out and no amount of overhauls could change that. They were withdrawn from active combat and most were sent to training duty, with a few making the far less stressful Atlantic anti U-Boat patrols.

I would imagine that given the state of affairs at that time, the boats loaned or sold to other countries were probably barely serviceable. The USN was going to retain the boats that were in the best condition for obvious reasons. I don't believe there was a conscious effort to screw over our allies, it simply was a matter of determining priorities. The Royal Navy and Polish Navy officials that accepted these boats were fully aware of their condition and probably took the attitude that a less than optimum boat is better than nothing at all.

Second issue is the story of USS Wahoo penetrating Wewak Harbor. Navigating with a school atlas and hand-drawn charts (for example harbor depth charts were made by crew pretending they were fishing) remined me of ORP Orzel's escape from Tallinn. Charts and navigational equipment were removed from the sub but it not only reached Scotland but also decided to 'hang around' for a bit to look for something to sink.

Wahoo's foray into Wewak Harbor in New Guinea was truly a ballsy gamble. Navigation is a precise art form that demands extreme attention to details, without which your ship will come into trouble damn quick. The fact that Mush Morton, Dick O'Kane, and the crew of the Wahoo were able to pull this off using a hand drawn chart based on dubious data is remarkable to say the least. Then again, I wouldn't have expected anything less from this fine fighting crew. :up:

LukeFF

04-29-09, 02:11 AM

Dave,

What was it that made the Navy decide to create the Motor Machinist's Mate rating in 1942 and ultimately qualify all new submarine diesel mechanics with this new rating? (Background here: at the beginning of the war, all of the diesel mechanics in the submarine force were Machinist Mates, and this would remain so until some time in 1943). In reading the description of the two ratings, they read almost the same:

Machinist's Mate: Operate main and auxiliary engines. Adjust, repair, and overhaul engines. Be familiar with ship's drainage systems, distilling plants, evaporators and pumps.Motor Machinist's Mate: Operate machine tools. Operate and maintain internal combustion engines and engine auxiliaries. Knowledge of pressure and air systems. Be familiar with electrical apparatus.The only thing I can guess is that the Motor Mac rate dealt more with systems that interact with diesels on submarines, but wouldn't the Navy have found that out in all those years prior to the war?

DaveyJ576

04-29-09, 05:53 PM

Luke,

The classification system of Navy enlisted ratings (job descriptions) is a constantly changing work in progress, and has been since they were first instituted in 1885. Some of the biggest changes came during the massive expansion the Navy went through in the WWII years. Ratings were established and disestablished, their descriptions and responsibilities changed, and the abbreviations and symbols were altered to fit.

In general, a Machinist Mate (MM) would have been responsible for the operation and upkeep of auxiliary systems such as hydraulics, air, fresh water, A/C, and refrigeration. Motor Machinist Mates (MoMM) would have been operators and maintainers of diesel engines and their associated fuel oil and lube oil systems. Prior to 1942 relatively few Navy ships were powered by diesels; we had mostly a steam navy and MM's would have covered both auxiliary systems and propulsion (along with Watertenders and Boilermen). The huge expansion of the fleet combined with the maturation of diesel technology resulted in a massive increase in the use of diesels and thus created a need for a specialized diesel operator/mechanic. Motor Macs were split off from MM's in 1942. Submarines, almost being a whole different navy itself, sometimes did things differently.

I perused the sailing lists of two boats (Tang and Barb) and found no mention of MM's being onboard at all during the war. A 3rd boat (Wahoo) listed several, along with MoMM's. Probably what you are seeing here is the earlier boat (Wahoo) still retaining her MM's from the pre-war organization, and the later boats (Tang and Barb) not having any MM's due to the split with MoMM's in '42. It was probably simpler for the smaller crew of a submarine to have only one rate doing both jobs, with MM becoming mostly a surface ship rate. This is not an unusual situation for submarines and this practice continues to this day. In 1948, the name of Motor Machinist Mate was changed to Engineman (EN) and MM's returned to submarines to operate and maintain the auxiliary systems.

When you have some time, surf over to these links:

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq78-4.htm

and

http://www.valoratsea.com/rate.htm

The info on the second link is not complete and has a few minor errors, but is still pretty good. Both sites should go a long way towards explaining the Navy's rather arcane enlisted rating system. I can also highly recommend the book Complete Guide to United States Navy Medals, Badges, and Insignia: World War II to Present by James G. Thompson (ISBN 1-884452-53-1). There is a little bit of missing information, but it is still pretty reliable.

LukeFF

04-30-09, 03:10 AM

Thanks, Dave. I've had both of those sites linked for some time and have found them to be a lot of help in my research. Another good one is this one:

http://naval-reference.net/

(Site seems to be down at the moment)

Anyways, that was my hunch as to why MoMM was created (the rapid expansion of diesel use), and it makes perfect sense. The boats where I see a full complement of MMs are almost all in the first months of the war (such as Shark and S-26). Oddly, the Archerfish lists two MMs (one a CPO, the other a 1C) for her first patrol in December 1943! :o However, that was definitely a rare instance, since all the contemporary rosters at that time show a full list of MoMMs.

Where did you find the crew lists for the Barb?

Also, for the submarine force, in what types of duties were Firemen trained? I.e., was it more MM or MoMM-focused?

DaveyJ576

04-30-09, 07:19 AM

Where did you find the crew lists for the Barb?

Also, for the submarine force, in what types of duties were Firemen trained? I.e., was it more MM or MoMM-focused?

The sailing lists for Barb came from Gene Fluckey's outstanding book Thunder Below. If you haven't read this book yet, do so.

The term Fireman is probably the most misunderstood term in the Navy as it has virtually nothing to do with putting out fires. Firemen are the non-rated assistants to engineering department petty officers. They are the engineering equivalent of Seamen. The term started because they were the sailors that maintained the coal fires under the boilers in the old steam ships. This was the worst duty on the ship and was given to the most junior personnel in the engineering department. As the years passed, the non-rated Firemen could work for any of the engineering divisions including Auxiliaries, Electrical, Main Propulsion, etc. Firemen could chose a specific rate to train in and would be called "Strikers". After a period of time, usually about a year, if they could show proficiency in their chosen rate and could pass a written examination, they could be advanced to 3rd Class Petty officer (i.e. MoMM3c, EM3c, etc.). They would also sometimes be sent to formal Navy training schools prior to advancement.

LukeFF

04-30-09, 04:06 PM

Thanks as always, Dave!

Another one for you: I've read the three oldest ratings still in existence from the original 1797 rating system are Gunner's Mate, Boatswain's Mate, and Quartermaster. Is that true?

DaveyJ576

05-01-09, 09:52 PM

Another one for you: I've read the three oldest ratings still in existence from the original 1797 rating system are Gunner's Mate, Boatswain's Mate, and Quartermaster. Is that true?

Yes, for the most part. There is actually quite a bit of seemingly conflicting info out there on this subject. It is true that these job titles for enlisted sailors existed as early as 1797. However, there was no rank structure to go along with them. The rating system was formalized in 1885 and included these rates along with Carpenter's Mate, Machinist, and Painter (among others). 1885 is considered the start of the system that was in place in WWII and that continues to this day.

Petty Officers have been around since the beginning of the Navy. However, the formal organization of enlisted ranks is generally traced to 1853, when they were established by Navy Regulations. Strangely, an insignia for petty officers existed as early as 1841. The rank/rate insignia as we know it today (eagle, rating badge, and rank chevrons) was first established in 1885 at the same time that the rating system was formalized. The rank of Chief Petty Officer was formally established on April 1st, 1893.

DaveyJ576

05-02-09, 12:21 PM

In the course of these posts, I have thrown out quite a few terms that at times can be confusing. I will try to explain the ones that seem to raise the most questions.

Conning Tower - In the USN fleet boats, the term conning tower officially only describes the horizontal cylinder that sits directly above the control room and contains the TDC, sonar and radar displays, periscopes, and helm. This cylinder is actually a separate pressure hull and is rated to the same depth as the main pressure hull. See the boat on the left in this picture: http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0851602.jpg

Conning Tower Fairwater (or just Fairwater, for short) - A metal framework is erected around the conning tower and is attached to the pressure hull. Metal plating is attached (curiously usually by rivets) to the framework and this plating smoothes the hydrodynamic flow of water around the conning tower, reducing drag. The area inside the plating is free flooding and full of water when the boat is submerged. In the original design, the fairwater was quite massive and provided for the sheltered navigation bridge at the forward top end, the open bridge just aft, and the "bathtub" that surrounded the "cigarette deck" aft of the periscopes. Underneath the cigarette deck the fairwater enclosed the Main Air Induction Valve, a very large, mushroom shaped intake valve that fed air to the main engines. During the war, all of this flat plating became a visual liability and large portions of it were cut away, eliminating the navigation bridge and the bathtub and conveniently forming two gun decks for AA weapons. Late Gato class boats and all of the Balao and Tench class boats were built with a reduced size fairwater from the start. See http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0821514.jpg

http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0822415.jpg

http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0836505.jpg

Periscope shears - The submarine's two periscopes protruded from the top of the conning tower and the structure that supported them is called the shears. Most of the fleet boats through the Gato class had three I-beams running vertically alongside the conning tower, just aft of the bridge. At the level of the bridge, these beams turned 90 degrees inward and met in the center. These beams formed the primary supports for the periscopes and other masts. Attached to the tops of these beams were additional supports for the sheathing tubes that supported the scopes as they were raised or lowered. All of this structure together is called the periscope shears. Once the metal plating was cut down in an effort to reduce the sub's silhouette, the three I-beams that supported the shears were exposed aft of the bridge. These looked like the supports of an old covered wagon and thus came to be called "covered wagon ribs". This area on either side of the shears also made for perfect lookout platforms. The later Balao and Tench class boats had a completely redesigned fairwater and shears structure that was much less massive and eliminated the covered wagon rigs altogether, replacing them with a downward flaired support structure just aft of the bridge. The shears also provided anchoring points for communications antennas and the later radar masts. For examples, see the above photos.

Superstructure - This is the metal frame and plating structure built on top of the rounded pressure hull. It provides a ship-like hull for surface steaming, enclosed all the ballast tank vents and air induction piping, and forms the main deck. External to the pressure hull, the entire superstructure (except for the bow buoyancy tank) is free flooding and is completely full of water when submerged. See http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0823722.jpg

Pvt. Public

05-02-09, 09:39 PM

JREX53

05-02-09, 11:16 PM

how do modern submarines air supply systems work? more specifically the breathing air for the crew. all i really know is that it uses electrolysis on seawater to get the oxygen. but how do they deal with the hydrogen produced? and once it gets used up and is then C02 how do they expel it? all without making bubbles.

Pvt. Public,

On modern submarines they have a piece of equipment called an Oxygen Generator. It used electrolysis but the liquid used was Potassium hydroxide, the hydrogen is pumped overboard via a seawater connection that was used for cooling water. The oxygen is saved in Oxygen Cylinders.

To take care of the CO2, they use a piece of equipment called CO2 Scrubber, it sucks atmospheric air, runs the air through sodium hydroxide which separates the oxygen from the air and the hydrogen is pumped overboard via a seawater connection. The oxygen is then release back into the submarine atmosphere.

Platapus

05-15-09, 05:22 PM

During WWII what was the policy of men smoking?

Was smoking allowed in all compartments?

Was smoking permitted pretty much all time with few exceptions or the other way around?

Aramike

05-16-09, 03:52 AM

This is honestly one of my favorite threads in the Radio Room. Kudos to all who have participated.

Now, my question: has there ever been an instance of a sub diving while the deck hatches were accidently left open? If so, what was the result?

If not, what would likely be the result?

Thanks for the reply!

DaveyJ576

05-18-09, 09:48 AM

Now, my question: has there ever been an instance of a sub diving while the deck hatches were accidently left open? If so, what was the result?

If not, what would likely be the result?

Thanks for the reply!

Aramike,

To my knowledge, this type of event has not happened in the USN. The closest we ever came to it was the incident with the USS Squalus (SS-192). She dove with the Main Air Induction Valve for the diesels partially open, even though it indicated shut. It flooded the aft half of the boat and she sank to the bottom.

All deck hatches are equipped with an electric switch that sends a signal to the indicator board in the control room when the hatch is shut. This gives the personnel in the control room an instant reference as to the watertight status of the boat. A quick glance at the board will tell you the status of the hatches: green light - shut, red light - open. Once the diving alarm is sounded, the operator at the air manifold will check the status of these indicator lights, and then bleed high pressure air into the boat. This is a backup check to the indicator lights. You raise the air pressure in the boat slightly and check to see if the pressure falls. If it does, something is still open and the dive is halted. If everything is okay, the operator will report to the diving officer, "Green board, pressure in the boat" and the dive continues.

Shutting all the deck hatches and dogging them down prior to diving is probably the most basic of operations performed on a submarine and thus is foremost on the mind of the crew. Because of this, it rarely happens. However, if it did there can only be one result: Disaster.

DaveyJ576

05-18-09, 05:15 PM

During WWII what was the policy of men smoking?

Was smoking allowed in all compartments?

Was smoking permitted pretty much all time with few exceptions or the other way around?

I can't specifically state what the Navy's policy was during WWII, but I can comment on the state of tobacco useage in the 1980's.

The policy was quite liberal and was long as you didn't leave a mess, few people cared. I remember standing many watches in the control room with a good friend of mine who was a chain smoker. He would light one smoke at the beginning of the 6 hour watch and smoke continuously from then on, but never pull out his lighter again. He would light the next cig off the butt of the last before it went out.

The only compartments where smoking was not allowed were berthing compartments. There also were certain evolutions where the "smoking lamp" (permission to smoke) was out. These included Battle Stations, loading or transfer of fuel, lube, or hydraulic oil, weapons handling, and any other situation were the captain would not permit it. On our boat, the topside watch was not allowed to smoke on watch while in port.

Again, I can not comment specifically on the WWII policy, but I would imagine that in the 1940's when smoking was hugely popular and completely socially acceptable the policy could not have been more restrictive than what it was in the 80's. The aft gun deck on the conning tower fairwater was commonly known as the Cigarette Deck and was a popular spot to come topside to smoke.

Today's USN is rapidly moving towards a smoke free environment. There is absolutely no smoking internal to the ship, and is permissible in one area only (usually the fantail). I had one CO who hated smoking and threatened numerous times to ban smoking on the ship completely if the smokers didn't keep the fantail squared away. As for submarines, they will usually have one small compartment designated for smoking and it will be permissible only during certain times.

Stealhead

05-22-09, 11:49 AM

I bet it was pretty lax in old days where they smoked I would assume that they did not smoke around things that could be set off by open flame. I know a pretty good story on the dangers of smoking on a B-17 laden flight line from my buddies grad pa. He was a navagiator on 17's and told us one that the enitre squadron was just sitting and waitng around their 17's for the order to get in and take off so all the men where just sitting relaxing as best they could pre-mission when some guy (I am sure there where others smoking as at least 60% of GIs smoked in those days) proceded to light his smoke though he was outside the then 100ft no smoking zone (oddly this only applied to the outside of an aircraft smoking in flight when the oxygen was not is use was fine then) but there was a cloud of vapor where he was standing which was in a large open area that split the two groups of parked planes. The spark of flame from the poor saps lighter set the gas vapor up luckly all the guys saw it and many guys beside the nearst B-17 took of thier jakects to attempt to wave them in the air in the hopes that that would move the gas vapors away from the planes to keep them all from being blown to kingdom come.Anyway according to gramps it worked or he said maybe all the vapor was just beside the unlucky smoker not like you are going just assume such when you sitting around several tons of explosives(the smoker did not get burned by the way not by fire anyway) but man they where lucky that it did not set of the fuel and bombs in just 1 B-17 theyd have done the Luftwaffe a favor.

Platapus

05-23-09, 10:31 AM

In the Navy, as everyone knows, Captain is both a position and a rank.

The MFWIC of the boat is called Captain regardless of his actual rank.

Let's take Lt Cmdr Smith. Lt Cmdr Smith, being assigned as the Honcho of the boat is addressed as Captian.

My question is when is Lt Cmdr Smith addressed as Captain and when is Lt Cmdr Smith addressed as Lt Cmdr Smith?

Is it only on the boat? Is he ever called Captain Smith on shore?

If so, how does the Navy disambiguate between Lt Cmdr Smith (O-4) and Captain Smith (O-6).

This question came to me while watching a movie.

I was watching Operation Pacific for the millionth time. There is a scene where Lt Cmdr Gifford (John Wayne) is talking to the Admiral. At the time, Lt Cmdr Gifford was the Captain of the USS Thunderfish. At one point the Admiral picks up the phone and contacts some logistic weenie.

The Admiral says, "Please arrange passage for Captain Gifford....."

Is this correct? Or should the Admiral refer to Gifford as Lt Cmdr Gifford?

How would the logistic weenie know that he was supposed to book travel for an O-4 and not an O-6 (I am assuming that the Navy is like the Air Force in that there is a "difference" between an O-4 and O-6 for such things)?

Bonus question: Are Admirals ever Captains? If so, are they also addressed as Captain or are they addressed as Admiral?

Why the hell couldn't the Navy pick some other title for the MFWIC?

DaveyJ576

05-24-09, 08:57 AM

In the Navy, as everyone knows, Captain is both a position and a rank.

The term "captain" can be applied to an officer of a lesser rank as an honorary title when that officer is the designated Commanding Officer (an official title) of a U.S. Navy vessel. The term is informal in nature and is generally used only aboard ship and in informal situations ashore. Even an officer of higher rank (like an admiral) will refer to the ship's CO as "Captain" when aboard the ship.

In all other situations, afloat or ahore, especially in any official correspondence, he would be refered to as "Lt. Cmdr Dudley W. Morton, USN, Commanding Officer, USS Wahoo (SS-238)".

An officer of the rank of Captain (O-6) is always refered to as Captain at all times, regardless of his status as Commanding Officer.

The passage by the Admiral in the movie would have been incorrect. In that particular circumstance Wayne's character should have been refered to as Lieutenent Commander.

It would be exceedingly rare for an Admiral to be a Commanding Officer of a single vessel. However, if he was his official title would be Commanding Officer, but he would always be refered to as Admiral, never "Captain".

BTW, the term "skipper" is very, very informal in nature and would NEVER be used in any situation that required any sort of formality. The only place you might hear it off the boat would be at a backyard BBQ or a bar. I had one CO that hated the term and absolutely did not want to hear it. My present CO is actually an O-6 Captain and doesn't mind the term at all. Whether or not the crew uses the term is totally up to the man in charge.

Platapus

05-24-09, 11:41 AM

Much thanks for the clear answers. :salute:

DaveyJ576

05-24-09, 03:51 PM

Here is an interesting sidebar to Platapus's post about the title and rank of Captain.

An ensign is the lowest officer rank, and is the first rank an officer achieves after graduating from the Naval Academy position of Midshipman. Ensigns are usually in a bad spot. They are so junior and inexperienced that the enlisted men will barely give them the time of day. The other officers naturally look down at them and are sometimes treated only marginally better than the chairs they sit on. They have to fight for every ounce of respect they get. However, they are still commissioned officers and are expected by the Commanding Officer to take charge and lead men.

In the early days of the New Steel Navy of the 1900's, there were occasions in which an ensign was placed in command of a ship. One such occasion occurred in 1908 when an ensign took command of the USS Decatur (DD-5), a destroyer based at Cavite in the Philippines. In accordance with naval tradition, even this most junior of all officers would have been granted the honorary title of Captain while aboard his ship.

Even though this ensign was considered highly competent, he still managed to run the Decatur aground. He was subsequently tried by court-martial and received a letter of reprimand.

Bouncing back from this incident, this determined officer transferred to submarine duty and eventually moved on to command the submarines C-5, D-1, and E-1 in addition to several submarine flotillas and squadrons. In 1912 he received the Lifesaving Medal for saving an enlisted crewman from drowning.

Devoted to the Navy, this officer went on to have a brilliant career. He served as an admiral's aide, and was the Executive Officer of the battleship South Carolina. He went on to command the heavy cruisers Chicago and Augusta, commanded Battleship Division One, and eventually was appointed the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

What eventually became of this lowly ensign, who as Captain managed to run his destroyer aground? On December 17th, 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and advanced him to the rank of full Admiral. He brilliantly led our Navy to victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII.

His name? Chester William Nimitz. Tomorrow, as you celebrate Memorial Day, remember this man. Celebrate his life and accomplishments, along with all of the other men and women who have fought to keep us free. :salute:

Platapus

05-24-09, 04:52 PM

Way cool history.

Does the title of Captain, apply to the commanding officer of any ship? How about the itty bitty ones?

DaveyJ576

05-24-09, 05:07 PM

Does the title of Captain, apply to the commanding officer of any ship? How about the itty bitty ones?

I guess that depends on your definition of "itty bitty". My 224 foot plywood minesweeper was commanded by a Lt. Cmdr and he bore the title of Captain. In general, any vessel considered a "ship" will have a Commanding Officer appointed. A Commanding Officer may bear the title of Captain. Any vessel designated a "craft" (i.e. tugboats, midshipman training boats, landing craft, LCAC, PBR, etc.) will have an "Officer in Charge". An OIC is usually not refered to as Captain and will just use his/her rank.

BTW, an OIC can also be an enlisted man. It was not uncommon during the Cold War for a Chief Boatswains Mate or Chief Quartermaster to be the OIC of a tugboat or PBR.

Platapus

05-24-09, 07:03 PM

Ok this is getting real interesting.

What is the difference between a Ship and a Craft.

And am I correct that only subs are refereed to as "Boats"?

and why are subs boats?

Aramike

05-24-09, 07:19 PM

Ok this is getting real interesting.

What is the difference between a Ship and a Craft.

And am I correct that only subs are refereed to as "Boats"?

and why are subs boats?I think I know this one. "Boats" were originally a term used for craft launched off of ships. The earliest submarines were this type of vessel. In the end, the name stuck.

At least that's something I heard somewhere...

I do know that I have heard quite a few submariners refer to their vessel as a ship. I suspect the "tradition" of calling a sub a boat is far more ingrained in fictional media than it is in real life.

As far as only subs being referred to as boats, I can't say for sure now, but I do know that in previous eras there were other kinds of boats in the USN.

Kapitan Soniboy

05-26-09, 03:12 AM

Did any submarine during WWII have the same commanding officer through the entire war?

Platapus

05-26-09, 08:20 AM

... Even though this ensign was considered highly competent, he still managed to run the Decatur aground. He was subsequently tried by court-martial and received a letter of reprimand.

Bouncing back from this incident, this determined officer transferred to submarine duty and eventually moved on to command the submarines C-5, D-1, and E-1 in addition to several submarine flotillas and squadrons. In 1912 he received the Lifesaving Medal for saving an enlisted crewman from drowning......

As a landlubber, it is my understanding that grounding a ship is what the Navy refers to as a "bad thing". It tends to limit the commanding officer's upward career mobility. :nope:

Do you think that Nimitz was ordered to the Submarines because it would have been his best change to get a command again? From my readings I understand that in the early parts of the 20th century, submarines and submarine duty was not looked at favorably career wise.

If Nimitz had not transfered to Submarines, would he have been given a "second change" with commanding a surface ship?

Platapus

05-26-09, 08:42 AM

Did any submarine during WWII have the same commanding officer through the entire war?

An interesting question. I need to dust off my Clay as I think he has a list. By initial thoughts would be no. With the need to rotate and promote officers, I don't think the Navy would put one man in command of a submarine from 1939-1945. Even if we limit it to only the years of US involvement in WWII we still have 1941-1945 -- 3 years, 8.5 months roughly.

That is a long time for a commanding officer to have one position. Besides there are PCOs and Executives Officers waiting in line for their command.

DaveyJ576

05-26-09, 12:28 PM

A ship is generally defined as any vessel that is capable of open ocean, long term, independent steaming without the support of a mothership. Examples: Battleship, Cruiser, Aircraft Carrier, Destroyer, Oiler, Ammo Ship, and yes Submarines.

A craft is generally the exact opposite, i.e. it will operate in the "brown water" regions in harbors, rivers, or close to shore. It will have an endurance usually measured in hours, maybe a day or two at the most, and it will require the direct support of a shore base or mothership to complete its mission.

A boat is any ship or craft that operates in fresh water, or one that is normally carried onboard another ship. It will usually meet the definition of a craft.

A submarine is officially considered by the USN to be a ship. In official documents and correspondence it is refered to as such. However, on a person to person basis, the term "ship" is rarely used to describe a submarine. How did subs come to be called boats?

Our earliest submarines were quite small and were designed for harbor defense only. They perfectly met the definition of "craft" that I outlined above. For long transfers from port to port, they were either towed or hauled out of the water and placed on the deck of a ship. Thus the term boat. By 1918, the technology had rapidly improved and the USN had submarines capable of blue water operations and they should have been rightly called ships. However, the term boat had become so ingrained into Navy lexicon that it stuck around, although in a somewhat un-official capacity. Even today, our massive Ohio class SSBN's armed with 24 Trident ballistic missiles are still called boats. It is exceedingly rare for you to hear our submariners to refer to their boats by any other term.

Platapus

05-26-09, 12:35 PM

Davy, we can always count on you to deliver the collimated feces.
:salute:

Platapus

05-27-09, 04:43 PM

DaveyJ576

05-27-09, 05:24 PM

Yet another of my dumb questions...

With the sinking of the USNS General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (T-AGM-10), the following question came up:

What is the difference between a United States Ship (USS) and a United States Navy Ship (USNS).

I thought all big floaty things belonged to the Navy? :88)

A vessel designated with the prefix USS (United States Ship) is owned and operated by the United States Navy and manned with USN sailors. A vessel that carries the tag USNS (United States Naval Ship) is owned by the Department of the Navy, but is operated by the Military Sealift Command and is manned by civilian mariners. Currently, the MSC operates all naval auxiliary vessels such as salvage ships, ammunition ships, combat stores ships, hospital ships, fleet oilers, and fleet ocean tugs, among others. This leaves the USN to operate only combatant ships.

Platapus

05-27-09, 05:34 PM

Much thanks

DaveyJ576

05-27-09, 05:36 PM

As a landlubber, it is my understanding that grounding a ship is what the Navy refers to as a "bad thing". It tends to limit the commanding officer's upward career mobility. :nope:

Do you think that Nimitz was ordered to the Submarines because it would have been his best change to get a command again? From my readings I understand that in the early parts of the 20th century, submarines and submarine duty was not looked at favorably career wise.

If Nimitz had not transfered to Submarines, would he have been given a "second change" with commanding a surface ship?

You are absolutely correct. In the early days, the officers that made up the Gun Club looked down their blue blood noses at the "pigboats". They considered them nothing but a toy and the sailors that manned them to be rude, crude, and socially unacceptable. While I can't say for sure, I believe Nimitz's transfer to submarine duty probably saved his career. It gave him a chance to redeem himself by demonstrating his ability to effectively command. It took a while, but submarines eventually gained respect and duty in them took on an air of respectability. Fortunately for Nimitz, and indeed the entire United States Navy, this neatly dovetailed with his career and an outstanding officer was able to pull his reputation from the dustbin of history.

Kapitan Soniboy

05-28-09, 05:41 AM

I have heard of a German submarine which was sunk by an American submarine. They were the only germans who put their feet on American soil during the war (if not the only axis troops), I think:hmmm:. They mounted an automatic weather station there. Maybe it was in Canada... Have you heard of it? Do you know why they did it? The U-boat was later sunk by a Gato.

The weather station was not discovered until the 1970 - 80's and is now on a museum.

Soni :rock:

Edit:
I guess this is not relevant AT ALL but you guys seem to know quite a bit of everything

Stealhead

05-28-09, 02:49 PM

Sledgehammer427

05-28-09, 02:55 PM

yeah, I ahve a painting somewhere of those guards pushing a mine cable away from the screws, so yeah.

also, i'm sure they are there so people dont get...fouled up.

thats what I know anywho

DaveyJ576

05-28-09, 04:17 PM

Ok I have a question about a structure seen on some older submarines. Those "cage" things on the sterns of some what are those? I notice that some warships also have them. Are they sort of like a bumper to protect the screws?

You are exactly correct. They are propeller guards. They are mostly in place to prevent a tugboat from hitting the screws while maneuvering in harbor, or to keep the screws from hitting the pier pilings. Many subs had them temporarily removed during the war, the reasoning not being entirely clear.

Platapus

05-28-09, 06:51 PM

In the early days, the officers that made up the Gun Club looked down their blue blood noses at the "pigboats". They considered them nothing but a toy and the sailors that manned them to be rude, crude, and socially unacceptable. ]

You mean they aint?

:D

Platapus

05-28-09, 06:54 PM

II think:hmmm:. They mounted an automatic weather station there. Maybe it was in Canada...

If this type of thing interests you, you might be interested in reading about the Battle of Greenland which was a land battle between Danish and German weathermen.

A piece of WWII history few know. :know:

Stealhead

05-29-09, 11:02 PM

I was going to say it seems that not all subs had them. Might just have been something they did not do at the yards to save time.Must have been some reason for them being removed.

Platapus

05-30-09, 02:11 PM

Another nit-picky question

A vessel designated with the prefix USS (United States Ship) is owned and operated by the United States Navy and manned with USN sailors. A vessel that carries the tag USNS (United States Naval Ship) is owned by the Department of the Navy, but is operated by the Military Sealift Command and is manned by civilian mariners.

I fully understand your explanation about the crews. Thank you. My nit-picky question is about the "different" navies in your answer.

Is there some legal distinction between United States Navy and Department of the Navy?

Are there some parts of one that aint in the other?

DaveyJ576

05-31-09, 07:57 AM

I should have written Department of Defense instead of Navy. The MSC is a joint command of the DOD. They support operations of all the services to a point, although their primary focus is the Navy. The ships do not carry an official commission as vessels of the USN but are government owned and operated in support of DOD operations, thus the United States Naval Ship title, used to differentiate it from a regular Navy vessel.

Most MSC ships that are assigned to a task force or group (oilers and stores ships) will carry a detachment of Navy sailors to augment the civilian crew. They will primarily assist in communications.

I never really thought of it that way due to the significant differences in shipboard organization, but I guess you could consider it a second Navy.

The Department of the Navy consists of two major components: the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps. Yes, to their everlasting chagrin, the mighty Marines are actually a part of the DON.

The United States Coast Guard is a separate uniformed service that operates under the control of the Department of Homeland Security. Wikipedia actually has a pretty good entry on the USCG and it describes the legal distinction of this service.

Platapus

05-31-09, 08:25 AM

Thanks, as always, for the clear explanation.

This learnin stuff is good! :88)

Stormende

06-05-09, 02:55 PM

Great thread!

Back to Silent Hunter, the first game had a feature that was not implemented in the sequel. It was the chlorine factor, we must surface. How often the batteries broke to the point that chlorine was present inside the sub and was not the anti gas masks enough to deal with it until the time to surface was better with no destroyers around?

Also I read somewhere that an electric sub is harder to detect by passive sonar than a nuclear, is it due to the reactor makes more noise or what?

Thankx in advance for this great thread and the replies and questions my fellow skippers have made. I gave you another star even if it already is 5 stars thread.

:up:

Sensekhmet

06-05-09, 05:22 PM

It seems modern diesel subs really are quiet. For example, since we joined the NATO, it seems every western nation wants our Kilo class sub (ORP Orzel) to take part in their sea excercises! And it's not even the newer Kilo generation. Oh, but don't believe mr. Clancy's 'black sea hole' Kilo theory, the man's delusional.
As for the Kilo class itself it seems it was specifically designed to detect and stalk/hunt big nuclear subs.

Stealhead

06-05-09, 07:28 PM

The Kilo is nothing compared to the current German and Swedish made subs ever heard of AIPS?But the bad guys will have Kilos so it is a good idea to train aginst them. The newer SSKs with AIPS that many western navies are using and also the russians are selling are perfect in what they call Green Water or platorial(i know that is misspelled) waters are very quiet nuclear powed ships are perfect in the deep ocean where there is a lot of water to hide in but not so great aside form the Sea Wolf and Virginia class in green waters.It is really a change in how most navies choose to fight. You can have a very small cheap navy be pretty nasty by simply playing an area denial war in shallow water where an AIPS SSK can hide very well that makes a big ship like a CV think twice about going into those waters.I belive the Kilo was an imporvement on the Tango class and they where they where perfect to control places like the Black Sea or the Med. in a "hot" Cold War era the Kilo is the son of the Tango which is the son of the Whiskey class all SSKs.What the US Navy must and is doing is adapt to this new very serious threat the new SSK.

DaveyJ576

06-06-09, 04:26 PM

How often the batteries broke to the point that chlorine was present inside the sub and was not the anti gas masks enough to deal with it until the time to surface was better with no destroyers around?

Chlorine gas is generated when sea water mixes with the acid inside the batteries. It is extremely deadly and only a very small amount can kill you. I do not have any data as to how often this occurred in the USN fleet boats, but theoretically it can happen anytime sea water gets into the battery well. I do know, however, that it was not a common occurrence.

The individual jars that contained the battery cells in the USN fleet boats consisted of an outer layer of hard rubber, then an impermeable membrane of soft rubber roughly the thickness of a toy balloon, then another layer of hard rubber. This was a very rugged construction that could flex with shock and not break. The membrane contained the acid and prevented leakage that could mix with sea water to create chlorine. This design was a tremendous improvement over the standard hard steel jar and was a key factor in the high survivability rate of the USN boats.

Also I read somewhere that an electric sub is harder to detect by passive sonar than a nuclear, is it due to the reactor makes more noise or what?

You are correct.

The prime source of radiated noise on a submarine is the propulsion plant. What drives a diesel-electric boat when it is submerged? Electric motors that are coupled to the propeller shafts. These motors are powered by storage batteries. Electric motors are virtually silent in operation, thus very little if any noise is radiated into the water.

What many people don't realize is that nuclear powered submarines are actually propelled by steam. The only thing the reactor does is provide an anaerobic (i.e. no air needed) heat source to superheat water in the primary loop. The primary loop provides heat to boil water in the secondary loop, generating steam. This steam then spins a turbine. This high speed turbine is connected to a set of reduction gears that in turn spin the propeller shaft. The water in both loops has to be moved through the system using pumps. So, in a nuclear plant you have three sources of noise: the pumps, the turbine, and the reduction gears. If not designed right this makes a heck of a lot of noise. The first American and Soviet nuke boats sounded like a freight trains barreling through the water. Eventually the twin practices of sound isolation mounting of machinery and extremely tight production standards largely mitigated this problem, but even today a well designed and tightly run diesel-electric boat can be just as quiet, and in some cases quieter, than a nuke boat when running on the battery. Of course, when running on the diesels it gets very noisy and this is its primary weakness.

Keep in mind that my description of a submarine nuclear plant is a very simplified one, but essentially accurate. There are several different designs out there. One eliminates the circulation pumps and moves the water around the loops using the natural heat convection of the water. Another substitutes the reduction gears for an electric generator which in turn supplies power to a motor on the shaft.

The USN has gotten so good at noise reduction that our modern boats are actually substantially quieter than the ambient noise in the surrounding ocean. That gives the word "silent" a whole new meaning! :)

Stormende

06-06-09, 10:47 PM

You are indeed a truly well of knowledge, thank you for the answers now I leave with a lil more knowledge.

Your thread is awesome.

:up:

LukeFF

06-09-09, 02:32 PM

Dave,

The WWII patrol reports mention the use of what is called a "bubble sextant" for navigation. Many commanders also mention how it was sometimes difficult to use this device. How did this new type of sextant differ from the "old" style sextant, and what made it so more difficult to use?

Platapus

06-10-09, 04:02 PM

Ok, now I am going to ask the stupidest submarine question. :88)

Good thing I am a landlubber so I can have some excuse.

Given all the technology we have these days, why are not modern submarines constructed without sails?

Everything could be in a very streamlined "whale" shape. Now that Periscopes do not need a direct optical path as they are more sensors than a periscope, why is there still a need for a sail on a submarine?

What is the use of the sail on a modern nuclear submarine that spends 99% of its time underwater tryin to be sneaky?

DaveyJ576

06-10-09, 04:06 PM

The WWII patrol reports mention the use of what is called a "bubble sextant" for navigation. Many commanders also mention how it was sometimes difficult to use this device. How did this new type of sextant differ from the "old" style sextant, and what made it so more difficult to use?

When using a standard sextant, the angle to a celestial object is determined by sighting it, then bringing the reflected image of the object down to horizon level by moving the index arm along the semi-circular arc scale at the bottom of the sextant. Obviously, in order to do this, you have to be able to see the horizon. See the following link:

http://www.tpub.com/content/administration/14220/css/14220_230.htm

If for some reason you are unable to see the horizon, you would need to find a substitute. In a bubble sextant, the visual horizon is replaced by a regular alcohol bubble level. The reflected image of the celestial object would be brought down to the artificial horizon created by the bubble and the angle read off of the arc scale as normal. See this link:

http://www.users.bigpond.com/bgrobler/sextant/sextant.html

Not being able to see the horizon was usually a problem for aviators flying at night. A shipboard navigator usually takes his sights at morning twilight, when it is still dark enough to see the stars, but when it is light enough to drown out the minor stars, making the major navigational stars easier to distinguish and the horizon visible. Aviators flying night missions may not always have this luxury of choosing the time of their sightings. At night and at altitude it would be very difficult, if not virtually impossible to see the horizon.

I have never used a bubble sextant and therefore can not directly comment on its ease of use. However, it is probably quite difficult to keep the bubble level enough to take an accurate sight on the pitching and rolling bridge of a fleet boat. Why didn't they just use a normal sextant? Well, it would give them the advantage of getting a fix at any time during the night, not just at morning twilight. The more fixes you get, the better your navigational situation will be.

Platapus

06-10-09, 04:32 PM

How long would it take for an average navigator to take the sightings he or she needs using a sextant?

DaveyJ576

06-10-09, 04:47 PM

Given all the technology we have these days, why are not modern submarines constructed without sails?

This is not a dumb question at all. In fact, several leading naval architects have asked the same question. They really wanted to eliminate the sail as it is a major source of hydrodynamic drag.

The main purpose of the sail was to provide a streamlined housing for the masts. These masts have to be a certain length in order to be able to penetrate the surface while at the same time keeping the boat at a deep enough depth to maintain control. This made for a fairly long mast. In order to house the mast completely when retracted, the hull of the boat would have had to be huge in cross section. This is impractical so the compromise is the sail.

The other important feature of the sail is the bridge. A partially sheltered, raised bridge is vital to safe navigation once the boat is on the surface entering or leaving port. It has to be some distance above the hull in order for the OOD and lookouts to be able to see anything.

On two separate occasions in the 1950's and 1960's the proposal to eliminate the sail was seriously put forth. However, each time the designers ran afoul of the problems that I described above. They tried one more time in 1968 during the CONFORM project, which was the first attempt at designing a follow on to the Permit and Sturgeon class SSN's. A scale model of the proposed design was built that had no sail at all. The masts and periscopes folded flush with the hull, similar to the way the snorkel mast folded on the late war German U-boats. The CONFORM design even featured a small folding bridge structure. This project would have produced a radically new and different submarine if it had been built. However, Admiral Rickover was adamantly opposed to these radical changes and championed the more "conservative" SSN-688 design. Rickover's forceful protestations eventually won out. CONFORM died and his design eventually became the Los Angeles class.

Realistically, we are only just now coming into a technology level that will permit the removal of the sail structure. CONFORM would have stretched the state of the art to its limits, and ultimately may not have been practical. Our newest submarines of the Virginia (SSN-774) class have non penetrating masts (i.e. they don't retract into or penetrate the pressure hull). This would allow a serious reduction in sail size. See this link for an artists impression of a proposed sail design for later Virginia class boats:

http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/0877413.jpg

DaveyJ576

06-10-09, 05:07 PM

How long would it take for an average navigator to take the sightings he or she needs using a sextant?

The actual taking of the sights doesn't take long at all, maybe 3-5 minutes depending on conditions. It is the prep and post sighting work that eats all your time. From start of work to plotting the posit on the chart, probably an hour for the average navigator, a little less for a really good one.

Platapus

06-10-09, 05:53 PM

As always, thanks for the clear answers. :salute:

DaveyJ576

06-13-09, 07:42 PM

There is currently a debate going on in the Submarine Trivia thread concerning the reliability of author Norman Friedman's book U.S. Submarines Through 1945: An Illustratred Design History. This book, while I consider it to be a authoritative reference work, has to be read and absorbed with a certain degree of caution. I can not emphasize this enough: this is not a book for a novice, or even average, reader. He wrote it for an experienced reader with a naval history or engineering background.

Mr. Friedman's writing style is not the best in the world. It is very academic in nature, with a choppy and broken paragraph structure. He will frequently drop interesting morsels like "The Electric Boat S-boats had to be rebuilt", then utterly fail to explain or expand on that statement. He also frequently refers to an extensive notes section, often leaving very important and illuminating information to a section in the back of the book, forcing the reader to constantly flip from the page you are reading to the notes section. This serves to break up your line of thought and makes his material hard to understand, and very easy to take out of context. I have also occasionally found some minor typos. Whoever his editor was did a poor job of keeping him on task and writing a well formulated and readable book.

I have a feeling that when he took on this project he didn't realize what a massive and detail loaded work it would become. A well intentioned attempt to cram as much detail as he could into the book backfired and the result was a sometimes confusing mass of data.

That is not to say that he is unreliable. Rarely have I found an out-and-out error in his works and in general he gets it right. He primarily works from original sources, i.e. Department of the Navy planning and construction documents, construction plans, materiel vendor documents, etc. Therefore, I consider him to be an authoritative and reliable author. But this also puts him at the mercy of the very material he uses. Planning documents will sometimes contradict the construction orders. Construction orders and plans are sometimes changed on the fly as needed to get the job done. These changes were sometimes not properly documented and this leads to contradictions from one document to the other. As the years have passed, some of the original documents have been lost and some destroyed, leaving gaps in the knowledge base and this leads to further confusion and contradictions.

My background has given me the experience necessary to "read between the lines" so to speak and interpret what Mr. Friedman writes. Even still, I have to read his works very carefully in order to understand what he intended.

For the average or novice reader, Mr. Friedman's book should only be used as a backup resource. The book that I can highly recommend is John D. Alden's The Fleet Submarine in the U.S. Navy. In this book, Mr. Alden hit solid gold. He has a well formulated and very readable writing style. It flows well and he makes this sometimes arcane subject easy to understand. I have never caught Mr. Alden in a mistake and his material has always checked out as accurate against other sources. I have refered to my copy of this book (which I have had for about 27 years) so many times it has become a little dog eared and worn. I consider it a true treasure and it is my prime source of info on the fleet boats. Unfortunately, I believe that this book is out of print so it may be a little difficult to find.

Lt.Fillipidis

06-21-09, 07:50 PM

DaveyJ576
I have a question here that has to do with the hull toughness on a VII or IX.
Ill just repost the question i posted on the SH3 forum.

A week ago i've got my hands on "The Curious Case of Benjamin Button" film.
At some point of this ridiculously long film, a tug boat rams a german u-boat which looked like an IX to me. The tug boat collides with the boat and pierces the bow armor, causes the torpedoes to explode and the uboat sinks.
As far as im concerned, the mere tug boat is too light and its bow not pointy enough to do such damage but i would like a second opinion on that...

Thanks! :D

Sailor Steve

06-22-09, 12:33 PM

Mr. Friedman's writing style is not the best in the world. It is very academic in nature, with a choppy and broken paragraph structure.
:haha::yeah:

I was reading his book on the history of U.S. destroyers, and was pleasantly surprised to find out that naval history came to him as a sideline. His original professionwas teaching physics at the Naval War College. That explained a lot to me I didn't understand about his writing.

Of course even he didn't give me the one piece of information I was looking for, which was the hull plate thickness of the 1890s torpedo boat destroyers.:wah:

DaveyJ576

06-23-09, 08:46 PM

A week ago i've got my hands on "The Curious Case of Benjamin Button" film.
At some point of this ridiculously long film, a tug boat rams a german u-boat which looked like an IX to me. The tug boat collides with the boat and pierces the bow armor, causes the torpedoes to explode and the uboat sinks.
As far as im concerned, the mere tug boat is too light and its bow not pointy enough to do such damage but i would like a second opinion on that...

It has taken me a while to respond because the Navy and my family have kept me busy!

I am not an expert on the German boats, so someone correct me if I am wrong here.

I believe the Type VII and Type IX boats were of single hull construction. That means that most, if not all, of the ballast tanks were internal to the pressure hull. The Type IX probably had external fuel tanks, called saddle tanks, on the outside of the hull, but all the ballast tanks were internal. Why is that important to this issue? Well, on a single hull submarine, the pressure hull is always directly exposed to the sea, unprotected by external ballast tanks, all along the length of the hull. This makes the pressure hull somewhat more vulnerable to damage, especially from ramming. The USN fleet boats were of a partial double hull construction, having ballast and fuel tanks wrapped around the pressure hull, protecting it to a degree. The pressure hull is only exposed at the extreme ends, at the foreward and after torpedo rooms.

On a single hull boat, any blow to the outside of the boat will be directly on the pressure hull. If it is breached in any way, you will get massed quantities of water in the "People Tank" and that will make for a very bad day.

Now, as to whether or not a small or medium size tug boat could breach the pressure hull of a submarine by ramming, that is very hard to say. There are a lot of variables involved. My gut feeling would be probably not. I think it would have a tendency to ride up and over the hull, causing damage to the superstructure and the topside equipment, but not to the pressure hull. This is all conjecture, though. If it was my submarine, I would avoid getting rammed by anything larger than a canoe at all costs.

You would have to have a very unusual set of circumstances occur to have the torpedoes explode from ramming. It is just not likely to happen. Torpedo explosive like Torpex is quite stable by nature. It has to be in order for the torpedoes to stand up to depth charging. Only a very hot fire or an explosion from another source would set off the warheads accidentally. If you get rammed you get a hole in the hull, water rushes in, your boat sinks, and you die. The torpedoes, though, should be safe!